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Abstract 
 
Population growth has already ended in a number of countries around the world. 
Significant demographic trends are transforming the global population, with 
record low fertility across the globe, increasing longevity and increasingly mobile 
populations. Depopulation is multifaceted and has major flow on effects for the 
allocation of resources, the provision of services and the viability of communities 
isolated from the economic powerhouses.  
This thesis studied the drivers of depopulation, the policy responses to 
population decline and the spectrum of interventions available to address 
population decline from a number of OECD countries. It also looked at whether 
population decline could be slowed or reversed through studying the 
demographic and distance challenges of peripheral towns in the Waikato Region 
in New Zealand.  
There is a strong relationship between depth and length of depopulation and the 
response to depopulation.  Responses to population decline vary from country to 
country based on historical, cultural, political, institutional arrangements, issues 
to be addressed and resource availability.  
The literature proposes that there are only three possible policy responses to 
population decline, non-intervention, countering and accepting.  It was found 
that successful ‘countering’ strategies were dependent on the location, 
economic and demographic context of each community and primarily slowed 
decline rather than reversing it.  None of the ‘accepting’ strategies that were 
identified were able to stop population decline.  It is easier to achieve improved 
quality of life than to slow population decline.  The research showed that in the 
context of zero or low national population growth peripheral towns are unlikely 
to gain population. Outmigration is even more significant in peripheral 
communities in nationally declining countries. 
XII 
 
 
What became apparent through this research was that towns are like businesses 
– they need to keep reinventing themselves in the global marketplace to remain 
competitive.  However, some communities do not have the functional elements 
to succeed.   
It will be many years before New Zealand is depopulating at a national level, so 
there may still be opportunity to slow down population decline in peripheral 
locations.  The Waikato case study showed that this would be a challenging 
proposition for some Territorial Authorities on the periphery.  At the very least 
New Zealand can adapt to ageing population structure and increase the quality 
of life for those that inhabit small declining towns.  As more regional areas shift 
towards natural decline with low fertility rates and ageing populations and many 
enter permanent zero growth or decline, it is important that there are policies 
which are fit for purpose. 
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1. Overview 
1.1. Introduction 
Population decline has been identified as a major future challenge. The 
consequences of depopulation are wide ranging and will have tremendous 
impact on how countries operate (Ferry & Vironen, 2011). The last century was 
categorised by tremendous population growth which brought the World’s 
population to over 6 billion before the close of the Century (United Nations 
Population Division, 2001), with another billion added to this number by 2011 
(United Nations, 2011).  The 21st Century, on the other hand, is ushering in a new 
population trend - depopulation.  Although probabilistic projections released in 
July 2014 for individual countries to 2100 show little prospect of world 
population growth ending before the end of this century, decline in many More 
Developed Countries (MDCs) is masked by high fertility in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Gerland, et al., 2014; Kunzig, 2014).  Low or zero growth is becoming an issue 
for many advanced-economy countries (Lee, 2011).  By 2008 twenty-six countries 
were already shrinking at national level, such as Russia, Bulgaria, Ukraine and 
Latvia (Pearce, 2010).  Germany and Japan began shrinking during 2010 and 2011, 
respectively (World Bank, 2015). 
Population shrinkage is impacted upon by wider economic and social 
transformations within societies on global, national and regional levels 
(Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 2012b). The drivers for population shrinkage are 
multi-dimensional with complex and cumulative self-reinforcing linkages 
(Matanle & Rausch, 2011). Depopulation typically occurs first at subnational level 
before becoming a national issue and there is evidence that population decline 
begins in the regions before extending to the cities (Jackson, et al., 2014).  
Subnational decline is clear in many countries that have not yet tipped into 
national decline, such as Australia, Canada, several European countries, the 
United Kingdom and the United States (Mackenzie, 1994; Martinez-Fernandez, et 
al., 2012b; Sedlacek, et al., 2009; Warkentin, 2012).   
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Population decline influences the functioning of social institutions at all levels of 
a country but has particularly profound impacts at the subnational level and 
presents both threats and opportunities to regional areas (Ferry & Vironen, 2011; 
Hospers & Reverda, 2015). Shrinking and growing processes may be seen in 
parallel in many countries at the subnational level (Wiechmann & Pallagst, 2012). 
This diversity between areas is caused by local level mixes of the drivers of 
population ageing – birth rates, longevity and migration (Jackson, 2007). These 
factors have different mixes in different locations, but have significant impacts 
on the ability of subnational areas to provide services for their populations. For 
the most part, population change is likely to be incremental, but where the 
drivers combine, the process may be much more rapid and lead to absolute or 
terminal decline (Jackson, et al., 2014).   
Governments and planners have yet to learn how to manage population decline 
in that it does not occur in a uniform manner at the local level and institutional 
arrangements and the legal framework are geared for a growth paradigm 
(Hospers & Reverda, 2015).  For depopulating communities, population 
shrinkage can become self-reinforcing, creating a cycle of slowing economic 
activity, out-migration of human capital, restricted local revenues, degradation 
of social and physical networks and services, and a reduced quality of life for 
those left behind (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1998; Haartsen & Venhorst, 
2009; Matanle & Rausch, 2011).  
The consequences of depopulation impact on all sectors and actors of society 
from education to housing developers and local governments to business 
corporations.  The problems associated with depopulation are challenging to 
address, with major flow on effects for the allocation of resources, the provision 
of services and the viability of communities (Ferry & Vironen, 2011; Hospers & 
Reverda, 2015).  Martinez-Fernandez, et al., (2012) consider that it is crucial that 
political strategies and guidelines are developed to tackle demographic change, 
or communities risk becoming disconnected from the economic opportunities of 
the global market place.  Communities may then become trapped in a pattern of 
3 
 
 
reinforcing population, economic and employment shrinkage. As such, 
demographic change in regional areas is a relevant issue for policy makers and 
requires concerted effort to find appropriate place-based initiatives (Ferry & 
Vironen, 2011). 
1.2. Research focus 
Demographic decline and its accompanying difficulties have encouraged policy-
makers across numerous countries to develop combating policies (Hospers, 
2014).  This thesis explores the spectrum of policies and the interventions 
available to address population decline from seven countries that are members 
of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), with 
some additional examples from New Zealand. The countries selected were; 
Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (UK) 
and the United States (US). The aim of this study was to locate strategies that 
may assist in reducing the social and economic consequences of subnational 
depopulation and which might be applied to areas within New Zealand which are 
experiencing such decline.  
Although subnational New Zealand has not reached the depopulation extremes 
of Japan and Europe, population ageing is advancing rapidly and lessons from 
countries further down the shrinkage pathway need to be analysed to enable 
local governments and other organisations to buffer the future effects of 
depopulation. The first of New Zealand’s Territorial Authorities are experiencing 
natural decrease (Jackson, 2013a; Jackson, 2014). New Zealand has only recently 
begun to explore ways to deal with the challenges of subnational depopulation 
and little research has been undertaken to explore possible strategic 
interventions to population decline in this country. It is important that we have 
policy strategies that are fit for purpose and enable New Zealand to manage the 
challenges that are to come.   
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This objective was framed into the following research questions: 
 What is the spectrum of policy responses to depopulation?  
 What is the spectrum of interventions available to address subnational 
population decline?  
 What are the key messages and themes from international examples of 
interventions? 
 How transferable are interventions from other countries to New 
Zealand’s context? 
The research questions follow a progression of; a theoretical framework for 
responses to depopulation, exploring the subnational interventions that 
countries are using to deal with depopulation and creating a typology of 
interventions. This is followed by a thematic analysis of the key messages and 
themes across the case studies and literature examples. The transferability of 
interventions to the New Zealand context is also explored in a short case study of 
New Zealand with a focus on the Waikato Region. Finally, the thesis concludes 
with policy recommendations for developing an action plan for local level 
communities.   
Over 40 case studies and literature on initiatives were examined, but this list is 
by no means exhaustive. There are large bodies of research undertaken on each 
type of strategy. This thesis seeks to understand the broad context of the 
initiatives. Due to time constraints and the breadth of scope of this thesis, case 
study selection was limited to only a few OECD countries. However it should be 
noted that there are many other useful initiatives occurring in countries outside 
the scope of this study.  
1.3. Thesis outline 
This thesis is presented in nine chapters. Chapters 1-2 cover the thesis overview 
and methodology. A comparison New Zealand’s demographic indicators with the 
indicators of seven OECD countries selected for the thesis is provided in the 
methodology, laying the rationale for selecting case studies for thematic analysis.   
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Chapter 3 discusses the drivers of population decline, types of depopulation and 
the consequences of depopulation. Chapter 4 provides a synopsis of seven 
theoretical policy response frameworks from the literature on how selected 
governments respond to the issue of depopulation. This is followed by a 
discussion of the range of responses to depopulation by governments at various 
levels from sources such as the United Nations World Population Policies survey, 
OECD databases, case studies and literature.  
Chapter 5 drills down into the types of interventions that countries are using to 
either counter or accept depopulation, categorizing these interventions into 
policy sector groups, such as governance, economic, planning, social and 
promotional  interventions. This chapter also looks at the limits of countering 
and accepting interventions to slow down or reverse depopulation.  Chapter 6 
presents findings of a thematic analysis of the case studies and literature.  
Chapter 7 explores the demographic and geographical context of the Waikato 
Region in New Zealand. The case study provides a description of subnational 
population variation with depopulating peripheral areas within the context of 
overall regional growth.  In light of the underlying drivers of depopulation there 
is a discussion on the scope of change that can be achieved for those subnational 
areas that are suffering depopulation. The constraints in transferring 
interventions from other countries to the New Zealand’s governance context are 
then deliberated.  
Chapter 8 outlines recommendations for building a local level action plan for 
community level change within the context of a regional strategic framework. 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis. 
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2. Methodology  
2.1. Conceptual framework 
This thesis investigates strategic interventions to population decline from several 
OECD countries. Interventions were examined from countries that are more 
advanced than New Zealand in terms of structural ageing, to provide New 
Zealand planners, policy makers and advisors with comprehensive and timely 
insight into the range of possible interventions that may be applicable here.   
This study was based on a comprehensive review of relevant literature, 
individual and grouped case studies and secondary data, supported by a case 
study of the New Zealand experience with a focus on the Waikato Region. 
Instead of assessing substantive evidence of theories of population decline, the 
focus of this thesis is how countries are responding to depopulation through 
policy and the range of subnational interventions that countries are 
operationalising to address their depopulating areas. No other examples of a 
comprehensive review of interventions could be identified from the literature, 
rather, most response literature is in the form of individual case studies or at the 
most, groups of two or three case studies.   
The methodology used by this thesis was: 
 A review of policy response literature to develop a policy response 
typology 
 Comparative analysis of:  
1. central government population policies – migration, fertility and 
ageing and key demographic indicators 
2. central government spatial distribution population policies and key 
demographic indicators 
 A review of subnational interventions through developing a database of 
selected variables and typology of interventions from case studies and 
literature for the purposes of thematic analysis. 
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 Case study research – a New Zealand case study with a particular focus on 
the Waikato Region.  
A challenge of studying population policies is that there is no consensus on the 
definition of a population policy. Population policy definitions can range from 
narrow to broad. Narrow definitions may be as specific as all deliberate 
government actions to influence population (i.e. laws, government programmes 
and regulations), while broad can include population-responsive policies, such as 
all the ways that government respond to population changes (i.e. reducing the 
number of houses available, closing schools in a depopulating situation etc.) 
(Lucas & Meyer, 1994).  
Population policies may be divided into broad categories: direct or indirect, 
explicit or implicit, policies of intervention or non-intervention. For instance, 
direct policies affect population variables directly, such as immigration policies 
which may increase growth rates, while indirect policies may be targeted at 
another goal but have an indirect effect on population variables (Lucas & Meyer, 
1994). Some policies may be aimed at explicitly addressing population decline, 
while others may be focused on managing the effects of depopulation, such as 
through the proxy of economic development (implicit).  Finally, there can be 
policies of intervention and non-intervention. Policies of non-intervention are 
deliberate actions by a government to choose not to intervene after 
investigation of the issue (Lucas & Meyer, 1994). 
This thesis uses the narrow definition of a population policy to discuss central 
government policies for addressing national population change and subnational 
distribution, and focuses on specific population policy actions. These policies are 
categorised as explicit direct policies, which means that their objectives and 
means for achieving them are formally articulated (Lucas & Meyer, 1994). When 
drilling down into regional and local government policy action the broader 
definition of ‘population responsive action’ was adopted due to the fact that 
many governments at this level do not have the power to change traditional 
population policies to influence their regions (i.e. fertility, abortion, etc.) but 
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rather rely on the use of economic development to change their population 
situations (Lucas & Meyer, 1994).  Certainly the regions of New Zealand do not 
have the ability to adopt their own explicit population policies, such as fertility 
policies, although in federal systems the states can have this level of control.  
Many of population responsive policies could be defined as implicit, in that they 
may affect population variables, but are not purposely aimed at such. Finally, this 
thesis focuses on both policies of intervention and non-intervention, and this 
distinction underlies part of the discussion of theoretical policy responses in 
Section 4.1. 
2.2. Theoretical framework 
This thesis does not use a direct theoretical framework as there are few, if any, 
theories of depopulation (Jackson, 2014). One intention of this thesis is to 
contribute to the development of such a theory, alongside a project that is 
currently in progress and led by one of the supervisors of this thesis – ‘The sub-
national mechanisms of the ending of population growth, Tai timu tāngata 
Taihoe e?’.  
This research was developed with a practical outcome in mind; to develop a 
framework for conceptualising policy responses, as well as provide a range of 
possible subnational interventions for depopulating areas, so that local level 
policy makers may be able to adopt strategies that fit with their governance 
framework and their demographic and economic context to achieve the greatest 
measure of success.  
2.3. Analytical framework 
Figure 1 presents the analytical framework for this study, which covers policy 
responses, intervention types (what the intervention is trying to influence) and 
intervention policy sectors (the policy area of action).  
This policy response framework was adopted from a synthesis of the response 
literature which shows that there were only three possible policy responses to 
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population decline. These were defined as do nothing, stimulation or countering, 
or accepting the decline and managing the consequences. 
Figure 1: Analytical framework for intervention study 
 
Interventions or strategies are “a collection of actions and activities that help 
achieve a predetermined goal” (Rink, et al., 2012, p. 4).  Case studies of policy 
interventions and initiatives across the seven OECD countries (see Section 2.4.2) 
were drawn from conventional academic sources, news articles and grey 
literature (such as, but not limited to: reports, theses, conference proceedings, 
technical specifications and standards, bibliographies, technical and commercial 
documentation, and government reports and documents) (Alberani, et al., 1990) 
(Gordon & Glenn, 2003).  
Case studies and individual interventions were defined as ‘countering’ if the text 
clearly stated that the intention was to regenerate a location by attracting either 
industries, income or migrants into an area.  
Case studies and individual interventions were defined as ‘accepting’ if they 
described one of the following, to: 
 Enable service provision with less resources 
 Enable service provision in a declining area 
 Attempt to retain population 
Intervention policy sector
Governance Planning Economic Promotion Social
Intervention type
people focused business or capital focused
Policy response
Do nothing Countering Accepting
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 Redevelop to adapt to an ageing population 
 Specifically state that the intervention was to manage consequences 
 Specifically mention an acceptance of population decline 
According to Heindenheimer et al. (1983) “government inaction, or non-decision, 
becomes a policy when it is pursued over time in a fairly consistent way against 
pressures to the contrary” (p. 7). This definition has been adopted for the ‘do 
nothing’ category. As this thesis focuses on interventions, which by definition are 
taking some form of action, the do nothing option is discussed as a policy 
response but does not feature in Chapter 5 where subnational interventions are 
outlined.  
Most locations do not focus specifically on population policies to boost 
population, therefore in this thesis countering interventions were defined by 
explicit policy actions – attraction of capital (defined here has attracting industry, 
investment or spending), or the attraction of people into a given area.  These 
policy actions were further grouped by the type of policy area that were targeted 
for action (described as ‘policy sector’ in this thesis). For example, drawing 
people to an area by developing the built environment was considered within 
the planning sector, whereas drawing people to an area by promoting the 
location through the means of advertising was considered in the promotion 
sector. There is significant overlap between the policy sectors and a 
comprehensive strategy may cover several sectors.  
A database of interventions and case studies was created to enable thematic 
analysis. The database listed:  
 Location 
 Response type – countering or accepting 
 Government operation level of the intervention – national, regional, local 
 Policy sector that the intervention was focusing at – economic, 
governance, planning, promotion, social 
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 Parties or ‘actors’ involved with the intervention – state or local 
government, the business community or local community 
 Details of interventions or strategies 
 Whether the initiative required input from higher level initiatives, funding 
sources or expertise. 
 Outcomes and lessons learnt 
Few case studies were selected from the national level. Many regional level case 
studies covered a large number of intervention initiatives across several policy 
sectors. Local level case studies were more focused on one or two policy sectors 
and contained a number of interventions.  
2.3.1. A review of policy response literature 
This study firstly examined the spectrum of policy responses to depopulation and 
the influences on policy responses to build a framework for exploring the policy 
choices of countries at both national level and subnational level. Seven policy 
response frameworks were identified in the literature. These frameworks guided 
a brief review of the political economy literature to identify influences on policy 
responses. A theoretical policy framework was formulated from a synthesis of 
the various policy groupings provided by the response literature as well as the 
analysis of the political theory that underpinned governmental responses to 
depopulation.  
2.3.2. Country and case study selection 
A central premise of this thesis was to identify subnational interventions that 
may be of use to depopulating areas of New Zealand. Due to the word 
constraints of this thesis it was decided that interventions would be explored 
from a limited number of countries only. Seven countries were selected as 
appropriate countries to draw case studies and interventions from.  The 
countries selected were; Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. The countries were chosen for a 
range of factors but primarily because they had a number of interventions that 
had been operationalised at various levels of government. In particular, case 
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studies and literature describing groups of case studies were selected from seven 
OECD countries that: 
 have similarity to New Zealand by political economy (Australia, Canada, 
UK, US). 
 are depopulating significantly on a national level and are exploring 
strategies with which to address the situation (Germany, Japan) 
 have active strategies to deal with decline at regional level (Netherlands, 
Nordic countries1). 
 showed a range of response types and intervention levels for 
comparability. 
 
Countries that were too dissimilar from New Zealand in political, historical or 
social governance were left out of the selection. For instance, although Portugal 
has seen systematic shrinking of 121 of its 278 mainland municipalities and has 
interventions to deal with shrinkage, it was decided that some of  the types of 
policies that local governments are using would not translate well to New 
Zealand’s social context  i.e. – incentives to marry (Panagopoulos & Barreira, 
2011). It was felt that such interventions would be met with significant resistance 
in New Zealand.  
2.3.2.1. Justification for country selection 
Selected demographic indicators were used to compare countries’ levels of 
depopulation. This analysis serves to add to the justification for selecting case 
studies from these countries that are further down the depopulation pathway 
than New Zealand. The demographic indicators analysis explains how New 
Zealand compares to the intervention case study countries in terms of levels of 
depopulation and ageing.  
This comparison shows how New Zealand compares with selected OECD 
countries. New Zealand has historically had a higher total fertility rate2 (TFR) than 
                                                     
1 Although the Nordic countries have many useful initiatives, profiles of these countries were 
restricted to seven countries for ease of comparison.   
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most other OECD countries. Population replacement level is 2.1 children per 
woman. Figure 2 shows that the total fertility rate of most of these countries, 
except the US and New Zealand, fell below two children per woman during the 
1970s and, except for slight rises, have not regained replacement level fertility. 
Although Figure 2 shows an increase in New Zealand’s TFR between 2002 and 
2010, more recent data has shown that this upturn was short lived. This upturn 
reflected the movement of a large cohort through the key reproductive age 
groups—essentially an echo of the baby boom. Both the US and New Zealand 
have shown a drop in fertility rate over the last 5 years.  
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Total fertility is the mean number of children a woman would have by age 50 if she survived to 
age 50 and were subject, throughout her life, to the age-specific fertility rates observed in a given 
year. The total fertility is expressed as the number of children per woman. Total fertility (TF) is 
computed as the sum of age-specific fertility rates weighted by the number of years in each age 
group, divided by 1,000 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division, 2013). 
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Figure 2: Estimated Total Fertility Rate for selected nations 1955-2015  
 
Source: World Population Prospects 2015 Revision: UN Population Division 
 
The majority of these countries have experienced below-replacement fertility 
rates for more than three decades. Fertility is not expected to recover to reach 
replacement levels in the selected countries. 
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Figure 3: Projected Total Fertility Rate for selected nations 2015-2100 (Medium variant)  
Source: World Population Prospects 2015 Revision: UN Population Division 
 
The fertility trends show a corresponding decline in the proportion of each 
population aged 0-14 years over the last 50 years. Figure 4 shows that Germany 
and Japan have the lowest youth population levels out of the eight countries, 
with New Zealand and the US enjoying the highest comparative rates.  The peak 
baby boom years in the 1960s were not experienced as strongly by Germany as 
the other countries depicted, and as a result proportionally, Germany has not 
experienced the same rapid descent in youth rates (Teitelbaum & Winter, 1985). 
In comparison, Canada and Japan experienced the largest negative change in 
youth rates from 1960 to 2013. 
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Figure 4: Youth population rate (percentage aged 0-14 years) for selected nations 1960-2013  
 
Source: World Bank (2015) indicator database  
 
Accompanying these fertility trends is numerical and structural ageing of 
populations, associated with increased longevity and declining fertility (United 
Nations, 2000). Figure 5 shows the change in the percentage of the total 
population over the age of 65 from 1960 to 2013 for the selected OECD countries. 
Across the world there is a clear trend in structural ageing, with the exception of 
Africa and parts of the Middle East (Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 2012b).  The 
steady increase in the proportion of elderly people in the populations of the 
selected OECD countries can be seen in Figure 4, with Japan and Germany 
leading the trend.  Even though New Zealand and the US have the highest 
fertility rates and highest youth population rates out of this group of countries, 
Figure 4 clearly shows that their populations are also ageing significantly. 
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Figure 5: Percentage of population aged 65 and above, 1960-2013 selected OECD countries 
 
Source: World Bank (2015) indicator database 
 
Figure 6 shows that Germany has been in a state of natural decline (where 
deaths exceed births) for several decades, whereas Japan has only recently 
crossed the threshold. Some countries that have a low fertility rate, such as 
Canada and the UK, have a high net migration gain that is sustaining their 
population in the short term. New Zealand’s Rate of Natural Increase (RNI) (the 
difference between births and deaths) is still relatively high. New Zealand also 
typically has a high net migration that is sustaining population growth. 
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Figure 6: Rate of Natural Increase for selected countries 1955-2015  
Source: World Population Prospects Revision 2015: UN Population Division 
 
This analysis has shown that these OECD countries are appropriate choices for 
selecting case studies and interventions from, as they are either already 
experiencing depopulation or have more negative demographic indicators than 
New Zealand that are likely to lead to population decline sooner than New 
Zealand. In many cases these countries have been active in attempting to change 
their demographic future, although not all of these countries have interventions 
at the national level. Some have appropriate interventions that are in operation 
at the regional level.  
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2.3.3. Analysis 
2.3.3.1. Comparative analysis 
This research employed comparative analysis which enables a comparison of the 
similarities and differences between the phenomena (Unikaite-Jakuntaviciene & 
Rakutiene, 2013, p. 51).  Comparison analysis was undertaken first of national 
government policies from the United Nations World Population Policy 2013 
database, to assess how the selected countries (including New Zealand) are 
responding at national level to population change, particularly the response of 
countries at national level to population size and growth by adopting (or not) 
fertility or migration or ageing policies to increase or decrease their respective 
populations against key demographic indicators.  Comparative analysis was also 
undertaken of the spatial redistribution policies of national governments policies 
from this database, such as reducing migration from rural to urban places, with 
other sources of information such as OECD sources, response literature and case 
studies to assess how countries are responding at national level to subnational 
spatial distribution of their populations.   
Comparative analysis is useful when there are defined sets of data, such as 
census, economic indicators and surveys. A disadvantage of comparative analysis 
of such data is that country differences at regional level can be obscured by 
national level data and the surveys do not contain contextual information. This 
problem was partially addressed analysing literature, reports, case studies and 
news articles that provided more in-depth information on policy approaches at 
regional level. 
2.3.3.2. Thematic analysis of subnational interventions 
Thematic analysis was chosen to analyse the case studies and interventions due 
to the difficulties of undertaking comparative analysis. These case studies are a 
collection of individual cases, grouped cases or interventions draw from a wide 
range of sources rather than a systematically selected and methodologically 
controlled sample of cases. There are great difficulties in attempting to study a 
large number of case studies in any detail as they generally lack universal 
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theoretical frameworks and have a vast array of contextual issues (Bernt, et al., 
2014).  
Thematic analysis of case studies and literature was conducted to identify 
themes about: 
 types of policy responses 
 the underlying theories forming the policy responses  
 the spectrum of interventions available to address population decline 
 the key messages and themes from international examples of strategies 
being used to address population decline 
 the key themes for success of strategies where strategies do succeed 
 the factors that are needed to enable the transfer of strategies from one 
context to another.  
Key questions were asked: 
 What were the outcomes and key lessons learnt? 
 What are the key factors for success when an initiative was successful? 
Not all questions were able to be answered due to difficulty of measurement, 
lack of information and length of time since the initiative began. Themes for 
success were identified and cross grouped with the levels, initiatives and policy 
sectors.  
Intervention type was discussed under the motivator ‘countering’ or 
regeneration strategies in terms of: 
 Attracting human capital 
 Attracting capital flows 
For the motivator ‘accepting’, the strategies were discussed in terms of: 
 Maintaining and retaining human capital   
 Maintaining and retaining investment and infrastructure 
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2.3.4. Waikato Region – New Zealand case study 
A case study approach was adopted to carry out an analysis of the Waikato 
Region of New Zealand. This case study aimed to justify the need to explore 
interventions for subnational depopulation in New Zealand. The case study 
presented analysis from a report to the local government authorities of the 
Waikato which shows that eight of the 10 districts that make up the Waikato 
Region are projected to experience population decline between 2014-2063 
(Cameron, et al., 2014). Analysis of the peripheral relationship of distance from 
small towns to the main urban hubs of Hamilton and Auckland and population 
projections served to explain some of the impacts of globalisation on this region. 
Suggestions are made for an approach to intervening in each territory’s 
projected demographic future. Finally, the challenges for transferring 
interventions from other countries to the New Zealand governance framework is 
outlined.  
Despite the clear presence of end of growth indicators (Jackson, 2014), no 
depopulation policies are currently being developed or considered in New 
Zealand. Accordingly, this thesis develops the sort of policy framework that the 
Waikato and other currently growing regions will eventually need to address 
depopulation.  
2.4. Definitions 
2.4.1. Human capital 
Human capital is an important concept in this thesis as it is considered to be 
critical for regional economic prosperity (Kwon, 2009a; Singer, 2012) and is an 
integral part of many interventions. The OECD defines human capital as “the 
knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes embodied in individuals that 
facilitate the creation of personal, social and economic well-being” (Westphalen, 
1999, p. 4).  Growth economists are primarily concerned with human capital as 
an input that, amongst other variables, influences economic growth (Westphalen, 
1999). Kwon (2009a) defines humans as ‘labour force’, thus related to economic 
added-value that is generated by the input of labour force as other production 
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factors such as financial capital, land, machinery, and labour hours (p. 5). Human 
capital not lonely contributes to an individual’s development but also to national 
economic growth (Kwon, 2009a).  
Both forms of human capital are relevant to this thesis. ‘Countering’ strategies 
focus on drawing in people with their accumulated human capital from outside 
the area so that they may use that capital in the new location. ‘Accepting’ 
strategies attempt to retain the human capital that exists in a location.  There are 
countering and accepting  strategies that also aim on strengthening skills and 
knowledge of people that are already in a location with the intention that 
productivity may be increased, thus improving economic outcomes.  
2.4.2. Rural, urban and regional 
This thesis discusses spatial distribution of population at subnational level 
between urban and rural areas. In discussing these redistribution effects it is 
important to note that there is no internationally consistent definition for the 
terms ‘rural’, ‘urban’ or ‘regional’ (Coburn, et al., 2007; Field & Perrott, 2015).   
This lack of common definitions makes drawing comparisons between literature 
and policies on the topic challenging: the terms ‘rural’ and ‘regional’ are used 
interchangeably throughout the literature. In general, ‘rural’ denotes any area 
that is not classed as ‘urban’, based on the population count of the areas. The 
level of population that is classified as ‘urban’ and whether it is defined by 
geographic unit or administrative boundaries or some other quantifier differs 
greatly between countries. For instance, New Zealand has built a graduated 
definition of urban and rural based on the influence of main urban areas on 
outlying areas. Main urban areas are, for New Zealand, defined as population 
bases of over 30,000. Small towns on the edge of main urban hubs can be 
considered to be part of these urban centres. For example, the small urban 
communities of Te Awamutu and Cambridge, although they are over 20kms from 
the urban centre of Hamilton, due to their dependence on Hamilton they are 
classified as part of the main urban centre of Hamilton (Statistics New Zealand, 
2015c).  
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The US, on the other hand, defines ‘urban’ as areas of 50,000 or more people 
with ‘urban clusters’ as greater than 2,500 and less than 50,000. ‘Rural’ is all 
other areas not included in an urban area (United States Census Bureau, 2015).  
According to Coburn et al. (2007) the choice of definition “affects who benefits 
from a policy and who does not” (p. 1). Consequently any conclusions that are 
drawn can only be done so at broad thematic level. 
2.4.3. Periphery 
An additional concept that is utilised in this thesis is ‘periphery’ or ‘peripheral 
regions’. There is no consistent definition of what constitutes a peripheral region 
in the literature (Baerenholdt & Granas, 2008). In the context of regional studies, 
‘Periphery’ may be used as a geographical term (Polese & Shearmur, 2006) or as 
a process of exclusion that relates to geographical location (Beetz, et al., 2008).  
For empirical research, the definition of geographical periphery that was adopted 
in a Canadian study as a radius of one hour’s travel time from a major urban 
centre (population of 500,000 or more) with peripheral areas as all those outside 
of this limit (Polese & Shearmur, 2006). Although this definition may be 
appropriate for a very large country, such as Canada, there are issues with this 
definition for smaller countries. For instance, in the Netherlands all rural areas 
are close to cities. So the degree of rurality is limited (OECD, 2008).   
For the New Zealand case study in Chapter 7 a modified version of the Canadian 
study’s definition is adopted, which is discussed in greater depth in Section 7.2.1. 
Beetz et al. (2008) introduces the term ‘peripherization’ which differs from the 
geographical understanding of periphery to express the spatial aspect of regional 
socioeconomic decline and associated demographic shrinking. Although 
peripherization occurs primarily in peripheral locations, it can also occur in urban 
environments. Some key elements of peripherization are: public service 
reduction with associated rise in social disparities and social exclusion, political 
power being held out of the area, and difficulty in producing higher added value 
in food production, renewable primary products and quality of life. Both of these 
definitions are used in this thesis. 
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2.4.4. Place-based versus place-neutral policies 
Another concept that is used in this thesis is place-based and place-neutral 
policies. Place-neutral policies are those that are designed without explicit 
consideration to location and thus target people in all locations (World Bank, 
2009, p. 24).  These policies can be an effective way of generating efficiency, 
guaranteeing equal opportunities, and improving the lives of individuals (Barca, 
et al., 2012, p. 138).  Place-based policies take into account the social, cultural, 
political, demographic and economic context of a location or place and are 
designed to specifically target each context (Barca, et al., 2012; Ferry & Vironen, 
2011).   
2.5. Summary 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the range of strategic interventions that 
may be applied to New Zealand so that planners, policy makers and policy 
advisors are well placed to respond to the subnational depopulation that is 
projected to occur over the next few decades.   
This research provides a high level exploration of the spectrum of policy 
responses to depopulation, explores the policy responses of eight OECD 
countries, outlines the range of interventions that countries are using to address 
the issues of depopulation, and discusses the limits of interventions to change 
the demographic future of depopulating areas. Key themes from a thematic 
analysis of a wide range of case studies and literature examples are outlined. 
Based on a case study of the Waikato Region, suggestions are then made for an 
approach to intervening in each territory’s projected demographic future. Finally, 
the challenges for transferring interventions from other countries to the New 
Zealand governance framework are outlined.  This thesis develops the sort of 
policy framework that may be of use to regions of New Zealand that are 
experiencing uneven distribution of their populations. 
Contribution of this thesis: This thesis generates what may be the first extensive 
review of interventions to depopulation, as no such study could be identified 
from the literature.  
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3. Population decline 
Population decline has been identified as a major future challenge that has a 
wide range of consequences which will impact on how countries function (Ferry 
& Vironen, 2011). The last century was categorised by tremendous population 
growth which brought the World’s population to over 6 billion before the close 
of the Century (United Nations Population Division, 2001) and 7 billion in 2011 
(United Nations, 2011).  The 21st Century, on the other hand, is ushering in a new 
population trend - decline.   
Although probabilistic projections released in July 2014 for individual countries 
to 2100 show little prospect of world population growth ending before the close 
of this century, decline in many More Developed Countries (MDC) is masked by 
high fertility in sub-Saharan Africa (Gerland, et al., 2014; Kunzig, 2014).  Low or 
zero growth is becoming an issue for many advanced-economy countries (Lee, 
2011).  By 2008 twenty-six countries were already shrinking at national level, 
such as Russia, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Latvia (Pearce, 2010).  Germany and Japan 
began shrinking during 2010 and 2011, respectively (World Bank, 2015). By 2050 
the UN Population Division projects under the medium variant that 43 countries 
will shrink, with 11 of these countries losing more than 15 per cent of their 
populations between 2015 and 2050 (United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs/Population Division, 2015). 
Figure 7 shows the low, medium, and high fertility projections from the World 
Population Prospects 2015 Revision for the More Developed Regions – North 
America, Europe, as well as Japan, Australia and New Zealand (United Nations, 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015).  These fertility variants are 
based on the medium assumptions, with low fertility reducing the medium 
assumption by -0.5 child and high fertility adding an additional 0.5 child (Wilmoth, 
2015). The World Population prospects 2015 medium projections show the More 
Developed Countries peaking as a group in total population in 2041 then 
declining around 14 Million inhabitants, before returning to slow growth after 
2078. This may be partly due to the fact that the Population Division’s medium 
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projections assume that fertility for Europe, as a whole, will increase from the 
estimated 1.6 children per woman in 2010-2015 to 1.8 in 2045-2050 (United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division, 2015, p. 
4).  According to the Director of the United Nations Population Division the 
medium variant is the best guess for future trends but is only one of a range of 
possible outcomes (Wilmoth, 2015). 
Figure 7: Population projections for the Most Developed Countries 2015-2100 (Low, Medium, 
and High) 
 
Source: World Population Prospects Revision 2015: UN Population Division  
 
This chapter briefly outlines the drivers of depopulation and their components, 
and describes how these features impact on subnational populations.  Types of 
depopulation are explored, as well as the consequences for communities that 
are experiencing population decline. 
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3.1. Drivers of depopulation  
Population shrinkage is ultimately driven by wider economic and social 
transformations within societies on global, national and regional levels 
(Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 2012b). The drivers for population shrinkage are 
multi-dimensional with complex and cumulative self-reinforcing patterns 
(Matanle & Rausch, 2011).  It is at the local level that demographic change is felt 
most keenly (Ferry & Vironen, 2011). 
The drivers that will be discussed in this thesis are listed in Table 3.1 and will be 
discussed further in the following sections.  
Table 1: Drivers of subnational depopulation 
Long-term drivers Short-term drivers 
Demographic drivers – fertility, 
ageing and longevity3 
Migration flows, especially internal 
Globalisation 
 
Changing spatial trends – international and 
internal mobility of workers, urbanisation, 
concentration  
Political transformations and policies  
Economic cycles and external shocks4 
 
Section 3.1.1 discusses the demographic drivers and trends, while Section 3.1.2 
focuses on how globalisation impacts on the spatial distribution of population at 
the regional and subnational level. 
3.1.1. Demographic drivers 
The demographic drivers will discussed firstly at an international and national 
level before drilling down into their subnational ramifications. 
One of the key demographic trends causing depopulation is the reduction in 
fertility. The ability for a population to replace each generation is expressed as a 
                                                     
3 (Hospers, 2014; Matanle & Rausch, 2011)  
4 (Matanle, 2011) 
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Total Fertility Rate of 2.1 children per woman in countries with low mortality5.  
Across the developed world, demographic trends tend to follow a similar pattern 
with total fertility below population replacement levels for an extended period of 
time, and increasing longevity and ageing populations.  A consequence of 
continued low fertility is structural population ageing (United Nations, 2010). As 
fertility declines and birth numbers reduce, the increased numbers reaching 
older age due to greater longevity also become an increased proportion. The 
extent of structural ageing is dependent on the length of time that low fertility 
has been occurring and the depth of the fertility decline (United Nations, 2014). 
There is a lag of several decades between the time when below-replacement 
level fertility becomes entrenched in a country and the onset of national level 
depopulation (United Nations, 2014).  
3.1.1.1. The demographic transition 
The shift to low growth or population decline for the Most Developed Countries 
is primarily a consequence of progressing through the demographic transition 
(Bloom, 2011). Classical demographic theory states that populations move 
through a series of stages from a state of high mortality and high fertility to a 
state of low mortality and low fertility (Lee, 2011, p. 569).   
The first demographic transition model introduced by Notestein (1945) had three 
main stages. These stages have been added to over the decades by other 
scholars. The models of Blacker (1947), Day (1977) and Dyson (1978) have five 
phases; high stationary, early expanding, late expanding, low stationary and 
declining which will be discussed in further detail. At the beginning of the 
demographic transition populations are in a high stationary phase where the 
natural rate of increase is negligible, although there are high birth rates, due to 
the accompanying high death rates. Once a population moves into the early 
expanding phase, birth rates remain high and death rates begin to drop allowing 
                                                     
5 Total fertility is the mean number of children a woman would have by age 50 if she survived to 
age 50 and were subject, throughout her life, to the age-specific fertility rates observed in a given 
year. The total fertility is expressed as the number of children per woman. Total fertility (TF) is 
computed as the sum of age-specific fertility rates weighted by the number of years in each age 
group, divided by 1,000 (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division, 2013). 
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the rate of natural increase to lift slowly (Blacker, 1947; Day, 1977; Dyson, 2011; 
Lucas & Meyer, 1994). The reduction in death rates is understood to be due to a 
combination of; public health improvements, superior nutrition, vaccinations and 
medical advances (Bloom, 2011).  By phase 3, the late expanding, transitionary 
growth stage, birth rates are falling but death rates are falling faster, causing a 
rapid increase in population, and also juvenescence (the population grows 
younger).  
According to Galor (2012) mortality began to decline in Western European 
countries a century before fertility also began to drop. Triggers for reducing 
fertility are attributed to increases in income, education of women, access to 
contraceptive mechanisms, and social and economic improvements (Bloom, 
2011).  In phase 4 there is zero or very low rates of natural increase as death 
rates are very low but so are birth rates, and the population ages structurally. 
Finally, phase 5 is the onset of ‘incipient decline’. Death rates are higher than 
birth rates creating a state where natural increase becomes negative, although 
theorised to ebb and flow between positive and negative rather than 
permanently declining. This state is called incipient decline (Lucas & Meyer, 
1994).   
At present, many countries have had below replacement fertility rates for several 
decades and are in Phase 4, but have not yet started decline. This is due, in part, 
to the momentum effect from past birth cohorts. Even if fertility falls below 
replacement level, in a young population the number of mothers will continue to 
increase for a generation, as females from the younger cohorts shift into the 
reproductive years (Keyfitz, 1971). Therefore, population growth rates are the 
generally the highest when the bulk of the population is within the childbearing 
years (Blue & Espenshade, 2011).   
The age distribution of a population thus has a tremendous effect on the future 
population growth potential as it influences the crude birth and death rates (Blue 
& Espenshade, 2011). Continued low fertility drives structural ageing of the 
population. This is particularly stark when previous large cohorts are followed by 
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a series of much smaller cohorts. For instance, the large cohort of children born 
post World War II, the so called baby boomer generation, is now (as officially 
defined) aged 50-69 years of age.  It is followed by variously sized cohorts, most 
of which are much smaller. This process increases the absolute numbers of older 
people (numerical ageing) and also leads to elderly people making up a larger 
proportion of the population (structural ageing).   
Added to this is the fact that life expectancy has also increased over the last few 
decades. When birth rates stabilize at low levels, increased life expectancy 
begins to influence population ageing (Goldstein, 2009). Structural ageing 
coupled with increased longevity further swells the proportion of older people in 
the population (Bloom, et al., 2011).  In Phase 4 of the demographic transition, 
the population may still be experiencing some growth, but this can mask the 
numerical and structural ageing of the population that will inevitably shift to 
decline as the greater proportion of the population is past childbearing ages and 
no longer contributes children.  Population ageing is occurring in developed and 
in developing countries but currently, the countries with the highest proportion 
of older people are all the developed world (Bloom, et al., 2011). Countries are at 
different stages of the ageing process and the pace of structural ageing also 
differs significantly between countries (United Nations Population Division, 2002).  
As outlined above, some industrialized countries have shifted into the last phase 
of the demographic transition – incipient decline, which may well become 
permanent decline if birth rates remain below replacement level. There are now 
70 countries which have a TFR of below 2.0 children per woman. Thirty-nine of 
these low fertility countries from 2005-2010 are located in Europe, with 16 in 
Asia, and 12 in Latin American and the Caribbean 6 (United Nations, 2014).  
Below-replacement fertility has been in place for so long that there are relatively 
small cohorts under the age of 30, shrinking the size of the number of mothers 
progressively with each generation creating downwards momentum. Even if 
fertility returned to above replacement level, negative population momentum 
                                                     
6 Low fertility can be defined as “total fertility of 2.0 children per woman or less.” (United 
Nations, 2014) 
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would continue for some time (O'Neill, et al., 2001).  Of note, population ageing 
is largely irreversible and populations are not expected to return to the young 
age structures of the past if longevity continues to advance and fertility remains 
low (Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 2012b; United Nations Population Division, 2002; 
United Nations, 2010). 
The demographic transition resulted in a doubling of the world’s population 
between 1960 and 2000 (Bloom, 2011), however different groups of countries 
are at different stages of the process. A large number of advanced economies are 
currently in Phase 4 with either zero or a very low rate of natural increase, with 
some countries already in the Phase 5 decline, with any growth occurring only 
from immigration. A further group is now in decline without the mitigating 
effects of migration gain. In 2014 twenty-five countries had a negative annual 
growth rate and the majority of these had been consistently declining for the last 
20 years.  Most of these countries are located in Europe. A further 34 countries 
had annual growth rates of > 0 and < 0.5, with 37 countries supporting growth 
rates of between > 0.5 and < 1.0 (World Bank, 2015).  
In 2001 the UN Population Division stated that by 2050, 39 countries were 
projected to have shrunk (e.g. Germany 14 per cent smaller; Italy and Hungary 
25 per cent smaller; Georgia and Ukraine between 28 to 40 per cent smaller 
(United Nations Population Division, 2001). Russia is projected to have 17 per 
cent fewer people by 2050 than 2010 and Japan 20 per cent (Ezeh, et al., 2012). 
This projected drop is due to reversal of the ‘rule of 70’ that is commonly used by 
demographers. The rule states that the length of time (in years) which a 
population takes to double in size can be measured by dividing 70 by the growth 
rate in per cent per year (Hinde, 2014). Therefore a country with a growth rate of 
2.0 per cent per annum would take 35 years to double the population. The 
reverse of this is that it will take 35 years to halve population size with an annual 
growth rate of -2.0 per cent.  This negative momentum will create significant 
challenges for future generations in terms of the fiscal and physical provision of 
32 
 
 
resources, facilities and services.  For further information on fertility and ageing 
see Appendices 5 and 6. 
3.1.1.2. Demographic drivers impact on subnational 
population 
Demographic drivers have a significant impact on subnational populations (Ferry 
& Vironen, 2011; Jackson, 2011).  Shrinking and growing processes may be seen 
simultaneously in many countries (Wiechmann & Pallagst, 2012). Although 
several European countries began to depopulate nationally in the 1990s, many 
more began shrinking at a subnational level during the same period (Martinez-
Fernandez, et al., 2012b). Subnational decline is also clear in other industrialised 
countries, such as Australia, Canada, and the United States (Frey, 2014; 
Mackenzie, 1994; Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 2012b; Sedlacek, et al., 2009; 
Warkentin, 2012).  
At a subnational level the diversity between areas is caused by local level mixes 
of the drivers of population ageing – birth rates, longevity and migration (Jackson, 
2007). The impacts of these drivers on subnational populations are: 
Declining birth rates: Accelerate structural ageing - the proportion of the 
children in the population decreases, causing the proportion at older ages to 
increase. 
Longevity: Increasing life expectancy accelerates numerical ageing, as there are 
more people living longer, and also accelerates structural ageing as the 
additional numbers add to the proportion at older ages. 
Net migration loss: Typically accelerates structural ageing, because of the age-
specificity of the loss. Peripheral communities often experience net migration 
loss at the key reproductive ages of 20-39 years, thus reinforcing the loss as both 
the people themselves leave the area but also the region loses the reproductive 
potential of those people.   
Net migration gains: The age structure of migrants is a critical factor. Net 
migration gain typically swells the young and middle-aged adult population. Net 
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migration gain can also accelerate structural ageing if the in-migrants are past 
the age of childbearing. Again the numbers and proportions of those in the older 
age brackets swell. 
These factors have different mixes in different locations, but have significant 
impacts on the ability of subnational areas to provide services for their 
populations. For the most part, population change that is driving decline is likely 
to be incremental, but where the drivers combine, the process may be much 
more rapid and lead to self-reinforcing absolute decline (Jackson, et al., 2014). 
3.1.2. Globalisation – a subnational focus 
In addition to the underlying drivers of demographic change (births, deaths and 
migration), regional demographic change is often caused by factors beyond the 
territory and as part of the complex interplay of subnational, regional, national 
and international factors in the political, economic and social spheres (Matanle & 
Rausch, 2011).   
Globalisation is a key driver in creating economic cycles, political transformations 
and policies and changing the spatial distribution of people and capital across 
countries and within countries.  Although there is no consistent definition of 
globalisation (Rzepka, 2011), broadly in economic terms, globalisation “consists 
of the integration of national economies in the direction of an international 
trade-based economy, direct foreign investment, short-term capital flows, the 
international flow of workers and people in general, as well as the flow of 
technology” (Bhagwati, 2004, p. 3).  
Global transformations have occurred in the last fifty years that have had 
significant impacts on depopulation at both the regional and national levels 
(Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 2012a).  The literature suggests that the forces of 
globalisation and agglomeration concentrate financial capital, human capital, 
resources and infrastructure in globally competitive cities whilst leaving those 
cities, towns or regions on the periphery sucked dry of those same life-giving 
components (Beetz, et al., 2008; Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 2012b).  
Consequently, growth is unbalanced with some areas experiencing labour 
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surpluses while others experience prolonged shortages, particularly of skilled 
labour. In addition to this, empirical evidence suggests that population ageing 
reinforces agglomeration (Grafeneder-Weissteiner & Prettner, 2013) suggesting 
further concentrations as the population ages. 
Globalization affects labour market mobility in more ways than international 
migration. Permanent long term migration is not the only issue, long-distance 
commuting has become common with people moving across regions and 
countries for work opportunities. Functional labour market areas are changing 
with this mobility as people live in one area but work and spend in another 
(Eaqub & Stephenson, 2014; Newell, 2006).  
3.1.2.1. Changing spatial trends 
Subnational variations in demographic change show a range of spatially 
differentiated impacts (Ferry & Vironen, 2011). There are a number of different 
patterns of spatial change that have intensified in recent decades due largely as a 
response to globalisation. Due to the wide scope of this thesis, the discussion is 
limited to only two patterns of spatial change that are experienced in many 
developed countries, as well as in New Zealand. These are; the rural to urban 
dimension and the flow of internal migrants to retirement destinations. 
3.1.2.1.1. The urban-rural dimension 
Subnational distribution of population is usually uneven and population is gained 
in or near urban centres with remote rural communities left behind (Olfert & 
Partridge, 2010, p. 147).  These spatial changes often lead to further 
peripherization of more remote areas. The outcomes of this can be; a cutback of 
services due to decreasing local tax revenues with a flow on effect of worsening 
social inclusion, the inability of peripheral regions to participate in decision-
making processes yet be strongly effected by external political decisions and the 
struggle to obtain high added value to the economy although the area is still 
impacted by economic cycles at a supra regional and global level (Beetz, et al., 
2008).  
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In countries that are still growing at a national level, studies have shown that 
rural communities that are managing to grow even with the changing spatial 
redistribution are; those in close proximity to urban agglomeration economies 
(spill over effects), have services and have amenities (Midmore, et al., 2010).  
This finding is supported by OECD research which reveals that rural regions close 
to cities attract population, and rural regions on the periphery are the only type 
of region experiencing population decline (Garcilazo, 2013). 
A case study of Victoria, Australia, showed that over the period 2001 – 2011 only 
six per cent of the population growth occurred outside of a two hour drive 
perimeter from central Melbourne. Peri-urban areas with strong integration with 
the city labour market received significant gains in population (Spiller, 2012). In 
New Zealand over half of New Zealand’s growth between 1996 and 2013 
occurred in just one region – Auckland, while Auckland and four of the remaining 
66 Territorial Authorities (TAs) accounted for 76 per cent of all growth (Jackson, 
2014).  
The impact of depopulation drivers often has a negative effect on economic 
growth (Beetz, et al., 2008).  For instance, between 1995 and 2000 GDP per 
capita in rural regions in more than half of OECD countries dropped as a 
percentage of the national average. According to the OECD (2006b) this weak 
performance is driven by factors such as, out migration and ageing, lower 
educational attainment, lower average labour productivity, and overall low levels 
of public service (p. 12). There is great disparity within rural regions though, as 
rural regions close to cities have been shown to be the most dynamic types of 
regions in terms of GDP per capita growth (Garcilazo, 2013).  
The local level economy is gaining in importance to governments. 
“Analysts and industrial, technological and regional policy makers have 
realised that competitiveness and innovation are primarily determined at 
the regional and local levels” (Aguado, et al., 2008, p. 4).  
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There is a growing understanding of the interconnected nature of national 
competitiveness. Regional development policy has become a significant issue in 
the OECD countries as regional areas are increasingly recognised as crucial 
contributors to overall national competitiveness (OECD, 2009c, p. 17).  
For many rural based primary industries, the desk-based part of the value chain 
is often located in cities with links to global supply chains, communication 
technologies and international services trade. The making and distribution part 
of the supply chain is often dislocated from the research and strategic 
management sections. For instance the Queensland mining industry shows that a 
third of the value chain by value of the mining industry’s outputs is accounted for 
by Scientific, Technical and Professional services. These activities are typically 
located in the major centres and may be well away from the location of a mine. 
Neither the main centre nor the region can survive without the other (Spiller, 
2012). Thus policy focus cannot be simply directed at keeping cities competitive, 
the local regional level needs to be included as part of the whole supply chain 
that fundamentally enables economic growth.  
3.1.2.1.2. Retirement destinations 
Another spatial pattern that is quite prevalent in wealthy developed countries is 
migration after people have retired from working life. There are typically three 
different types of retirement migration – a return to the place of origin, 
movement to be near to family, and movement to areas of high amenity, such as 
coastlines, mountains and rural landscapes (Chipeniuk, 2004; Janoschka, 2009).  
These trends are seen throughout Europe and many other countries (Janoschka, 
2009; Williams, et al., 1997). Amenity orientated migration, the movement of 
people for quality of life and pleasure rather than economic reasons, is a feature 
of many developed countries among affluent populations and is associated 
mainly with retired people (Chipeniuk, 2004; Janoschka, 2009; Williams, et al., 
1997). In Europe, there is a clear amenity trend to retirement migration with the 
warmer European countries gaining significant numbers of older people (Ferry & 
Vironen, 2011; Janoschka, 2009; Williams, et al., 1997). New Zealand experiences 
amenity retirement migration, particularly in the Bay of Plenty and Coromandel 
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Peninsula (Pool, et al., 2004; Statistics New Zealand, 2009). Indeed a recent New 
Zealand survey found that even among working age people, the primary 
motivator for internal migration is not jobs, but housing and amenities (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2007). 
3.1.2.2. Political transformations 
Paradigm shifts in economic theory have had a huge impact on populations over 
the last 40 years, with neoliberal capitalist concepts driving political policies, 
changing how industry and trade function with consequential effects on 
community dynamics (Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 2012a).  Neoliberalism favours 
macro-economic deregulation, and privatisation of state industries and has been 
linked to the loss of jobs (Conradson & Pawson, 2009). Beetz, et al. (2008) 
emphasize that regional demographic shrinkage is closely linked to government 
centralisation policies. In New Zealand, when the government widely adopted 
neoliberal policies in the 1990s, employment dropped dramatically in peripheral 
areas, such as the West Coast of the South Island, which had previously been 
sustained by local or national state government agencies (Conradson & Pawson, 
2009). 
3.1.2.3. Economic cycles and shocks 
Globalisation has a major interconnection with economic cycles. Economic or 
business cycles are defined as a fluctuation in the aggregate economic activity of 
nations between periods of expansion and periods of contraction (Hall & 
McDermott, 2014).  These cycles are not standard across countries, for instance, 
New Zealand has a volatile GDP relative to international standards (Hall & 
McDermott, 2014). Cho & McDougall (1978) found that regional economic cycles 
may differ from national cycles. The OECD (2009b) states that although there are 
significant differences across regions within countries and these differences are 
often greater than between countries, less attention is paid to addressing 
regional growth than national development.  
These cycles can certainly influence population movements, for example, as 
unemployment rises people seek jobs elsewhere. However, whether economic 
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cycles drive depopulation, or depopulation drives the local economy is still a 
matter of debate. 
“Whether a declining economy leads people to leave or an increasing 
number of people leaving results in a declining economy, it is clear that as 
the process advances, there are consequences” (Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 
2012b, p. 21). 
A further short term driver that is not necessarily linked to globalisation is 
external shocks. External shocks encompass unanticipated events that have large 
effects on population and/or economy – such as, but not limited to, natural 
hazard events and wars (Matanle, 2011).  
When short-term drivers, such as external shocks, coincide with downward 
trending long term drivers, there is reduced ability for towns to recover, leading 
to depopulation (Matanle, 2011). 
3.2.  Types of depopulation 
The above drivers combine to cause depopulation in subnational areas. There 
are several different types of decline that are expressed in demography by 
analysing the relationship between components of population change.  There are 
two components of population change, natural increase/decrease and net 
migration. These components describe the movement of populations in and out 
of an area that is being studied. Natural increase/decrease is the difference 
between births and deaths, whereas net migration is the difference between in-
migrants and out-migrants.   
The Webb classification (1963) of demographic regimes provides a useful 
framework for understanding population decline. According to Webb there are 
four states of population increase and four for population decrease. Table 2 
shows the relationship between natural change and migration direction to 
describe population increase or decrease. This thesis concentrates on the latter. 
The Webb classification can be further classified into old and new types of 
population decline which have been included in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Types of depopulation – modified from Webb classification 
Webb 
Class 
Natural 
Change 
Migration 
Direction  
Relation  
Population Increase 
A Natural 
Increase 
Net out-migration Birth surplus exceeds outmigration 
B Natural 
Increase 
Net in-migration Birth surplus exceeds in migration 
C Natural 
Increase 
Net In-migration In migration exceeds birth surplus 
D Natural 
Decrease 
Net In-migration In migration exceeds death surplus 
Population Decrease 
E Natural 
Decrease 
Net In-migration Death surplus exceeds in migration - 
new type of depopulation 
F Natural 
Decrease 
Net Out-migration Death surplus exceeds outmigration - 
new type of depopulation 
G Natural 
Decrease 
Net Out-migration Outmigration exceeds death surplus - 
old type of depopulation 
H Natural 
Increase 
Net Out-migration Out migration exceeds birth surplus - 
old type of depopulation - cumulative 
causation 
Source: (Webb, 1963) 
 
In the past, most depopulation has been a product of the Webb classifications G 
and H, that is, fuelled by net migration loss typically in response to an economic 
or environmental shock or stagnation. Most interventions for dealing with 
depopulation are based on the assumption that this is the form of depopulation 
that they are dealing with.  The Webb classifications E and F represent a type of 
depopulation not commonly seen until recently, where structural ageing of the 
population adds to the complexity of the problem and death surpluses become a 
key feature of the decline. In type E there is insufficient replacement migration 
to offset natural decline (absolute decline) (Jackson, 2011). Type F is the deepest 
expression of absolute decline as both out-migration and natural decline 
combine making this the most challenging of the depopulation types to address. 
Although the Webb classification may be useful tool for identifying the transition 
in subnational populations from the old form of decline to the new, Jackson 
(2014) notes that it does not allow for analysis of the age of migrants to be 
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considered which appears to be of particular importance to understanding the 
nature of subnational decline. 
Figure 8 shows an example of the spatial variation of the different forms of 
depopulation in parts of Europe over the period 2001-2005.  The red locations 
experience the strongest forms of population growth, yellow second strongest, 
with pale yellow being the weakest growth. Pale blue denotes weak decline, mid 
blue medium decline and dark blue the strongest form of decline. This figure 
suggests that sizeable parts of Sweden, Finland and Eastern Europe are already in 
absolute decline. More recent analysis is likely to show that this decline has 
deepened further. 
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Figure 8: Typology of population development in Europe 2001-2005  
Key modified from Ferry & Vironen (2011) to reflect Webb classification 
 
Population increase (from strong increase to weak increase): 
Red – natural increase + net in-migration (Web classification C and B) 
Orange – natural decrease + net in-migration (Web classification D) 
Yellow – natural increase + net out-migration (Web classification A) 
 
Population decrease (from weak decline to deep decline): 
Pale Blue – natural increase + net out-migration (Web classification H) 
Mid Blue – natural decrease + net in-migration (Web classification E) 
Dark Blue – natural decrease + net out-migration (Web classification F) 
 
 
Once a region or town reaches a certain depopulation point, the onset of 
absolute decline, it is almost impossible to bring about significant population 
increase (Polese & Shearmur, 2006).  
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3.3. Consequences of depopulation 
Depopulation is multifaceted and has major flow-on effects for the allocation of 
resources, the provision of services and the viability of communities isolated 
from the economic powerhouses (Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 2012a). Population 
ageing and outmigration can place pressure on labour supply, public budgets, 
health and welfare provisions and infrastructure for both national populations 
and subnational areas (Ferry & Vironen, 2011, p. 25). An example of this is a 
study of labour force in Europe which projects that if labour force participation 
rates do not change, the total size of the labour force in Europe will decline by 17 
per cent by 2050, and 23 regions are projected to see their labour forces shrink 
by 50 per cent over the same time period (Rees, et al., 2012). 
Demographic trends are becoming increasingly recognized as having significant 
ramifications for regional economic productivity and social cohesion (Ferry & 
Vironen, 2011). Population shrinkage can be self-reinforcing, creating a cycle of 
multiple causation, of slowing economic activity, out-migration of human capital, 
restricted local revenues, degradation of social and physical networks and 
services, and a reduced quality of life for those left behind (see Figure 9) 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1998; Haartsen & Venhorst, 2009; Myrdal, 1957).  
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Economic degradation
Reduced investment 
in human, social and 
cultural capital
Net outmigration
Restricted local 
revenue
Loss of services
Reduced quality of life
Figure 9: Downward cycle of population shrinkage 
  
 
Abandonment of businesses and homes is the most visible evidence of the loss of 
population. The negative consequences that can come with these – decreased 
housing values, crime, health and safety issues, and environmental hazards – can 
create a vicious cycle, with more people leaving and less investment in the area 
(Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 2012a).  
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3.4. Summary 
This chapter has outlined the drivers of depopulation, the types of depopulation 
and the consequences of shrinkage. Across the developed world the 
demographic trends that result in depopulation tend to follow a similar pattern; 
total fertility below population replacement levels for extended periods of time, 
increasing longevity and structural population ageing—the latter in many 
subnational cases accelerated by sustained net migration loss at young adult 
ages. Polese & Shearmur (2006) point to the demographic transition as the main 
driver which then combines with economic factors to create population decline.  
“The demographic transition is a fact, and it fundamentally alters the way 
in which future changes in the economic geography of nations will affect 
some regions. Some will decline.” (Polese & Shearmur, 2006, p. 43) 
The balance and interplay of drivers is unique to each country and regional 
context. In many countries depopulation and growth may be seen in tandem at 
the subnational level driven by different mixes of economic and demographic 
drivers. This complexity leads to a different experience of demographic change in 
each locality and presents considerable challenge for developing or transferring 
interventions from one location to another.   
Some spatial patterns of change have intensified in recent decades, with 
retirement migration and urban-rural inter-linkages changing shape and speed 
with profound consequences for planning settlements, providing services and 
stimulating economic growth.  Although each region and community is 
experiencing their own combination of drivers, for many the type of 
depopulation that they are attempting to tackle is changing form in a rapidly 
greying world, to one which interventions are far less likely to be able to 
resuscitate. 
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4. Policy responses to depopulation 
Demographic decline and its associated problems have encouraged policy-
makers across numerous countries to develop combating policies (Hospers, 
2014).  The aim of this chapter is to describe the spectrum of policy responses to 
depopulation. This chapter begins with a theoretical policy response framework 
developed from a synthesis of seven policy response frameworks from key 
literature. This is followed by a discussion of the range of responses to 
depopulation by governments at various levels.  
As noted in Section 2.1 this thesis uses the narrow definition of a population 
policy to discuss central government policies for addressing national population 
change and subnational distribution, and focuses on specific population policy 
actions. By and large in developed countries these policies respond to population 
change, rather than seek to influence it. When drilling down into regional and 
local government policy action the broader definition of ‘population responsive 
action’ was adopted due to the fact that many governments at this level do not 
have the power to change traditional national level population-related policies to 
influence their regions (i.e. fertility, abortion, etc.) but rely on development type 
action to respond to their population situations (Lucas & Meyer, 1994).   
4.1. Spectrum of policy responses 
Population and development are understood to be interlinked, with population 
influencing development and development influenced by population (Lucas & 
Meyer, 1994).  The link between economic development and population growth 
has been heavily debated for decades. There are three main schools of thought, 
population pessimism, population optimism and population neutralism. 
Population pessimists believe that high fertility and rapid population growth 
constrain development.  Population optimists insist that rapid population growth 
fuels economic development by increasing market size, while those ascribing to 
population neutralism hold that population growth has little effect on economic 
growth and this conclusion is supported by numerous economic studies (Bloom, 
et al., 2002; European Union, 2008). Evidence from regional studies in Europe 
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have shown that depopulating regions were significantly poorer on average than 
the rest of the country that they are located in, suggesting that the reverse of 
population growth, population decline may well reduce economic development 
(European Union, 2008). However when demographic typologies of population 
decline and growth were superimposed over economic trends in Europe it was 
found that “there was no correlation between economic and demographic 
processes at regional level” (European Union, 2008, p. 54).  This finding supports 
the population neutralism viewpoint. 
The viewpoint that is adopted within the policy response literature is based on 
the optimistic paradigm that population growth fuels economic development. 
Regardless of the arguments between population and economic scholars of the 
validity of their viewpoints, there is a broad consensus amongst policy response 
researchers, who are primarily located in the planning field, that the optimistic 
interpretation (the growth paradigm) influences much of the policy response to 
population decline (Haase, 2008; Panagopoulos & Barreira, 2011; Rienits, 2009).   
It is the opinion of the planning scholars that policy makers and planners see 
population growth as essential elements to support economic activity and 
consequently accepting depopulation can be politically unappealing for 
governments at all levels (Haase, 2008; Hospers & Reverda, 2015; Panagopoulos 
& Barreira, 2011).   
According to Hospers & Reverda (2015) this attachment to the growth paradigm 
became entrenched in the legal and institutional framework of countries in 
reaction to population expansion. After hundreds of years of relatively low 
growth, populations in Europe began to grow more rapidly in the 18th Century, 
but not in a steady or cohesive manner.  This rapid growth, which arose out of 
the demographic transition described in Chapter 3, was at first considered to be 
a significant problem, as it was unmanaged and had enormous social 
consequences.  Governments and planners have by and large learnt how to 
manage population expansion and its social challenges. Continuous growth of 
population and economy became expected and also embedded in legal 
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processes as a necessary and essential good for the functioning of society 
(Hospers & Reverda, 2015).  
Although the growth paradigm is being challenged by depopulation and ageing in 
a number of countries, on the whole numerous scholars regard growth-
orientated planning still has supremacy in local government decision-making in 
many countries (Bernt, et al., 2014; Haase, 2008; Hollander, et al., 2009; 
Panagopoulos & Barreira, 2011; Schilling & Logan, 2008; Johnson, et al., 2014).  
Johnson, et al. (2014) states that this is because planners and policy makers do 
not accept depopulation is a reality or do not know how to anticipate the onset 
of population decline—or even know that it is on the horizon. 
In the literature policy responses to depopulation have been primarily grouped 
into three or four major response types (Beetz, et al., 2008; Bernt, et al., 2012; 
Hospers, 2014; Rink, et al., 2012; Verwest, 2011). In general, the response types 
may be grouped by; taking no policy action through denying or ignoring that 
depopulation is an issue in their country or location, policies that attempt to 
regenerate a location (these may be explicit or implicit) and policies that accept 
that there is an issue of depopulation, accept that the underlying drivers are too 
strong to reverse and the new state of population decline must be in some form, 
managed.  
Table 4 presents an overview of seven different policy response frameworks 
from selected literature. These policy responses have been observed by scholars 
in a range of countries and levels of government (national, regional and local) 
(Beetz, et al., 2008; Bernt, et al., 2012; Hospers, 2014; Rink, et al., 2012; Verwest, 
2011).  Most of the literature examined European local government policy 
responses, with the exception of Matanle and Rausch (2011) who researched 
Japan’s responses. There are many similarities in the literature between policy 
response frameworks, however each focused on slightly different aspects.  
The British Merseyside County Council (1979 in Rink et al. 2012) developed 
response categories in the 1970s and defined these as: passive decline, urban 
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regeneration and managed dispersal. Passive decline is a continuation of 
continue previous policies.  Urban regeneration is an attempt to reverse the 
depopulation trend but at the same time deal with consequences of population 
decline, while managed dispersal focuses on accepting decline in some areas and 
investing in areas that still have growth potential. 
Beetz, et al. (2008) found in their research that there were four diverging points 
of view for responding to depopulation. The first saw decline is an opportunity 
for alternative lifestyles. The second considered that building regional 
competitiveness was essential rather than allow regional closures. The third 
assumed people will leave a shrinking region to maximise their life conditions 
creating a state of passive restructuring.  The last viewpoint believed that there 
should be mutual support between regions with strong and weak regions 
needing to be mutually supportive. 
Verwest (2011) and Bernt, et al. (2012) draw on political theory as well in 
developing their policy responses groups.  Verwest (2011) considers that ‘doing 
nothing’ is akin to political stability where the local government does not 
explicitly adapt its policies to deal with shrinkage.  The second category, 
attempting to combat population decline, is shifting into the realms of 
conservative political action. Here the local government adapts its policies to 
increase population. When the decline is accepted and policy is adapted to deal 
with the consequences and management of shrinkage, Verwest (2011) contends 
that the policy action has become ‘radical’.   
Bernt, et al. (2012) has primary categories of conservative (growth orientated) 
and radical (accepting or mediating) but draws on a similar vein to Merseyside 
(1979) to add a spatial element. Their research in Europe revealed that it was 
common to have either a policy of focusing investment on declining areas, or 
investing only on those areas that have the best chances of growth. 
Rink, et al. (2012) categorises responses as; do nothing – either denial that a 
problem exists or acknowledge but not respond, reverse – try to reverse the 
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trend and stimulate population growth or accept decline and manage the 
consequences.  In their research Rink, et al. (2012) found that strategies could be 
distinguished between “western holistic explicit growth strategies dealing 
implicitly with consequences of shrinkage and post socialist pro‐growth 
strategies emphasizing job ‐ creation based on attraction of external resources… 
ignoring causes and consequences of shrinkage” (p 6).  
Hospers (2014) has a similar framework to Rink, et al. (2012) but considers the 
do nothing category to be a trivialising of the depopulation where shrinkage 
symptoms are not accepted and no action is taken.  In the countering category 
all policy measures are aimed at fostering growth, while accepting is much the 
same as Rink, et al. (2012). Hospers adds one more category in which a positive 
viewpoint of shrinkage is adopted and attempts are made to take advantage of it.  
Matanle & Rausch (2011) found that there are four different types of responses 
in Japan to depopulating areas. In the first category of redeveloping, the central 
government provides fiscal transfers to regional areas and funds development, 
particularly construction. The central government also has been attempting to 
repopulate the rural areas by developing replacement migration policies drawing 
people from primarily within the nation, but also internationally.  The last two 
categories, recovering and reinventing, are more local-level responses. Some 
communities are acknowledging current circumstances and attempting to 
reinvigorate their location by using local attributes, while others use innovative 
initiatives that focus on maximising the potential of local characteristics.  
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Table 3:  The spectrum of policy responses to population decline  
Beetz et al 2008 Bernt et al 2012 Hospers 2014 Matanle & Rausch 
2011  
Merseyside County 
Council 1979 
Rink et al 2012 Verwest 2011 
Europe Europe Europe Japan Britain Europe Europe 
Decline is an 
opportunity for 
alternative 
lifestyles 
Conservative 
(growth orientated) 
 
Trivialising: 
shrinkage 
symptoms are not 
accepted and no 
action is taken 
Redeveloping: 
central govt.  
provides fiscal 
transfers to 
regional areas and 
funds 
development, 
particularly 
construction 
Passive decline: 
continue previous 
policies 
Do nothing:  
Either denial that a 
problem exists or 
acknowledge but 
not respond 
Do nothing 
(political stability): 
local govt. does not 
explicitly adapt its 
policies to deal 
with shrinkage  
Need to build 
regional 
competitiveness 
rather than allow 
regional closures 
Radical (accepting 
or mediating) 
Countering: all 
policy measures are 
aimed at fostering 
growth 
Repopulating: 
replacement 
migration policies 
from within the 
nation and 
internationally 
Urban 
regeneration: try 
to reverse the 
depopulation trend 
but also deal with 
consequences 
Reverse:  
Try to reverse the 
trend and stimulate 
population growth 
Conservative local 
policy changes 
(combat): local 
govt. adapts its 
policies to increase 
population 
Passive 
restructuring: 
people will leave a 
shrinking region to 
maximise their life 
conditions 
Focused 
investment in 
areas of decline 
Accepting: 
adapting the 
content of policies 
to mitigate the 
negative effects of 
shrinkage 
Recovering: 
acknowledging 
current 
circumstances and 
attempting to 
reinvigorate by 
using local 
attributes 
Managed 
dispersal: accept 
decline in some 
areas and invest in 
those areas with 
growth potential 
Accept: 
Accept decline and 
manage the 
consequences 
Radical local policy 
changes: when 
local govt. accepts 
shrinkage and 
adapts accordingly 
Mutual support: 
welfare is an 
indispensable 
good. Strong and 
weak regions need 
to be mutually 
supportive 
Focused 
investment  in 
areas of the best 
growth potential 
Utilising: looking at 
the positives of 
shrinkage and 
taking advantage of 
it. 
Reinventing: Using 
innovative 
initiatives that 
focus on 
maximising the 
potential of local  
characteristics  
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As can be seen there is great variety in the above response frameworks, but 
merit in many aspects of all. An attempt has been made here to synthesize all 
the concepts and categories from the seven frameworks into a new policy 
response framework that has three main categories entitled, ‘do nothing’ non-
intervention, ‘countering’ or strategic intervention, or ‘accepting’ with further 
subgroups or policy positions. Figure 10 provides a summary of the 
accompanying policy responses.  
Figure 10: Summary of policy responses 
 
 
The categories and subgroups shown in Figure 10 are more fully developed in the 
following tables.  
Table 4 covers the non-intervention policy responses which range from passive 
non-intervention, such as ignoring or denial (Hospers, 2014; Rink, et al., 2012), to 
active non-intervention with two different expectations of the outcomes of 
market forces on a location – either the market will decide which towns survive, 
or the market will provide new opportunities and create a new equilibrium 
(Beetz, et al., 2008).  
The responses in Table 5 are active intervention choices to counter depopulation 
but they come from very different motivations. These responses related to 
different ends of the spectrum of regional economic development. 
Do nothing
• Denial
• Ignoring
• Passive 
Restructuring
• Market Adaptation
Countering
• Competitiveness
• Interconnection
Accepting
• Focusing
• Utilising
• Managing
• Exiting
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‘Competitiveness’ attempts to manipulate market forces by stimulating the 
economies of regions and attract migrants (Beetz, et al., 2008). This approach 
argues that growth should be promoted in all regions, as all regions have growth 
potential and focus should be on developing competitive advantages by utilising 
local assets (OECD, 2009b).  Conversely, ‘interconnection’ is based on regional 
development theory that strong and weak regions should provide mutual 
support and redistributive welfare is classed as an indispensable good (Beetz, et 
al., 2008).   
Table 6 covers a wide range of responses which accept that depopulation is 
occurring and attempt to deal with the consequences. ‘Focusing’ is the least 
radical of the accepting policy positions, accepting decline but targeting 
investment in growth potential areas.   
Population ageing driving the end of growth is a significant new aspect of 
population decline, especially for New Zealand which is still growing strongly at 
national level (Jackson, 2007). The ‘utilising’ response focuses on finding 
innovative solutions and opportunities to provide for this ageing dynamic or 
maximising the potential of local characteristics.  
‘Managing’ strategies try to slow the rate of decline, retain the current 
population and manage the consequences of depopulation.  
Finally, ‘exiting’ strategies (i.e. the development of exit strategies) are the most 
radical of all the policy responses. This is primarily a theoretical proposition, as 
although three potential exit strategies were located during the course of this 
study, two of these examples were prior to the 1960s and implemented under 
emergency conditions.  A further, more recent example, was implemented in 
response to very specific social-economic circumstances and as such is unlikely to 
be able to be translated generally to other communities. These examples will be 
discussed in further detail in Section 5.3.3. This policy position might be used for 
communities that have reached terminal decline and look for strategies to 
withdraw communities that are no longer viable. 
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Table 4:  Spectrum of policy responses – Do nothing/Non-Intervention 
Response: Do nothing/Non-intervention 
Policy position Explanation Action  Political position 
(Verwest, 2011) 
Denial Denying that a problem exists (Hospers, 2014; Rink, et al., 2012). None Stability 
Ignoring Knowing the problem is there but not actively considering it (Rink, et al. 2012). None 
Passive 
restructuring 
Actively choosing not to intervene. Allowing the free market to choose which towns survive (Beetz, et al., 2008). None 
Adaptation Actively choosing not to intervene with the expectation that the free market environment will create a new equilibrium 
and provide opportunities for alternative lifestyles in areas that can no longer function as a traditional economic unit. 
The local economy can adapt and provide new avenues to create value. Civil society can provide support functions 
where government services can no longer function (Beetz, et al., 2008). 
None 
 
Table 5:  Spectrum of policy responses – Countering/Intervention 
Response: Countering/Intervention 
Policy position Explanation Action  Political position 
(Verwest, 2011)  
Competitiveness 
 
Active intervention. Regional closure is a disadvantage leading to innovation 
blockages and competitiveness should be accentuated. The region should be 
integrated into supra-regional and global economic activities (Beetz, et al., 
2008). 
Policy measures aimed at fostering growth 
(Hospers, 2014). Focus should be on product 
specialisation, deregulated working conditions 
and low workforce costs (Beetz, et al., 2008). 
Conservative 
Growth Orientated 
Combat 
Interconnection Active intervention based on the theory that free markets have no self-balancing 
mechanisms and the intrinsic value of weak regions. Redistributing welfare to 
weak regions is a necessity and an indispensable good. To reduce economic 
inequalities, regions that are strong and those that are weak should be mutually 
supportive (Beetz, et al., 2008). 
Focused investment in areas of decline (Bernt, 
et al. 2012) 
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Table 6:  Spectrum of policy – Accepting/Intervention 
Response: Accepting/Intervention 
Policy position Explanation Action  Political position 
(Verwest, 2011)  
Focusing Accepting decline in some areas and investing in those areas 
with growth potential (Bernt, et al 2012; Merseyside County 
Council 1976) 
Focused investment  in areas of the best 
growth potential (Bernt, et al. 2012) 
Radical 
Utilising Shrinkage is accepted but opportunities and advantages to the 
situation are actively pursued (Hospers, 2014). 
Using innovative initiatives that focus on 
maximising the potential of local 
characteristics (Matanle & Rausch, 2011).  
Managing  Shrinkage is accepted and policies are adapted to slow the rate 
of decline and manage the consequences of depopulation (Rink, 
et al. 2012; Verwest 2011).   
Focus is on how to retain the current 
population, provide services and 
maintain/enhance quality of life (Rink, et al. 
2012; Verwest, 2011).   
Exiting Exit strategies: ranking communities and retiring those 
communities that are no longer viable (Matanle & Rausch, 
2011). 
This is currently a theoretical position – few 
actions were located. 
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The way in which decision makers recognize the issues related to depopulation 
differs greatly between regions and the particular problems that the area faces 
(Bernt, et al., 2014).  Ultimately, what policy response is decided on 
fundamentally shapes the political and planning framework for action on 
depopulation in a region (Beetz, et al., 2008).  The type of action that is chosen is 
likely to depend on the issues of the area, the range of actors that are part of the 
decision making process (government, business, community) and the type of 
policy making process that the location uses (Bernt, et al., 2014).  These policy 
response categories are useful for policy makers working on the issues of 
population decline to analyse their viewpoint and action choice as a guide to the 
next step of choosing what interventions to adopt.  
The following subsections will explore central government responses to 
depopulation at national level and subnational level, and outline regional policy 
approaches that are used to deal with subnational variation.  This is followed by 
a discussion of regional and local level government responses. 
4.2. Central government population policies 
This section presents an outline of the policy positions (views and policy 
developments) that the seven OECD countries referred to in Chapter 2, along 
with New Zealand, have adopted for dealing with national population change 
(United Nations Population Policy Division, 2013). Key demographic indicators 
are used to show how these population policies relate to the country’s level of 
population change.  
The World Population Policy Division surveys governments biennially, about their 
views on aspects of population change, and the related policy positions they 
adopt. Table 7 shows selected central government population-related policies 
and demographic indicators from Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.  The 
population-related policies included in Table 7 are: policy on growth, policy on 
fertility level, measures to address population ageing, and policy on immigration. 
In the 2013 World Population Policies survey there is no information logged with 
respect to these eight countries views on growth, fertility or immigration and 
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therefore these questions were not included in the table. These countries did 
respond to the question ‘level of concern about ageing of the population’, and 
this was included. There were only three possible responses to ‘measures to 
address population ageing’. These were: 1. Change in statutory retirement age; 2. 
Reform in the pension system; or Neither. For further information on definitions 
of the policy variables see Appendix 4. 
The demographic indicators selected to explore how these policies relate to the 
country’s level of population change were: total fertility rate, rate of natural 
increase, proportion of the population that is 65+, proportion of the population 
0-14, net migration for 2010-2014, annual growth rate and the year that national 
population decline began, if indeed it did. 
In general, how countries respond to national population change relates to the 
depth and length of time that the country has been experiencing negative 
demographic indicators (or indicators that are showing very low fertility and 
slowing growth).  For instance, Germany has had a TFR below replacement level 
since the early 1970s and the RNI has been negative since 1974 (Figure 4).  The 
youth population rate dropped below 15 per cent of the total population in the 
early 2000s (Figure 3) and the structural ageing of the population is progressing 
with over 20 per cent of the population over the age of 65 since 2008.  However, 
due to net migration gains the country only shifted into national population 
decline in 2011 (Table 7). The demographic indicators suggest that the levels of 
migration required to attempt to shift the country back into growth are likely to 
become unsupportable as natural decrease becomes entrenched.   
Table 7 shows that Germany responds to this situation with policies of raising 
fertility and changing the statutory age of retirement. Interestingly, the country 
is maintaining the policy on immigration, perhaps due to political reasons as 
increases in migration flows may be unappealing to the polity of the country.  
Japan had a slower drop below replacement fertility than Germany but has aged 
more rapidly than Germany and in fact than any other country in this group, 
shifting from just over 5 per cent of the population over 65 years in 1960 to more 
than 25 per cent by 2013 (Figure 4). Japan’s RNI only shifted into decline in 2010 
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in the same year that the country dropped into national population decline 
(Table 7).  Japan has responded with fertility and ageing policies but has not 
changed its migration policies. The types of policy actions that countries choose 
may relate to their historical context. For instance, Japan has had historically 
restrictive migration policies that, even in the face of severe population ageing 
and future shrinkage, it is reluctant to relax (Soble, 2014). As a consequence, 
migration is low on its agenda for slowing population decline.   
At the other end of the scale, New Zealand and the US have the strongest 
demographic indicators of growth (relatively high fertility and very high net 
migration gains per capita) and although these countries express concern about 
the ageing of their populations, this has not been backed by related action. 
The relationship between demographic indicators and policy action is not always 
clear. For instance, Australia’s demographic indicators are also still relatively 
strong, yet the country has an explicit policy to raise fertility levels and is 
reforming its pension system in terms of age of access. Canada, with weaker 
demographic indicators and below replacement level fertility since the 1970s 
(Figure 2), and with a smaller rate of natural increase (3.7) and an annual growth 
rate of 1 per cent, does not have any interventions for fertility or growth. 
The fertility and migration policies that are being actioned in these countries 
could be considered countering responses to forthcoming depopulation as they 
are attempting to boost the total population through demographic (and 
migratory) measures. The measures to address population ageing could be 
considered to be an accepting response as these are adapting to the changing 
age structures and attempting to spread the fiscal load.  
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Table 7:  Key country population policies and key demographic indicators  
 Australia Canada Germany Japan Netherlands NZ UK US 
Type of depopulation Regional Regional National National Regional Regional Regional Regional 
Demographic indicators 
Total population 2013/millions 23.3 35.2 82.7 127.1 16.8 4.5 63.1 320.1 
Total Fertility Rate 2013 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.8 2.1 1.9 2.0 
Rate of Natural Increase /1000 
(2010) 
6.9 3.7 -2.0 -0.1 3.1 8.1 3.1 5.8 
Elderly pop (65+) % of total pop 
2013 
14 15 21 25 17 14 17 14 
Youth pop (0-14) % of total pop 
2013 
19 16 13 13 17 20 18 20 
Net migration 2010-2014 (000s) 750 1,100 550 350 50 75 900 5,000 
Annual growth rate (%) 2013 1.31 1.00 -0.11 -0.08 0.27 1.02 0.57 0.81 
National population decline began N/A N/A 2011 2010 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Population size and growth 
Policy on growth* 
No 
intervention 
No 
intervention 
Raise Raise 
No 
intervention 
No 
intervention 
Lower 
No 
intervention 
Fertility 
Policy on fertility level* Raise 
No 
intervention 
Raise Raise 
No 
intervention 
Maintain 
No 
intervention 
No 
intervention 
Population age structure 
Level of concern about ageing of 
the population* 
Major 
concern 
Major 
concern 
Major 
concern 
Major 
concern 
Major 
concern 
Major 
concern 
Major 
concern 
Major 
concern 
Measures to address population 
ageing** 
2 Neither 1 1,2 1,2 Neither 1,2 Neither 
International migration 
Policy on immigration* Maintain Maintain Maintain Maintain Lower Maintain Lower Maintain 
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Sources: Total population, Total Fertility Rate (children per woman), Annual growth rate: World Population Policies 2013 database 
Net migration: is the net total of PLT migrations during the period. Data are five year estimates 2010-2014. 
Elderly population and youth population 2013: Source: World Bank (2015) indicator database 
RNI: World Population Prospects 2012 database 
*All policy: World Population Policies 2013 survey database.  
**Measures adopted to address population ageing: 1. Change in statutory retirement age 2. Reform in the pension system; Neither 
For further info on definitions of policy variables see definitions in Appendix 4 
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4.3. Central government policy response to subnational 
depopulation/spatial distribution 
All of the countries analysed in this thesis are experiencing regional depopulation 
of varying degrees but are responding to it in a range of different ways.  
Table 8 lists key regional demographic indicators and central government spatial 
redistribution policies.  The annual urban population and rural growth rates were 
used to give an indication of whether the rural areas were depopulating in each 
country.  
Table 8 shows that for most of the countries there is positive growth in the urban 
areas combined with decline in rural populations which supports the theory of 
rural to urban drift. Only Germany is losing population both in rural and urban 
areas.  Although Table 8 does not show the subnational spatial variation, 
literature makes it clear that Canada and New Zealand also are experiencing 
subnational population decline in specific peripheral locations in their respective 
countries.   
The biggest drop in the annual rural population growth rate is in Japan which 
shows a marked -7 per cent drop just in one year, indicating significant losses. 
The outmigration from rural areas may have been extenuated by the ongoing 
effects of external shocks, such as the Fukushima nuclear disaster and East Japan 
earthquake and tsunami that have devastated economies in those areas affected 
(Matanle, 2011).  
The World Population Policy Division also surveys governments about their views 
on the spatial distribution of their countries, and a range of policies that they 
implement to change the spatial distribution. Only the policy on migration from 
rural to urban places was included in Table 8 out of the range of possible policy 
choices as this was the only policy question that any country implemented in the 
spatial distribution dataset.   
All of the countries, with the exception of the US, expressed concern with the 
spatial distribution of their populations. However, just because countries see a 
need for a minor change to their spatial distribution, they don’t necessarily back 
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it up with action. For instance Australia, Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand and 
the UK all desire change but only Australia and Canada have policies to lower 
migration from rural to urban places. Germany and Japan desire major change to 
their spatial distribution and have adopted policies to lower migration from rural 
to urban places.   
These spatial distribution policies suggest that Australia, Canada, Germany and 
Japan ‘accept’ that they are experiencing rural outmigration and depopulation 
and are using ‘countering’ strategies to attempt to change the situation. 
Although Canada does not have overall rural outmigration in 2013, a deeper 
analysis would show that the country has been suffering depopulation at a 
subnational level (Polese & Shearmur, 2006; Warkentin, 2012).  
It is not clear whether the Netherlands and the UK accept that there is a need to 
deal with rural outmigration. The World Population Policy Division does not 
record any policies to combat rural depopulation from these countries.  
Finally, the response of the US suggests that the country does not accept that 
depopulation is an issue or that there is a need to intervene in the spatial 
distribution of the country. Further discussion on this point is in Section 4.5. 
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Table 8:  Key spatial distribution indicators and central government policies with national level regional policy approaches  
 Australia Canada Germany Japan Netherlands NZ UK US 
Demographic indicators – spatial distribution and internal migration 2013 
Population density 
(per sq km) 
3 4 232 336 404 17 260 33 
Urban population (%) 89 81 74 93 84 86 80 83 
Annual urban 
population growth rate 
(%) 
1.49 1.06 -0.03 0.57 0.74 1.09 0.76 1.14 
Annual rural 
population growth rate 
(%) 
-0.05 0.36 -0.70 -7.61 -2.08 0.70 -0.03 -0.55 
Spatial distribution and internal migration policies 2013 
View on spatial 
distribution 
Minor change 
desired 
Minor change 
desired 
Major change 
desired 
Major change 
desired 
Minor change 
desired 
Minor change 
desired 
Minor change 
desired 
Satisfactory 
Policy on migration 
from rural to urban 
places 
Lower Lower Lower Lower 
No 
intervention 
No 
intervention 
No 
intervention 
No 
intervention 
Source: Demographic indicators – United Nation World Population Policies 2013 http://esa.un.org/poppolicy/wpp_datasets.aspx  
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4.4. Regional policy trends and subnational policy approaches 
As shown in Section 4.2 many countries do not have explicit population policies 
for dealing with subnational depopulation. The policy approaches that central 
governments use to address subnational population issues are often indirect 
policies that fall into the broader definition of ‘population responsive action’ and 
primarily focus on a development agenda (Lucas & Meyer, 1994).   
Regional development policy has climbed to the top of the international policy 
agenda with the acknowledgement of the interconnectedness of national 
competitiveness for regional areas within countries (OECD, 2009a). Governments 
have attempted to reduce regional disparities over many decades but increasing 
globalisation, decentralisation and fiscal constraints have put pressure on 
redistribution policies (OECD, 2010b). National governments have shifted policy 
towards encouraging regional growth by adapting to the requirements of 
individual regions and building on their regional potential. In light of this, the 
top-down subsidy approach is being superseded by a growing trend of 
decentralisation to the regional level and the devolution of tasks to local 
governments (OECD, 2010b). 
Since the 1980s there has been a general shift in regional policy, across the OECD 
countries, away from financial redistribution to regional areas. Rural 
development was previously focused on farm subsidies to stimulate rural regions 
in many OECD countries. There has been recognition that financial redistribution 
and focusing on agriculture is not enough to encourage development of rural 
places (OECD, 2006c; OECD, 2007b).  
How rural economies were sustained in the past has changed dramatically. There 
has been a dramatic reduction in the need for farm labour. Rural regions now 
rely on a different set of economic engines to stimulate growth (OECD, 2006c; 
OECD, 2007b).   According to the OECD (2006a, 2007b) globalisation has provided 
new opportunities for prosperity in rural regions. The “future prosperity of rural 
regions will be determined by drivers such as human capital, entrepreneurship, 
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innovation, renewable energy, technology, creative industries and competitive 
farming” (OECD, 2006a, p. 8).   
Three main factors are changing the face of regional policy development across 
OECD countries: 
 an increased focus on places and their amenities 
 reformation of agricultural policy from subsidies to specific sectors  
 decentralisation and movement away from regional redistribution of 
financial support towards broader policies to improve regional 
competitiveness. 
This approach requires strong coordination across sectors, across levels of 
government, and between public and private actors (OECD, 2006c).  There is a 
broad trend away from top-down approaches that focus on single sectors. 
Policies are shifting to cooperative, multi-actor approaches that deal with place-
based issues (OECD, 2007a).  The place-based approach asserts that the social, 
cultural and institutional context of location is important (Barca, et al., 2012).   
Table 9 outlines the features of the new rural paradigm approach. 
Table 9: The new rural paradigm 
 Old Approach New Approach 
Objectives Equalisation, farm 
income, farm 
competitiveness 
Competitiveness of rural areas, valorisation 
of local assets, exploitation of unused 
resources 
Key target 
sector 
Agriculture Various sectors of rural economies (i.e. rural 
tourism, manufacturing, ICT industry, etc. 
Main tools Subsidies Investments 
Key actors National 
governments, 
farmers 
All levels of governments (supra-national, 
national, regional and local), various local 
stakeholders (public, private, NGOs) 
Source: (OECD, 2006c) 
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This rural paradigm shift is being adopted by a range of OECD countries, which 
are developing their own multi-sectoral, place-based approaches that aim to 
identify and exploit the varied development potential of rural areas (OECD, 
2006c).  The historical ‘one size fits all’ model of intervention is acknowledged as 
failing to recognize those inherent linkages between people and the places that 
they live (McIntyre, et al., 2006). Place-based challenges require place-based 
responses (Ferry & Vironen, 2011). 
4.4.1. Subnational policy approaches 
There are wide disparities between countries, evidenced by their regional policy 
approaches. Table 10 outlines the central government regional policy 
approaches for the seven OECD countries focused on in this thesis, as well as 
New Zealand.   
What type of intervention pathway is chosen for responding to depopulation is 
likely to be influenced by the political framework of the country. Previous studies 
have found that countries which follow neoliberal policies more closely tend 
towards an expectation of self-help for local communities (Chesire, 2006).  
Countries have a number of strategies to deal with countering population decline, 
with some favouring active management of the situation while others prefer to 
let market forces dictate. Some countries have state-directed responses, driven 
from central government with countries forcing a ‘top down’ approach where 
policy is formed at a national level and the regions are instructed to comply. 
Other countries have a ‘bottom up’ approach where the policy agenda is 
facilitated by the state, giving the responsibility for developing regional 
development plans to their regions. 
Some countries have a constitutional commitment to regional balance, such as 
Germany. Other countries, like the Netherlands, are emphasizing growth 
orientated policies to drive competitiveness in their regions. New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom are also following this pathway. Another concept, 
endogenous development, is gaining popularity in countries such as Australia 
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and Norway. This concept aims to combine competitiveness with the potential of 
regions along with social and environmental sustainability (OECD, 2010b). 
All countries, with the exception of Germany, accede to a ‘competitiveness’ 
policy position. Canada also adopts an ‘interconnection’ paradigm which is 
facilitated by the Federation, rather than directed, while the UK is quite state 
directive. The US has an assortment of responses and policies, with low 
intervention and driven by the local level with some input from regional level 
funding bodies (OECD, 2014).   
The policies countries choose are also dependent on the economic development 
goals and objectives of countries. These may be numerous and potentially 
conflicting, for instance, regional policy in the UK aims “to contribute to high and 
stable levels of growth and employment nationwide by ensuring that each region 
is achieving its full potential,” whereas the European Union regional policy 
objectives are to “support cohesion, competitiveness and employment, and 
cross-border co-operation (EC 1083/2006) (OECD, 2009a, p. 34).”  
More in-depth country profiles can be found in Appendix 1. These discuss the 
role that central government plays in the regions of each country and recent 
policy developments.  These profiles have been developed from the OECD 
Regional Outlook (2014) as well as relevant literature. 
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Table 10:  Central government regional policy approaches  
 Australia Canada Germany Japan Netherlands NZ UK US 
Policy position Competitiveness, 
Interconnection 
Competitiveness, 
Interconnection  
Focusing, 
utilising, 
managing 
Competitiveness, 
interconnection, 
Utilising 
Competitiveness, 
interconnection 
Ignoring, 
Competitiveness 
Competitiveness Passive 
restructuring, 
adaptation, 
competitiveness 
Facilitation of 
regional policy 
approaches 
Regionally driven 
– some federal 
facilitation 
Federation 
facilitation 
Regionally 
driven 
Mixed, national 
and local 
Regionally driven Nationally 
driven 
State driven and 
state directed 
Regionally or 
local level 
driven 
Source: OECD (2014), selected literature – see Country Profiles (Appendix 1) 
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4.5. Regional and local government policy responses 
Strategies at the regional level, especially for shrinking city regions in the 
Western democratic countries of the European Union, have commonly been a 
mix of economic stimulation and accepting strategies for dealing with the 
negative consequences of decline (Bernt, et al., 2012).  These strategies are a 
combination of old and new responses, promoting growth but accepting: 
 concepts of sustainability 
 the need for policy adaptation to decline and mediation of consequences 
 the need for state intervention combined with market and civil society to 
achieve results (Bernt, et al., 2012). 
 
There is often a divide between the national level response to depopulation and 
regional or local response (Ferry & Vironen, 2011).  In general, countries that are 
part of the European Union, as well as Japan, have national level support for 
dealing with depopulation, whereas policy responses in the United States have 
been primarily at the local level (Editorial, 2013).  The US is the only country that 
considers the spatial distribution of the country to be satisfactory, however the 
local response is vastly different with a large number of local governments 
experimenting with interventions to attempt to either counter or accept 
depopulation in their area (Hollander, et al., 2009; Johnson, et al., 2014). In the 
Netherlands, although the country does not have internal migration 
interventions, in some shrinking regions of the country attempts are being made 
to reduce the housing stock (Dreijerink, et al., 2012).  
As well, the choices that governments make about population policies at national 
level, particularly for highly centralised governments can impact on the ability for 
regional or local level governments to initiate their own actions (Panagopoulos & 
Barreira, 2011).  The local level response may be constrained by the national 
political framework (Ferry & Vironen, 2011).  In a study of government responses 
to depopulation in four different cities from four different countries in Europe, 
Bernt, et al. (2014) found that the degree of local autonomy in decision making 
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varied greatly between the locations due to the political framework of the host 
country. For instance, in the UK the local governments are controlled by the 
central government, whereas in Germany a considerable amount of power is 
devolved to the local level. 
4.6. Summary 
This chapter has outlined three main theoretical policy responses to 
depopulation: do nothing, countering and accepting strategies, and has showed 
how the range of responses varies by level of government.  The literature 
suggests that national governments around the world are still in the early stages 
of developing policies to manage age-driven population decline. This is at least in 
part because it differs fundamentally from past periods of decline, so old 
approaches no longer work. 
There is a wide range of responses to depopulation and these vary significantly 
from country to country. The analysis of different levels of government response 
to population decline has shown that some countries are further ahead than 
others in accepting population decline and acting accordingly. There is a strong 
relationship between depth and length of depopulation and the response to 
depopulation. There is often a divide between central government and local 
government attention and efforts to address depopulation and in some cases 
this can restrict local level action. 
The growth paradigm on the whole appears to dominate over the governmental 
response to depopulation, however, there does not seem to be a systematic 
agenda within countries to counter or accept decline –rather a mix of population 
policies and responsive policies are adopted at any level deemed appropriate to 
attempt to change the demographic future. The synthesized policy response 
framework presented in this chapter could be useful for policy makers working 
on the issues of population decline to analyse their viewpoint and action choice 
as a guide to the next step of choosing what interventions to adopt. 
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5. Interventions 
This thesis investigates a wide range of interventions or strategies by countries 
or regions that are attempting to either regenerate or mitigate the consequences 
of population decline in their nations, regions and local communities. This 
chapter drills down into the type of interventions or strategies that a range of 
countries are implementing at national, regional and local level and outlines 
those strategies and related issues.  A broad range of literature has been 
canvassed and the findings are presented here, but this work is by no means 
exhaustive.  
5.1. Intervention framework 
In the context of depopulation, interventions are the tools that are used to 
influence behaviour, whether it is people or capital, so that the consequences of 
depopulation are either countered or managed.  However not all strategies are 
successful.  
Some initiatives are focused entirely on a premise of countering the effects of 
population decline and seek to stimulate regeneration, while others 
acknowledge the underlying drivers are too strong in their area  and accept the 
decline, focusing on maintaining their current population and enhancing quality 
of life.  Some countries have adopted a mixed response where depopulation and 
the role of population ageing are acknowledged and measures put into place to 
deal with the consequences, at the same time as advancing a policy of economic 
stimulation. Many strategies can be adopted by either a general countering or 
accepting response while others are very specific. Some initiatives do not 
explicitly focus on demographic change, but do so indirectly.  
Policies for dealing with population decline share substantial similarities due to 
the universal nature of the causal forces; low fertility and increasing longevity, 
population ageing and economic geographic mobility processes of concentration 
and urbanisation. However, there is great variation at the implementation level 
(Galjaard, et al., 2012).   
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Studies have shown that regions adopt a variety of different interventions or mix 
of strategies that are targeted at particular policy sectors or areas.  The term 
‘sector’ is sometimes associated with ‘industry’, however in this thesis it has a 
general meaning of political strategy focus on a substantive area or policy topic 
of interest (Lehmbruch, n.d.).  The interventions in this section have been 
grouped by the policy sector that they target. Five main policy sectors were 
identified; governance, planning, economic, promotion and social.   
Strategies may be activated at national, regional or local level or form a 
comprehensive strategy covering all levels, policy sectors and actors (Rink, et al., 
2012). A comprehensive strategy may combine a range of individual tools to 
form a complete strategy, for instance, an economic development strategy may 
have tax incentives, industrial zones, and public-private financial schemes.  As 
well, according to Rink, et al. (2012), a development strategy needs to include 
both short term and long term objectives.  
Interventions are actioned at national, regional or local level and are driven from 
the top down or bottom up depending on the country’s political stance (see 
Appendix 1). The interrelationships are very complex. For instance, Matanle & 
Rausch (2011) note that in Japan where there is a range of policy agendas being 
implemented in shrinking regions, each policy that is formulated has an 
underlying institutional foundation with its value set. The national context 
strongly influences the regional responses, which are in turn, influenced by the 
regional context (Galjaard, et al., 2012). However, local government 
policymakers and planners are very limited in their ability to influence their local 
populations as these are overshadowed by national forces (Johnson, et al., 2014).  
It is no surprise then, that studies have shown that there are strong linkages 
between national level policies and regional policies, with the more successful 
regional policies being supported by strong national policies (Galjaard, et al., 
2012). Consequently, governing regional development is a complex task and is 
characterised by horizontal and vertical inter-dependencies between levels of 
government and associated departments, relationships with stakeholders in 
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many private and public sectors, and requires participation and partnership 
between public and private actors (OECD, 2009a). 
Interventions to depopulation primarily attempt to influence the behaviour of 
people or the flow of capital.  People, as accumulations of human capital, and 
capital flows (finance), move between countries, regions and towns (OECD, 
2011).  People often move to where they can capitalize on economic 
opportunities or a better quality of life, while capital flows to areas with the least 
costs and greatest opportunity to increase (White, 2015, p. 6). These elements 
tend to cluster in particular locations, which in turn attracts more capital inflows 
through increased efficiencies, innovation and productivity (White, 2015, p. 6). 
This thesis has grouped the interventions firstly under their type of response 
(countering or accepting) and secondly by the objective of the intervention, 
whether to influence people (described as attracting human capital) or capital 
flows.   
5.1.1. Old Economy versus New Economy 
There has been a paradigm shift in economic thought in recent years.  Adelaja, et 
al. (2009), suggest that new drivers of growth have emerged challenging previous 
understanding of how growth and prosperity operate. The Old Economy placed 
great emphasis on drawing in big industries to create manufacturing jobs. The 
New Economy concentrates on knowledge based jobs and workers. Place making, 
in terms of amenities and quality of life, is emerging as a key component of 
attraction to locations and retention for these knowledge workers (see Figure 11) 
(Adelaja, et al., 2009; Knight Foundation, 2010). Many locations that are losing 
population were developed within, and still hold to, an Old Economy model in 
peripheral areas.  
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Figure 11: Place and placemaking in the New Economy  
Source: Adelaja, et al. (2009). Chasing the past or investing in our future 
Numerous strategies located through the environmental scan of the literature 
are based on the old economy theory model. If the economy has indeed shifted 
focus to match the ‘New economy’ model then many interventions may not be 
successful if they continue to follow the old model. 
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The following sections discuss countering or regeneration strategies in terms of: 
 Attracting human capital 
 Attracting capital flows 
Accepting strategies: 
 Maintaining and retaining human capital   
 Maintaining and retaining investment and infrastructure 
and Exit strategies:  
There also comes a point when some communities are no longer viable. 
Solutions may need to be found to enable shutting down of the town and 
community without significant loss of capital or quality of life. This is the ultimate 
challenge. 
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5.2. Countering interventions 
Countering interventions or regeneration are the most common strategies where 
the growth paradigm remains dominant (Hospers, 2013). The Scottish 
Government (2011) defines ‘regeneration’ as “the holistic process of reversing 
the economic, physical and social decline of places where market forces alone 
won’t suffice” (p. 2).  Most communities focus on regeneration without giving 
sufficient credence to the underlying population indicators and economic drivers. 
These interventions attempt to change the behaviour of people or capital.  
5.2.1. Attracting human capital 
Positive net migration is often labelled as the ultimate measure of success for a 
region or town that has been suffering from depopulation (Midmore, et al., 
2010). As will be discussed in this chapter the reasons that people move to a 
location are a matter of great debate, however what is clear through a variety of 
studies is that people are motivated by a variety of needs – social, economic and 
environmental (location, amenity) among others (Connell & McManus, 2011; 
Katz & Stark, 1986; Kenyon, et al., 2001; Martinez-Fernandez, 2010; Mendola, 
2006; Midmore, et al., 2010; Rosenzweig, 1988; Statistics New Zealand, 2007; 
Todaro, 1976). Human capital countering strategies attempt to utilise some of 
these requirements to attract people to the location. 
Table 11 lists some typical strategies for attracting human capital from the 
planning, economic and promotion policy sectors.  
These interventions aim to draw people in and retain them by: 
 creating physically appealing places to live in 
 promoting the location as an appealing place to live 
 promoting economic opportunities 
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Table 11: Strategies for attracting human capital 
Policy sector Strategy 
Planning Urban regeneration: Redevelopment of existing built environment and 
amenities 
 Refurbishment of houses to attract people 
 Historic preservation 
 Ecological restoration 
 Public space improvements 
 Landscape beautification 
Development of new built environment to attract immigrants 
 Building more social infrastructure – swimming pools etc. 
 Developing house lots 
 Building attractions  
Economic & 
Social 
Targeting skill and job shortages 
 Education and skills training 
 Industry experience centres 
Youth initiatives 
 Youth Councils 
 Pastoral care 
 Guaranteed job paths 
 Scholarships 
 Youth transport options  
 Internships 
Promotion Migration policies 
 Quality of migrants rather than quantity 
 Provincial programmes 
 Overseas recruitment workshops 
 Actively integrating migrants into the community  
Place promotion 
 Re-branding locations 
 Incentives to move – subsidies, raffles, lump sum payments 
 Promoting lifestyle attractions 
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5.2.1.1. Planning 
Attempting to reverse depopulation by using planning techniques, such as ‘urban 
regeneration’, has been a common strategy amongst OECD countries (Hospers, 
2013; Mak & Stouten, 2014; Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 2012b; Tennyson, 2015). 
Urban regeneration has been defined as “comprehensive and integrated vision 
and action aimed at the resolution of urban problems and seeking to bring about 
a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social and environmental 
condition of an area that has been subjected to change” (Roberts, 2000, p. 17).  
Urban regeneration strategies have shifted in or out of fashion depending on the 
prevailing thinking of the era. For instance, in Britain urban regeneration 
interventions began as a reaction to the decline of the manufacturing industries 
from the 1960s onwards, with the central aim to combat the social 
consequences of de-industralisation. Therefore the urban regeneration 
strategies of the 1960s and 70s were predominantly welfare based.  
With the adoption of free market concepts in the 1980s regeneration strategies 
shifted to promotion of towns or regions through marketing campaigns, while 
the late 1990s moved towards community participation (Ortiz-Moya, 2015). The 
central premise through all these stages was to improve conditions in the city 
and encourage a ‘sense of place’ that will draw in people. There has been a 
strong focus on physical transformation with the expectation that economic 
problems will work themselves out (Ortiz-Moya, 2015). 
Manchester, in the United Kingdom, is an example of a city in which urban 
regeneration was used to some success. Manchester suffered significant 
population loss, and was rebranded by the Manchester City Council to break 
from its manufacturing antecedents and shift towards a cultural and service 
industry city; it has since experienced population growth (Ortiz-Moya, 2015). 
One component of urban regeneration is the restructuring and upgrading of the 
existing built environment (Mak & Stouten, 2014). Manchester City Council 
initiated collaboration with private sectors partners and trialled a range of 
‘flagship’ development projects, such as stadiums, museums and media centres, 
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creating distinct character sections within the city, in the hope that one of the 
projects would achieve regeneration success (Ortiz-Moya, 2015). Although there 
have been a few success stories, there have been just as many, if not more, 
failures.  In Britain a number of declining towns were propped up with 
government money in which various attractions like museums, art centres and 
sculptures were built to draw tourists (The Economist, 2013; Tennyson, 2015). 
According to The Economist, this strategy has not succeeded and many of the 
towns that received government welfare are still experiencing population decline 
(The Economist, 2013). 
Although Manchester is touted as model of success, in that it achieved 
population growth after a lengthy period of decline, it has come at a cost of a 
polarised labour market and social exclusion and failed to address pre-existing 
social inequalities (Ortiz-Moya, 2015).   
This issue of underlying social structures is described by an urban process called 
‘gentrification’ which relates the effect of urban regeneration on communities 
(Freeman & Cheyne, 2008; Mak & Stouten, 2014). Gentrification is a well-
researched process of urban change and is a highly contested concept.  An early 
definition of gentrification by Glass (1964, in Freeman & Cheyne 2008: 34) 
defines the concept as a “process of succession and displacement in areas 
broadly characterised by working-class and unskilled households.”  
The central component of gentrification is progressive upgrading of 
neighbourhoods (Freeman & Cheyne, 2008).  Gentrification has both positive and 
negative outcomes, with the potential for improvement of the economic 
conditions of the location but comes at the cost of social equity (Freeman & 
Cheyne, 2008). The literature contends that gentrification is effectively a class 
struggle between working class and more affluent socio-economic groups that 
seek to enhance the location (Fol, 2012; Freeman & Cheyne, 2008; Smith, 1996). 
Certainly, research has shown that when these regeneration strategies work they 
can cause worse social problems, as when the built environment is gentrified and 
newcomers are drawn in to the improved location, the most vulnerable people 
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may be forced out of the area, into poor quality housing, or more crowded 
conditions, through higher rents (Fol, 2012).   
Another planning intervention that has been commonly used is building new 
infrastructure, housing and civic attractions to encourage people to relocate to 
an area. There is a fundamental assumption that if the houses, attraction or 
town is built then the people will come.  This strategy has had its own set of 
problems compared to those of urban regeneration. The key here seems to be a 
lack of understanding how social structures work.   
In China, instead of regenerating the built environment, an entire new town was 
built – a miniature Paris, complete with a scaled down Eiffel tower and European 
style boulevards as a drawcard. However, the Chinese public wasn’t so keen on 
moving to a location that was just buildings with no established community or 
business base (Journeyman Pictures, 2013). Burma also used this idea, where a 
whole city was built in anticipation of an influx of people that never arrived7.  In 
the Netherlands the local government of a declining region decided to invest in 
developing 1500 housing lots in the hope that people choosing to live in their 
region would also stimulate the job market. Twelve years later only 150 were 
sold (da Costa & Meyer, 2013).  
On the whole strategies that focus on new housing, tourism and related 
campaigns have limited success (Hospers & Reverda, 2015). A measure of 
success was achieved in Ireland with its Rural Renewal Scheme, under which 
financial incentives were used by the government to encourage construction of 
new housing and businesses and renovation of existing properties. The scheme 
stemmed population decline and increased housing output but had unintended 
consequences of excessive housing output with accompanying high vacancy 
rates (Gkartzios & Norris, 2011).   
Although certain success stories are touted, on the whole, there is little 
indication that developing the built environment to attract people works and can, 
                                                     
7 Top Gear episode – Burma Special: Supersize Burmese Drag Race - Top Gear - Series 21 - BBC 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8uwTnP8ioiU 
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in many cases, leave the local community in a worse financial situation (Beckham, 
2015). 
5.2.1.2. Economic – skills and jobs 
Generally job creation is likely to bring people into an area, though this 
connection is very complex (Mendola, 2006). Much of economic migration 
literature considers that people move based on an income maximisation 
objective and therefore will move where they will get the greatest income 
(Mendola, 2006; Todaro, 1976).  This concept fails to account for other 
influences on a potential migrant’s choices and research has shown that 
movement of people does not always correlate with expected incomes (Katz & 
Stark, 1986; Rosenzweig, 1988).   
Interpersonal relationships and family connections are also strong motivators for 
moving (Mendola, 2006).  According to Massey, et al. (1993), the costs and risks 
of moving are lowered due to this form of social capital.  This viewpoint is 
supported by a survey of dynamics studying motivations for migration in New 
Zealand which found that the main reason for people to move from their 
previous residence across all age groups was social motivation, followed closely 
by environmental reasons. Economic reasons for moving held third place 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2007).   
The finding that jobs are not always the primary reason for moving is supported 
by the fact that in many locations in New Zealand there is a mismatch between 
jobs and workers, with some areas having plenty of jobs available but limited 
workers and others many potential workers but few jobs. For instance, 
Southland has low unemployment due to employers’ labour requirements 
expanding at a greater rate than the pool of labour (Department of Labour, 
2007).  Although there have been a large number of initiatives activated to 
encourage in-migration to fill the skill shortages, the numbers of newcomers 
have not kept pace with employer’ requirements.  The Southland economic 
development agency, Venture Southland, projects that the labour force will 
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require an additional 12,000 workers over the next 15 years (New Zealand 
Immigration, 2015; Venture Southland, 2014).   
The challenge is not just attracting human capital to an area but also 
strengthening the skill base of the population which is already in the location as 
“human capital is the most important ingredient for long-run regional economic 
prosperity” (Singer, 2012, p. 8). Education and skills training is named as a critical 
pathway for improving productivity toward economic growth. Developing human 
capital helps to advance innovation and technology uptake (Kwon, 2009a; Singer, 
2012).  
A common problem for towns in peripheral areas is the loss of youth who leave 
for training and employment opportunities in urban centres, contributing to a 
shortage of skills (Martinez-Fernandez, 2010).  Martinez-Fernandez (2010) found 
that employment alone cannot stop emigration, especially in the youth age 
groups due to their desire to experience other lifestyles and opportunities. Of 
more importance than employment for retention of population is the demand 
for services in health, education, environment, housing, and entertainment 
(Martinez-Fernandez, 2010, p. 63). 
Even so, some towns are attempting to reduce the outmigration of this age 
group by adopting strategies that particularly target youth. The Regional Council 
in Kalmar County in Sweden sees the youth age groups as a resource for 
sustainable economic development (Johnsen & Perjo, 2014). With this viewpoint, 
the Regional Council has formed at Regional Development Strategy that 
prioritises youth and is adopting a range of initiatives to engage youth to combat 
outmigration of this age group. The expectation is that youth are more likely to 
stay or return to an area that they feel they can have an influence on. In 
particular, the initiatives focus on youth councils and influence in schools, 
employment and safety. Internships in healthcare are being created and part 
time opportunities in local businesses. There is no data yet available to show 
whether the initiatives have had any effect on retention of the youth population 
in Sweden (Johnsen & Perjo, 2014).   
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Kenyon, et al. (2001) found that a key attribute of successful small town 
regeneration in Australia was the use of youth initiatives - attention being given 
to the key issues affecting the retention of young men and women, including 
employment diversity, education options, transport, accommodation, lifestyle, 
image and participation.  
Otorohanga, in New Zealand, has also seen the benefits of a wide range of youth 
interventions. Although unemployment was low in the community and 
businesses were not able to fill positions, young people were leaving for training 
and generally for lifestyle elsewhere.  Under the leadership of a former Mayor, 
Dale Williams, the local council, business and community groups convinced a 
trade training centre to open in the town to supply the needs of local businesses. 
A range of other initiatives, such as; pastoral care of apprentices, keeping in 
contact with youth from schooling into work, scholarships and guaranteed job 
paths have helped to create a significant success story.  In Otorohanga, since the 
initiatives began in 2005, youth crime has plummeted and there is zero 
registered unemployment for people under age 25 since November 2006 
(Ministry of Social Development, 2010). 
Groningen, a declining region in the Netherlands, is similarly attempting to pre-
empt massive skill shortages in their industries within the near future by also 
focusing on youth. To that effect the local government has joined forces with 
industry sectors and education providers to develop a student experience centre 
in the town of Delfzijl which is designed to inspire youth to follow technical 
careers by introducing them to opportunities in the technical sector. Students 
from 10 to 25 years old can visit the centre (da Costa & Meyer, 2013).  
5.2.1.3. Promotion – migration interventions 
Increased immigration is the only explicit demographic policy intervention 
routinely used by most developed countries at national level to sustain their 
population levels (Galjaard, et al., 2012). Immigration interventions may be 
place-neutral or place-based and operationalised at the national or local level. 
Immigration is used by many countries as an answer to their low fertility crises.  
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For some countries, where fertility hovers around or just under replacement 
level (2.1 births per woman), the level of immigration (or net migration gain) 
required to maintain population size is not substantial.  For other countries, the 
volume of migration that is required to offset population loss is enormous. Of 
more importance is the fact that “the numbers of migrants needed to offset 
declines in the working-age are significantly larger than those needed to offset 
total population decline” (United Nations, 2000, p. 417). The average annual net 
number of migrants required to maintain the size of the working age population 
at its 2000 level was over 6,000 migrants per million inhabitants for Italy and 
6,000 for Germany. Japan required 5,000 migrants per million inhabitants, while 
as a whole, Europe needed over 4,000 (United Nations, 2000, p. 417).   
According to the United Nations (2000) the ability for countries to attract and 
absorb such large volumes of migrants depends on “the social, economic and 
political circumstances of the particular country or region” (p. 417). It is also only 
a medium-term measure, as globally population growth and migrant supply is 
projected to peak around the end of the present century (Lutz, et al., 2004). 
Some countries, such as the US, have in the past focused more on quantity (of 
legal migrants) than quality (Singer, 2012, p. 4). Policy discourse in the US is now 
shifting to attracting the ‘right sort’ of immigrants rather than volume. Several 
programmes for integration of migrants and enabling transference of skills to the 
US market are being developed (Singer, 2012, p. 4).  Integration strategies that 
enable immigrants to assimilate into the community have had greater success 
than simply attracting newcomers.  
In many countries, immigration is administered by the central government, 
however some countries are encouraging their regional governments to have a 
greater hand in responding to their migration needs. The Canadian federal 
government has shifted from a general points system for immigration to 
enabling the provinces to run their own ‘Provincial Nominee Programmes.’ 
Different provinces have different workforce requirements which they are 
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struggling to fill. People wanting to move to Canada must now make an 
application through the Provincial Nominee Programme (CanadaVisa.com, 2015). 
A broad body of research shows that immigrants tend to relocate to urban 
centres where there are already large immigrant populations (Aslund, 2005), and 
are less likely to move to the regional areas. Some local communities are creating 
their own initiatives to encourage migrants to their towns.  
In Canada, the town of Morden runs a successful recruitment campaign through 
their own community driven immigration initiative to fill gaps in their job market. 
The community only accepts applications from candidates that fall into target 
occupations and actively integrates the newcomers into the community. The 
initiative accesses support from a province level immigration programme where 
the programme employees travel overseas to recruit possible candidates. The 
success of the intervention is proven through the high retention rate (see 
Appendix 3.4 for more details). This intervention is only able to be achieved due 
to the Canadian government changing its governance structures to enable this to 
occur (CanadaVisa.com, 2015). 
Finland has also achieved a measure of success with a strong inflow of 
immigrants attracted to and integrated into the community. However, the 
Finnish community has had to acknowledge that even with the positive inflows, 
migrants are not able combat the structural ageing of the population and are 
merely a buffering measure (Johnsen & Perjo, 2014; United Nations, 2000). 
Immigration can be a tool to slow the onset and/or speed of decline but 
ultimately will not resolve the negative effects of population and labour force 
ageing (Bijak, et al., 2007). In the short term migration can mitigate the effects of 
an ageing population and increase the working-age population (United Nations, 
2014). In the long term, the pool of skilled workers from which to draw migrants 
in OECD countries will shrink from 2020 as the Most Developed Countries move 
pass peak population as a whole making it much hard to attract the types of 
migrants that developed countries desire (United Nations Population Division, 
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2015). Although migration is one of the most popular government interventions, 
net migration gain only partially offsets population ageing (Ferry & Vironen, 2011; 
United Nations, 2000). The age structure of the population will still age and the 
community and government will need to adapt to the older population.  
Migrant strategies have been most successful when coupled with 
integration/settlement policies. They can slow decline but are highly unlikely to 
stop it in areas with severe structural ageing (Johnsen & Perjo, 2014).  
5.2.1.4. Promotion – place marketing 
In this section, promotion of place as a location for permanent migration, rather 
than simply to visit, is discussed. A discussion on tourism is found in Section 5.2.2.   
Branding locations to encourage in-migration is a common strategy (Ortiz-Moya, 
2015).  Interventions are as wide ranging as giving away free plots of land to 
outsiders on the condition that the newcomers are planning on starting a family 
in the location, raffling building plots, advertising at emigration fairs, paying the 
parents of new born babies a lump sum on the condition that they stay in the 
location for an extended period, and providing subsidies for students (Haase, et 
al., 2012). 
There is some disagreement among researchers about what will encourage 
people to migrate to an area, however it is clear that there are many factors that 
influence the choice of home location (Connell & McManus, 2011; Katz & Stark, 
1986; Kenyon, et al., 2001; Martinez-Fernandez, 2010; Mendola, 2006; Midmore, 
et al., 2010; Rosenzweig, 1988; Statistics New Zealand, 2007; Todaro, 1976).   
In Australia, councils used tourism type promotions of lifestyle attractions but 
recently identified that lifestyle was not the key motivation for encouraging 
migration. Instead, they identified that employment opportunities, housing, 
education and health facilities were of high importance, accompanied with 
attractive local features (Connell & McManus, 2011). This contradicts a New 
Zealand study referred to in Section 5.2.1.2 which stated that social motivation 
was the main driver of choice. However, the other motivators were much the 
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same, such as environmental motivations (amenity and natural features), 
followed by economic reasons in third place (Statistics New Zealand, 2007).   
Martinez-Fernandez (2010), as mentioned previously, found that employment 
opportunities were not strong enough to keep people in a location. All the other 
factors had to be part of the mix, housing, education, quality of life.  Adelaja, et 
al. (2009) states that place making in terms of quality of life and amenities draws 
people to locations, while Galjaard, et al. (2012) states that countering 
interventions are more effective in areas with the higher amenities or that have 
higher potential opportunities. 
What is clear is that place promotion and the reasons people chose one location 
over another is a challenging conundrum that has changed over time as people’s 
expectations of living change (Adelaja, et al., 2009; Knight Foundation, 2010). 
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5.2.2. Attracting capital flows 
Using economic development strategies to stimulate the local economy, create 
jobs and draw in people is a time honoured tradition for community 
regeneration. Many local governments have some form of economic 
regeneration strategy. These are particularly prevalent in the UK (The Scottish 
Government, 2011). Although economic regeneration strategies are not 
expressly focused on population, they have been the tool of choice for 
transforming locations and can be considered in the broader definition of 
population policies - ‘population responsive action’ that is primarily focus on a 
development agenda (Lucas & Meyer, 1994) within the paradigm of growth.   
Economic regeneration strategies usually aim to bring more capital into the 
location and enable job creation by either: 
 Attracting businesses i.e. factories, businesses 
 Attracting spending i.e. tourism 
 
Table 12 only touches on some of the possible strategies and tools for economic 
countering as this topic has an extensive literature and a huge range of strategies.  
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Table 12: Strategies for attracting capital flows 
Policy sector Strategy 
Economic  Building competitive regions 
 Real estate based projects – science parks, industrial parks 
 Competitive clusters  
 Linking research and industry 
 Smart specialisation 
 Innovation 
Economic and 
promotion 
Small town redevelopment 
 Preservation 
 Revitalization 
 Economic activation 
Economic Developing the green economy 
 Alternative energy production 
 Green procurement 
 Green consumerism  
 Industrial ecology 
 Extended producer responsibility  
 Socially responsible investment 
 Integrated waste management 
 Green labelling 
 Eco-technologies 
 Eco-industrial clusters 
Economic and 
promotion 
Tourism 
 
As outlined earlier, many of these strategies can be utilised under either a 
countering or accepting strategy. However, these strategies will have only a 
limited success in a town where the underlying economic and demographic 
drivers are too strong, as will be discussed in Section 5.2.3.  
What strategies and tools governments and local governments choose to use is 
often dependent on their expressed aims, which relates to whether the 
institutional bodies adopt a competitive response, an interconnection policy 
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response, or a combination (see Section 4.1).  For instance, the Scottish 
Government draws particularly on an interconnection response:  
“Much of the regional/economic regeneration policy in the past has been 
applied to depressed and marginalised areas. What is required now is the 
need for a balance of investment in all areas – both weak and strong – 
aimed at promoting overall sustainable economic growth.” (The Scottish 
Government, 2011, p. 11) 
The following sections will explore the range of strategies for attracting capital 
flows from Table 12.  
5.2.2.1. Attracting business 
Economic regeneration strategies aim to bring more financial capital into the 
location and enable job creation. Development policies under the Old Economy 
have often focused on infrastructure provision and government investment 
strategies to attract large companies to areas that do not have a strong industry 
mix. Ongoing research is showing that large infrastructure projects often have 
unintended consequences with greater economic agglomeration, further 
regional polarization, and to an increasing economic marginalization of many 
peripheral regions where significant infrastructure investments have taken place 
(Barca, et al., 2012, p. 137).  
In attempting to prop up depopulating and economic declining areas, 
government industrial investment strategies have also, in places, ended up 
wasting resources on declining industries and defunct white elephants. In general, 
these policies have struggled to cope with the new economic realities of 
globalisation (Barca, et al., 2012). 
5.2.2.1.1. Building competitive regions  
Governments commonly encourage their regions to become ‘competitive’.  
Globalisation has created one giant worldwide market that requires countries, 
regions, cities and towns to compete against all the rest for a share of consumers, 
in the form of investors, tourists, students, migrants etc. (Anholt, 2007). 
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Reputation and perceptions become important tools for guiding consumers to a 
product from a given location or the location itself (Anholt, 2007).   
There are three main policy measures that are used for building competitive 
regions; real estate based projects (science parks, industrial parks), cluster type 
policies (clustering together collective services or joint initiatives for marking 
purposes) and linking research and industry (providing linkages between 
knowledge producers and knowledge users) (OECD, 2005). 
Competitive clusters are a particularly prominent strategy being used across the 
OECD countries to guide regional competitiveness (OECD, 2007a). A range of 
competitive regional cluster programmes from selected OECD countries is listed 
below (Table 13-15): 
Table 13: National level programmes in Germany - Competitive Regional Clusters 
Programme/ 
policy 
Year 
started 
Programme/ 
policy period 
Brief description 
BioRegio 1995 
selection 
8 years 
1996-2003 
BioRegio serves to concentrate research funds 
in  
a limited number of regions to support 
biotechnology, a sector of strategic national 
interest. 
InnoRegio 1999 7 years 
through 2006,  
next phase  
planned 
InnoRegio seeks to improve the innovation 
capacity of the lagging new Länder in Eastern 
Germany with support from EU structural 
funds. 
GA-network  
initiative  
(Joint Task) 
2005 On-going The purpose of this funding negotiation tool 
between the federal level and lagging Länder is 
to provide funding for projects that improve 
collaboration among regional actors with a 
strong research focus. 
Source: (OECD, 2007a) 
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Table 14: National level programmes in Japan - Competitive Regional Clusters 
Programme/ 
policy 
Year 
started 
Programme/ 
policy period 
Brief description 
MEXT 
Knowledge 
Clusters 
2001 5 years, to 
2005 
These Japanese knowledge clusters are 
centred around key universities and seek 
to promote greater university-industry 
collaboration. 
METI 
Industrial  
Clusters 
2001 5 years to 
2005; Phase 2 
2006-10 
The Industrial Cluster Programme supports 
SMEs and research links in a range of 
regional area types with a strong focus on 
the triple helix relationship (i.e., effective 
relationships among industry, university 
and government), business incubation and 
support services. 
Source: (OECD, 2007a) 
Table 15: National level programmes in the Netherlands - Competitive Regional Clusters 
Programme/ 
policy 
Year 
started 
Programme/ 
policy period 
Brief description 
Peaks in the 
Delta 
2005 Undefined 
(minimum  
5 years) 
This nationally sponsored programme 
seeks to support region-specific 
opportunities of national significance by 
reorienting public policy to build on the 
nation’s strengths (peaks). Regions 
covering most of the country identify a 
spatial economic development strategy, 
including their own priority clusters for 
support. 
Key 
Innovation 
Areas 
2005 Undefined 
(minimum  
5 years) 
The Netherlands innovation strategy seeks 
to focus resources on key innovation areas 
that have internationally strong 
performance and commitment of 
stakeholders. 
Source: (OECD, 2007a) 
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There is evidence that industry specialised areas with appropriate clusters enable 
business to out-perform competitors in regions that are not so strong. However, 
the lack of diversification is a concern with over-reliance on key businesses and 
industries that are vulnerable to rapid global market place changes (OECD, 
2007a). 
Another competitive regional strategy that is rapidly becoming accepted among 
European regions is smart specialisation (Midtkandal & Sorvik, 2012) and this too 
may suffer from a lack of diversification (Cho & McDougall, 1978). The central 
strategy is to enable targeted support for research and development of the 
knowledge economy (Midtkandal & Sorvik, 2012). Regions go through a process 
of establishing a vision for their area, identifying the locations within their region 
that have the highest strategic potential for development, reforming their 
governance arrangements to allow for multi-stakeholder governance, setting 
strategic priorities and implementing a range of tailor made policy actions that 
serve to strengthen the knowledge based development potential of the region 
(Midtkandal & Sorvik, 2012). 
Cho & McDougall (1978), call into question specialisation of regional areas. In a 
study of cyclical behaviour during the 1950s to 1970s it was found that 
diversified regions mirrored the national economic cycles whereas specialized 
regions had much more volatile cycles. This is an interesting supposition that 
may have changed with globalisation. Unless cyclical behaviour has changed 
considerably this research suggests that such smart specialisation may have only 
a short lived timeframe and not be the answer to the regions challenges after all.  
Policy makers are also focusing on innovation, ICT, place-based policies, 
identifying unused potential, enabling structures, and amenities to enhance 
competitiveness (OECD, 2005).  Innovation has become of particular interest 
over the last decades. According to the OECD (2005), knowledge based strategies 
that promote innovation stand out as the most appropriate way to build 
competitiveness in such a globalised world, however, the instruments seem to 
work best in advanced regions.  Innovation is a contested concept that has 
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considerable policy implications. Often associated with scientific or technical 
research of development activities, innovation has much wider considerations 
and can be linked, not just to new products, but also to new ways of thinking 
about dealing with traditional processes in more productive ways. Innovation is 
“strongly linked with social processes such as the creation of networks, the 
strengthening of local identities, and the creation and dissemination of 
knowledge” (OECD, 2006b, p. 3). 
An example of a competitive programme that draws on many of the above 
strategies is found in the Netherlands, where they have developed a rural-urban 
partnership called the ‘BrabantStad: the five cities programme’ as an integrated 
approach to economic competitiveness. The objectives of the programme are to 
strengthen economic resilience through knowledge, innovation and upskilling 
the workforce, increase the appeal of the region to the international community, 
increase accessibility through transport infrastructure, develop spatial linkages 
for greater ease of business operation and to encourage in-migration of skilled 
workers and to promote collaboration between sectors to create spillover effects. 
The underlying assumption is that international workers can solve the problem of 
an ageing population and outward migration from villages (OECD, 2013).  
The programme was supposed to support linkages to the rural areas. However, 
the rural areas are not directly involved and there is a strong focus on the urban 
areas. The five cities lead the strategic decision process and represent their 
regions and rural places, although partners from the local rural level are included 
(OECD, 2013). 
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5.2.2.1.2. Small town redevelopment 
Town centre or downtown redevelopment is a very common strategy for 
depopulating towns and aims to encourage customers into a town and support 
business growth (National Main Street Center, 2015). In the United States the 
National Trust for Historic Preservation runs the US National Trust Main Street 
revitalization programme.  A number of towns have experienced revitalization 
through the programme. The programme provides education, training, resources 
and seed money for preservation projects to enable communities to implement 
long term, comprehensive change in their towns (National Main Street Center, 
2015).  
The programme has a framework of eight guiding principles: comprehensive, 
incremental, self-help, partnership, identifying and capitalizing on existing assets, 
quality, change, and implementation. These principles support the four point 
strategy of organization, promotion, design and economic restructuring.  
Statistics collected on the preservation, revitalization and economic activities 
produced by the programme present an attractive picture of what can be 
achieved. From 1980 – 2014 $61.7 billion was reinvested in physical 
improvements from public and private sources, 251,838 buildings were 
rehabilitated, there has been a net gain of 528,557 jobs and a net gain of 120,510 
businesses (National Main Street Center, 2015).   
However, an issue with these statistics is that the economic impacts may be not 
only attributed to the programme, and other less tangible factors and impacts 
are not measured. What these statistics also mask is the failure rate of this 
strategy. Gates (2005), in a representative sample of main street communities 
undertaking the programme, found that many communities dropped out of the 
programme early or became inactive. In Oklahoma, 34 per cent of the 
communities that started a programme became inactive, while in Pennyslvania 
the figure was 42 per cent.  
The five main reasons that the programmes failed were consistent across the 178 
communities. These were: “structure, funding, programme flexibility, 
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commitment and unattainable expectations” (Gates, 2005, p. 78). Another study 
evaluating Main Street Programmes in Pennsylvania found that continuity of 
leadership was an essential element to create momentum, establish rapport, and 
begin building deep partnerships that sustain such programmes.  The 
programme requires the appointment of a Main Street Manager, however the 
average turnover rate of such managers is 1.5 years making it very difficult to 
achieve stability (Kimmel & Schoening, 2011).  
The programmes also appear to pay no attention to the underlying demographic 
drivers. It is not clear without further research if the programme had any impact 
on attracting population or capital to the towns.  
5.2.2.1.3. Green economy 
In the last decade there has been increased focus on coupling economic activity 
with environmental considerations in what has called the ‘green economy’ (The 
Royal Society of New Zealand, 2014). The United National Environment 
Programme defines a green economy as “one that results in improved human 
well-being and social equity while significantly reducing environmental risks and 
ecology scarcities” (United Nations Environment Programme, 2015).  In areas 
with declining populations, attention has paid to whether developing the green 
economy might also be an answer to stimulating the local economy 
(Mazurkewich, 2010).   
Developing the green economy has been seen as a saviour for areas that have 
declining traditional industries, as a way to create employment (Mazurkewich, 
2010). A number of towns with declining industries have turned to alternative 
energy production as a new source of employment (Mazurkewich, 2010). 
However, alternative energy production has been shown to be susceptible to 
economic downturns. In 2006 the town of Pipestone, in the US, attracted a wind 
blade plant that created 320 jobs. During 2009 the workforce was reduced by 
half due to economic conditions (Mazurkewich, 2010).  New functions are often 
untested in the marketplace and may not be the saviour that is expected, i.e. 
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factories building green technologies can be susceptible to economic downturns 
(Mazurkewich, 2010).  
Another green model is eco-towns. In Japan, an ‘eco-town’ concept was being 
promoted which aimed to ‘reduce, reuse, recycle’, as well as take into account 
the region’s local attributes. The ‘eco-town’ concept had a broad range of 
initiatives - green procurement, green consumerism, industrial ecology, extended 
producer responsibility, socially responsible investment, integrated waste 
management, green labelling, global reporting initiative, and corporate social 
responsibility (Global Environmental Centre, 2005, p. 1). The Japanese 
government supported the eco-town concept by providing a subsidy system to 
enable facilities to be built (Global Environmental Centre, 2005). 
Another green strategy that is being promoted by a number of countries is eco-
industrial clusters. Japan and the United Kingdom are just two of many countries 
that are adopting an approach that are attempting to integrate economic 
competitiveness with environmental concerns that also have a social conscience 
element (Anbumozhi, 2008).  
The eco-industrial clusters are built from collaboration with business and 
government and seek to enable cleaner production, reduce waste and pollution, 
improve living conditions for communities, while also increasing business 
competitiveness.  When successful, these clusters can be sources of productivity 
gains and cost benefits such as; effective use of raw and waste materials, access 
to knowledge and technology, employment generation and complementary eco-
product development. However there are major constraints to developing these 
clusters. Eco-industrial clusters need to be supported by integrated policy, have 
availability of human capital, enabling technologies and tap into eco-market 
forces. Research has shown that for small businesses to develop into competitive 
forces within eco-industrial clusters they require linkages to large firms, as well 
as to external market agents and support from local institutions (Anbumozhi, 
2008). 
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5.2.2.2. Attracting spending 
Tourism is a major growth industry and is one of the world’s largest industries 
(Creaco & Querini, 2003, p. 1).  Tourism is seen as one of the main economic 
instruments for stimulating regional economies (Creaco & Querini, 2003). 
Although tourism does in many cases have a positive economic impact, it can 
come with many negative effects, such as the environment being degraded, 
affecting the very basis that the tourism is often built upon (Creaco & Querini, 
2003). Using tourism as a community development tool is thus not always 
successful. Beeton (2010) found that rural tourism programmes failed due to a 
lack of understanding by the community of the complexities of tourism and its 
relationship with public resources (p. 129).  
Another key element of utilising tourism as an economic development 
intervention is understanding the tourism lifecycle and how this will affect the 
long term sustainability of the industry in that location. The hypothetical tourist 
life cycle begins with ‘exploitation’ of an unspoiled natural, cultural or 
environmental resource.  Next the community gets ‘involved’ and infrastructure 
and facilities are built.  By the ‘development’ phase the area is undergoing a 
dynamic period of growth and the destination is well known and developed 
(Creaco & Querini, 2003).  In the ‘consolidation’ phase tourist numbers are still 
increasing but not at such a great rate and tourism is a main economic 
instrument for the regional economy. The ‘stagnation’ phase sees tourists losing 
interest as the location becomes less fashionable and significant publicity is 
required to maintain visitor numbers. Finally, a ‘post-stagnation’ phase can 
either see the tourist attraction shifting into ‘decline’ or ‘rejuvenation’ where the 
attraction but must change form and seek new markets.  
 This cycle has been well documented in numerous resorts and tourist attractions 
(Creaco & Querini, 2003).  Communities seeking to capitalise on tourism as an 
economic stimulus tool need to understand that there is a finite timeframe for 
the benefits of the tourism.  
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Attempting to resuscitate some declining tourist towns has led to some extreme 
examples of publicity stunts to encourage interest in locations. For instance, a 
television show created a fake sea creature, the ‘Skegness sea monster’, to spur 
tourism (Murray, 2013). A flurry of tourism activity accompanied the sighting of 
the creature and the public appears to have rediscovered the benefits of the 
seaside town although the stunt was declared a fake (Gilbey, 2015). Whether the 
town maintains its visitor numbers remains to be seen. 
5.2.3. The limits of countering interventions 
Polese and Shearmur (2006) argue that when national population is stable 
population decline is inevitable for peripheral areas, assuming that population 
movements follow the spatial distribution of economic opportunities.  This 
viewpoint is shared by Midmore, et al. (2010) and backed up by later research 
which confirms that population decline in peripheral regions is far harder to 
address than in those close to economically strong centres (Galjaard, et al., 2012, 
p. 293).  
In countries that are still growing on a national level, studies have shown that 
rural towns that are managing to grow even with the changing spatial 
redistribution are those in close proximity to urban agglomeration economies 
(spill over effects), and have services and amenities (Midmore, et al., 2010).  
There is a significant body of research shows that there are considerable 
economic benefits to massing business, jobs and people in centres or hubs, often 
called ‘agglomeration’ (COAG Reform Council, 2012).  Small regional towns do 
not typically have these agglomeration economies. 
According to Terluin (2003), empirical evidence does support several successful 
theoretical approaches to regional development:  
 An active role of local actors in internal and external networks stimulates 
employment growth 
 Community-led rural development – a well-developed self-help capacity 
of communities stimulates employment growth 
 Exploitation of social and cultural capital stimulates employment growth 
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 Exploitation of rural amenities and cultural capital stimulates 
employment growth in tourism 
However, these approaches were only successful given the availability of labour 
and capital, which areas on the periphery are often short of. From research in 
Canadian peripheral towns, Polese & Shearmur (2006) developed a list of pre-
conditions for regional population decline, based on a combination of economic 
and demographic drivers.  Over time, locations with the full set of attributes will 
undergo relative, and eventually absolute, population and employment decline. 
These pre-conditions are categorised in national attributes and regional 
attributes. Not all attributes need to be present for decline to occur.  
National attributes: 
a) A geographically large nation, with inhabited locations more than one 
hour drive from a major urban centre 
b) A nation in the last stage of the demographic transition  
Regional attributes: 
a) The town or village is located more than one hour drive from a major 
urban centre (over 100,000 in the Canadian context) 
b) Not on a major transport route 
c) A resource exploitation or primary processing economic base 
d) Economic base of industries where the primary input is more costly to 
transport than the transformed product – i.e. raw logs, fresh fish 
e) A resource base whose limits of profitable exploitation have been 
reached 
f) Climatic and geographical conditions limit year round tourism (Polese & 
Shearmur, 2006, p. 42).      
Countering strategies for towns have been shown to work in some cases, but this 
is very specific to context and in places where the underlying economic and 
demographic drivers are too strong, population decline is unbeatable (Hollander, 
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2011).  Polese & Shearmur (2006) argue that the only places that have managed 
to regenerate did not have the full list of the above pre-conditions. 
According to Hospers (2013) it is doubtful whether any countering strategies that 
aim to attract people or businesses are truly successful. Hospers accounts this to 
the failure of many cities to differentiate themselves from each other, with most 
towns promoting themselves with the same set of attributes - diverse, creative, 
innovative or liveable.  Although some locations have managed to create positive 
outcomes for their towns, the issue of competition between several towns or 
regions that are attempting to attract the same dollars and people is still present 
(Chesire, 2006). As subnational decline spreads, regional competitiveness will 
come at the expense of other regions, as they fight over the same diminishing 
pool of people (Jackson, et al., 2014). Not all towns will win (Chesire, 2006).  
Research from Europe has identified that shrinking cities in Eastern Germany 
that are growing again are doing so only at the expense of the region 
surrounding them, as the only newcomers are from these areas (Haartsen & Van 
Wissen, 2012). Even when places have experienced regeneration, the 
newcomers do not occupy the same niche as the pre-existing society (Matanle, 
2011, p. 89). They have different spending and living patterns and will not 
necessarily provide the economic opportunities that the community is seeking 
(Stockdale, et al., 2000).  
Polese & Shearmur (2006) argue that the broad structural trends of the ending of 
the demographic transition accompanied with changing economic behaviours 
cannot be easily altered by interventions. They claim that it is unreasonable to 
expect economic development strategies to halt demographic decline. Moreover, 
concentrating on economic stimulation without allowing for declining 
demographic indicators can lead to severe oversupply of housing and 
infrastructure (Bernt, et al., 2012; Rink, et al., 2012). 
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The key finding is that countering strategies were able to slow population decline 
but this was dependent on the location, economic and demographic context of 
each community. Population decline is unbeatable in places where the 
underlying economic and demographic drivers are too strong.  
Case studies have shown that in the regions it is easier to achieve improved 
quality of life than slowing population decline (Galjaard, et al., 2012).  The OECD 
(2006b) states that, with regards to rural economies, the “future prosperity of 
rural regions will be determined by drivers such as human capital, 
entrepreneurship, innovation, renewable energy, technology, creative industries 
and competitive farming” (p. 8).  
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5.3. Accepting interventions 
Accepting strategies can be disaggregated into hoping to maintain the current 
population, trying to slow population loss, to pragmatically managing the decline. 
The first stage of an accepting strategy is to try to maintain and retain the 
financial and human capital that is already in place in an effort to slow further 
flight from the location (Hospers, 2013). In cases where the underlying 
population structure and drivers are too strong, there needs to be a shift to 
managing the decline of human capital and financial capital if population decline 
continues. 
Accepting strategies are very often aimed at upgrading the quality of life through 
renovation or removal of the existing infrastructure.  Hospers (2013) states that 
there also needs to be a greater focus on social strategies and the socio-
demographic characteristics of the area. 
5.3.1. Maintaining and retaining human capital  
Whether the emphasis is on retaining the existing population or on managing the 
consequences of depopulation for communities, the focus of interventions in this 
section is on providing a better quality of life, enabling social inclusion, and 
adapting to an ageing population.  
5.3.1.1. Social 
The reasons people stay in a location are complex. For instance, New Zealand 
data shows that people who own their own home are less likely to move 
(Statistics New Zealand, n.d.). International literature shows that this is not the 
case for some other countries, such as the Netherlands, where a strong increase 
in home ownership did not led to a decrease in migration (Helderman, et al., 
2006).  
Studies show that attachment to ‘place’ is very important for supporting the 
economic health of locations. Social ‘place making’ has a different trajectory than 
physically changing the built environment. Recent research found that there is a 
significant connection between economic growth and peoples’ emotional 
attachment to the community they live in (Knight Foundation, 2010, p. 2). In a 
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three year study of 26 cities in the US with almost 43,000 participants, it was 
found that those communities that experience the highest levels of attachment 
also showed the highest rates of GDP growth (Knight Foundation, 2010, p. 4). In 
addition social offerings, openness and aesthetics and education were named as 
the top reasons people felt attached to communities and locations, not the 
expected drivers - jobs, the economy and safety (Knight Foundation, 2010, p. 4).  
This finding supports the New Zealand study of migration motivations (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2007) but contradicts other studies that list economic motivations 
as the top priority (Connell & McManus, 2011).  
Residents that are strongly attached to their community are more likely to want 
to stay in their location (Knight Foundation, 2010, p. 4). This finding is reiterated 
by other studies that see quality of life as an emerging key economic driver 
rather than previous economic models, such as attracting large companies 
(Project for Public Spaces, n.d.). Social inclusion is an important aspect of 
maintaining human capital. When people feel catered for and included they are 
more likely to choose to stay in the location (Kenyon, et al., 2001).  
In a community that is depopulating, maintaining quality of life can be 
challenging. There is some contention that the link between depopulation and 
quality of life is not always negative. Hollander (2011) researched the link 
between happiness and the ‘opinion of neighbourhood quality’ in 38 growing 
and declining cities in the United States. Hollander found that neighbourhood 
quality scores did not show a significant decline during the time that the city was 
shrinking. Contrary to expectations, the opinion scores increased slightly even 
though the population and occupancy rates were declining. Hollander suggests 
that negative factors in growing cities, such as congestion and traffic may be a 
factor in this equation. This finding suggests expectations of negative social 
consequences of decline may be overrated in some locations or at any rate the 
perceptions negative social consequences.  
There have also been some examples of success interventions that have 
improved quality of life (Hollander, 2011). Pittsburg in the US provides a high 
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quality of life in the face of population decline, after a series of measures to 
improve social conditions, such as; preservation of historic buildings, 
diversification of the economy, and mixed use/pedestrian-friendly 
redevelopment (Hollander, et al., 2009, p. 230).   
Research into small towns that survived external shocks found that although 
quality of life declined after such an event those towns that were resilient had 
strong social connections (Besser, 2013). 
As outlined earlier, shrinking regions are typically also ageing, and in many cases 
– and will increasingly be the case -- this is what is causing the shrinkage (more 
deaths than births) (Jackson, 2013a). The proportion of the population that is in 
the over 65 age group is increasing in all the countries that were examined. 
Strategies for dealing with the ageing population are crucial to community 
development (Kresl & Ietri, 2010).  There is a need for local government to 
actively seek ways to engage and keep older people in areas where the market or 
cultural conditions do not actually provide these opportunities (Kresl & Ietri, 
2010). 
Strategies for adapting to an ageing society will support social inclusion and will 
encourage retention of the existing population. Although some strategies are 
aimed at older people they may benefit other parts of society, such as wider 
footpaths for mobility scooters would also support families with baby buggies or 
walking with children.  
Providing lifelong learning opportunities that are both informal and formal for 
older people has been shown to have positive impacts “on the attractiveness, 
competitiveness and vitality” of areas (Kresl & Ietri, 2010, pp. 167-8). A major 
benefit for providing these opportunities is reducing the social isolation of 
seniors.  
Providing social services is an important part of retaining current population. In 
Germany, where two-thirds of rural communities are affected by shrinking 
populations, it is acknowledged that there is a limit to the services that the 
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government can finance (Kuhn & Klingholz, 2013).  Both private and government 
facilitated projects are exploring community based solutions where the 
community can at least partially fill the gap. Some solutions that are being used 
are; a volunteer coordination centre, pensioners babysitting children for working 
parents, volunteers teaching arts and crafts to elderly rest home residents, local 
high school students setting up businesses to provide services to older people, 
teaching computer classes, volunteer-run art galleries, and ‘adopt a plant’ 
initiatives to improve the landscape (Lupieri, 2013).  
Another essential element for improving accessibility and encouraging social 
inclusion, is transport. Kresl & Ietri (2010) consider effective transportation as 
the most important factor for older people. Public transportation in a declining 
location can take the form of citizen buses, collective call taxis and call buses 
(Dremel, 2013).  As well as older people, youth often require transport solutions. 
In Germany an initiative in a rural region linked youth with available rides. The 
government provided the framework for the initiative, but the youth were 
obliged to participate and solve their own problems (Dremel, 2013). This 
initiative required the cooperation of both the government and the community 
to succeed. According to Khun & Klingholz (2013) although civic engagement is 
useful it will not stop depopulation in peripheral areas. 
5.3.1.2. Promotion - cultural regeneration 
Cultural regeneration is strategy that can be used to promote a location but can 
also meet the needs of seniors (Hollander, et al., 2009; Kresl & Ietri, 2010). In 
Japan, the island of Sado which is slowing depopulation, has developed their 
cultural aspects to attract tourists but also to encourage their own community 
focus and engagement (Matanle, 2015). In the US, UK and Austria, several cities 
cultural institutions have been working with local government to create linkages 
and provide opportunities for older people to enjoy the arts and culture of their 
region (Kresl & Ietri, 2010).   
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5.3.1.3. Planning 
An accepting strategy that a number of cities have adopted is redeveloping the 
residential core of the city centre with a focus on making it liveable and 
attractive for senior citizens to relocate (Kresl & Ietri, 2010). In the US as areas 
have declined there is more space available to allow construction of homes that 
are attractive for seniors. Several US cities have focused on making the city 
centres attractive for older people i.e. Atlanta, Nashville, Philadelphia, 
Milwaukee, Charlottesville. These cities have accepted their ageing populations 
and are catering for them. In locations such as the United States this strategy has 
been successful.  
The ageing interventions in the EU and US  have had strong leadership and 
support from city officials with a clear view of the benefits to urban vitality and 
economic competitiveness that result from having large numbers of  actively 
engaged older people in their city centres (Kresl & Ietri, 2010, p. 165). 
Redeveloping for older people includes redesigning or upgrading homes to cater 
for this demographic, providing more public seating, adapting pedestrian zones 
to allow for mobility scooters and improving kerbs (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2007-2008).   
In some areas of Europe, senior clubs have been established in locations where 
the market or cultural conditions do not support the movement of seniors to city 
centres and these have been found to help regenerate neighbourhoods (Kresl & 
Ietri, 2010). However, there is a caution for locations that are shrinking and 
ageing at a greater rate, as creating communities especially for the elderly has 
not been very successful in places like Belgium and Finland (Haase, et al., 2012). 
5.3.1.4. Economic and social - employment 
The disappearance of skills and knowledge is a feature of declining populations 
(Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 2012a). Depopulation is often a selective migration 
process, leaving the most disadvantaged and unskilled behind (Fol, 2012). A 
declining area is often a patchwork of different levels of disadvantage and 
unemployment.  Consequently, designing skills and employment interventions 
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requires tailored strategies that acknowledge the multi-dimensional challenges 
of depopulation and the local context. For instance, depopulating places that are 
located near a thriving urban hub will required a different strategy mix to those 
that are in broader peripheral declining areas (Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 2012a). 
There is a global trend towards greater labour mobility (Kukutai, et al., 2014). 
People are turning to long distance commuting (LDC) to enable them to carry on 
living in their home community but access distance employment opportunities.  
Studies in Australia, Canada and New Zealand show that workers are tapping into 
opportunities in the resources sector to earn a living. Fly in fly out (FIFO) 
resource work is providing alternative employment prospects for some struggling 
communities, such as in Labrador in Canada, and Western Australia.  LDC enables 
workers to maintain their home base and their family’s social connectedness 
while bringing money back into their communities (CBC News, 2014; Fitzpatrick, 
2012; Kukutai, et al., 2014). Further enabling LDC by supplying transport options 
may be a solution to struggling communities, especially ones that are located in 
high amenity areas. 
For many accepting strategies in this section there is a clear relationship between 
retention, inclusion, quality of life and adapting to an ageing society. Table 16 
outlines this relationship between a wide range of maintaining human capital 
strategies and tools and these social factors. This shows that when an 
intervention is adopted it may be able to support more than one group of people 
and achieve more than one social goal. 
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Table 16: Relationship between maintaining human capital strategies and tools 
Policy sector Strategy Intervention Retention Inclusion QOL Adaptation to 
ageing society 
Promotion, 
planning, social 
Built environment Redeveloping city centres for older people 
X  X X 
Planning, social Improving 
accessibility  
Mixed-use/pedestrian friendly redevelopments 
Transport initiatives 
X X X X 
Economic and Social Employment Providing silver learning opportunities X X X X 
Economic and Social Employment Promoting quality employment for older people X X X X 
Economic and Social Employment Access to jobs, training and education X X X  
Economic Employment Utilising the increasing mobility of workers to bring 
money into an area i.e. FIFO or DIDO 
X  X  
Social Supporting 
community 
Supporting community organisations 
X X X X 
Social Supporting 
community 
Senior clubs 
X X X X 
Promotion, social Supporting 
community 
Cultural regeneration  
X X X  
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5.3.2. Maintaining and retaining investment and infrastructure  
Maintaining financial capital of the public and private sectors is a key 
consideration for governments, communities and industries in a declining area. 
Affordability of government services and infrastructure is a major problem for 
central and local governments with rising costs and shrinking tax bases (Aziz, et 
al., 2012; Ball & Creedy, 2012). Maintaining housing values and retaining 
businesses and jobs are also significant challenges in a declining area.  
Table 17 outlines some typical interventions that are being used to retain or 
maintain investment, or provide services and infrastructure from the seven OECD 
countries in this study. These strategies have been grouped by their policy sector; 
governance, planning and economic and social, for ease of discussion. The 
following subsections provide further details about interventions within each 
policy sector grouping. There is extensive literature on each of the policy sectors, 
however these are only able to be discussed in a cursory manner due to the 
volume of material and the wide scope of this thesis.  
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Table 17: Strategies for maintaining and retaining investment and infrastructure 
Policy sector Strategy 
Governance Territorial authority mergers  
Governance Service and technical infrastructure provision reform 
 Aggregating demand 
 Developing alternative delivery mechanisms 
 Utilising different types of providers 
 Creating completely new services 
 Improving quality and marketing  
Planning  Pragmatic downsizing 
 Redevelopment of housing stock – demolish poor efficiency 
buildings, renovate appropriate dwellings to improve 
efficiency (The Government of the Netherlands, 2015)  
 Improve accessibility of necessary facilities 
Smart shrinkage 
 Right sizing infrastructure  
 Green infrastructure  
 Landscape beautification-brownfield site regeneration 
 Temporary use strategies 
 Land banking 
 Housing market rebalance 
Economic and 
social 
Developing the silver economy 
 Smart homes for older people 
 Service robots 
 Health and medical services and devices 
 Entertainment 
 Transport 
 Financial products 
 Innovative living concepts 
 Recreation provision 
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5.3.2.1. Governance accepting strategies 
Governance strategies focus on how governments can provide services and 
funding in declining areas. In this thesis governance interventions have been 
defined as those that focus on making resources and funding stretch across all 
the service areas rather than specifically on encouraging financial and human 
capital to flow into an area. It is about doing more for less.  
There is a range of strategies that governments are adopting in an effort to 
service communities, such as amalgamation of local government authorities to 
encourage economies of scale, devolution to civil society in declining regions for 
service provision, use of public-private partnerships, providing services through 
on-line portals (e-government). 
5.3.2.1.1. Territorial authority mergers 
One of the most prevalent strategies for dealing with governmental financial 
constraints is restructuring governance arrangements, such as merging territorial 
authorities. Redefining local areas is not only driven by the need to achieve 
economies of scale but also due to more mobile populations and changing 
functional areas.  The new boundaries of territories are aligned along factors 
such as, shared economic characteristics, natural resources and common 
features (OECD, 2010b).  
Many countries are restructuring their regional or local governments, for 
example; Australia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, and Japan (OECD, 2014).  For instance, the national government in 
Japan encouraged the merger of municipalities by using incentives. Over the 
period 1999 to 2008, the number of local governments dropped from 3,232 to 
1795. The Japanese government was particularly motivated by the need to 
address the ageing of the population, fiscal constraints and a desire to promote 
decentralisation (OECD, 2010b).  
There is much debate about the costs and benefits of this option, with 
consistency of processes, efficiencies and savings on the one hand and loss of 
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local voice on local issues on the other (Joint Working Party, 2013; Palmer, et al., 
2012). 
Table 18 provides a comparison of the numbers of Territorial Authorities to the 
population between the seven OECD countries and New Zealand.  New Zealand 
has the smallest number of municipal governments and third to lowest average 
number of municipalities per 100,000 of population. New Zealand has an average 
number of 64,550 inhabitants per municipality, though there is a wide range of 
absolute numbers in each municipality, from 1.4 million in Auckland to just a few 
thousand inhabitants in peripheral areas (Statistics NZ 2013).  Only the UK and 
Japan have a greater average number of inhabitants per municipality than New 
Zealand, and both of these countries have populations that exceed New 
Zealand’s by multipliers of 14 and 29, respectively.   
The salient point here is that with countries that have a very large number of 
municipalities (i.e. Germany 11,327) for their geographical and population size, 
amalgamation may be a legitimate intervention for approaching fiscal challenges 
of depopulation.  In contrast, countries, such as Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand which have vast rural municipalities and strong geographical constraints 
may experience loss of community cohesion and local voice (Joint Working Party, 
2013; Palmer, et al., 2012) from amalgamating their large territories. These are 
issues that are likely to be debated in New Zealand and elsewhere, as 
communities age and face depopulation. 
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Table 18:  Territorial authorities and governance  
 NZ Australia Canada Germany Japan Netherlands UK US 
No. of municipal 
governments (2012)* 
67 565 4,147 11,327 1,719 408 406 35,879 
Area (km2) 269,652 7,692,024 9,984,670 357,027 377,955 41,528 243,820 9,831,513 
Inhabitants (per 
thousands) 
4,325 22,647 34,181 81,212 127,498 16,778 63,244 316,266 
Avg. no. of 
inhabitants per 
municipality 
64,550 40,085 8,240 7,170 74,170 41,125 155,775 8,815 
Avg. no. of 
municipalities/100000 
inhabitants 
1.5 2.5 12.1 13.9 1.3 2.4 0.6 11.3 
OECD (2013). Subnational Governments in OECD Countries: Key Data. OECD Publishing. (2012 figures unless stated)
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5.3.2.1.2. Service and technical infrastructure provision 
Service and technical infrastructure provision is very challenging for central and 
local governments in areas with sparse or declining populations, due to the large 
distances that service users and service providers must travel and the lower 
density of the population that reduces economies of scale. Consequentially, 
service provision is more expensive in low density and peripheral areas than 
urban centres (OECD, 2010a).  
In addition, an ageing population structure puts further pressure on service 
delivery in peripheral areas (OECD, 2010a). The cost of caring for seniors 
increases as their needs become greater as they age, and thus increased 
proportions of older people in the population puts further pressure on service 
provision. Another contributing factor is retirement destination urban-rural drift 
that can occur in some peripheral areas and further increase proportions of older 
people requiring additional services. There can be issues with attracting service 
workers to peripheral locations and careers that provide services for older 
people. This can added to costs of services these areas, as higher wages have to 
be used to attract workers than for their counterparts in urban areas (OECD, 
2010a).   
Service and technical infrastructure provision may cover: 
 Water supply 
 Wastewater 
 Stormwater 
 Roading 
 Electricity  
 Communications 
 Rubbish 
 Libraries 
 Healthcare 
 Transport 
 Education 
 Welfare services 
 Emergency services 
 Retail 
 
Financing fixed infrastructure, such as, electricity, water, gas, and sewerage, is 
particularly challenging with operating expenses the same regardless of the 
numbers of users (Kuhn & Klingholz, 2013). For example, water pipes which are 
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fixed infrastructure have fixed costs, and, in Germany this can amount to 80 per 
cent of total costs. In some depopulating cities within Germany residents are 
experiencing rising costs for drinking water due to this problem (Hospers, 2013). 
New Zealand research shows that replacement of infrastructure is also cyclical, 
occurring every 20 or 30 years depending on the type of infrastructure and 
facility (Office of the Auditor General, 2014). This requirement can be expected 
to place councils facing both replacement and population decline in financial 
difficulties. Social infrastructure (hospitals, schools, libraries and supermarkets), 
on the other hand, can be closed down if the number of customers fall below a 
certain volume, though the social cost of doing so is very high (Kuhn & Klingholz, 
2013). 
Against this background of financial constraints is the challenge that 
infrastructure development is classed as an essential basic element for providing 
quality of life and which also enables increases in economic value in locations. 
Disparities in infrastructure can lead to social polarization.  Finding adaptive and 
flexible infrastructure options will be necessary for countries, from national 
down to local levels to deal with population decline and its associated social and 
economic change (Beetz, et al., 2008, p. 304).  
Broad policy strategies for providing services in peripheral areas are aggregating 
demand, developing alternative delivery mechanisms, utilising different types of 
providers, creating completely new services, and improving quality and 
marketing (OECD, 2010a). Aggregating demand attempts to increase the 
customer demand by consolidation of services into one location, or co-locating 
multiple services into one facility, or merging services (OECD, 2010a). Co-locating 
has been used in Scotland with the 3Rs project: reorganize, renovate and rebuild. 
Schools may offer space to other users – libraries, social work or police (Galjaard, 
et al., 2012).  Australia has a variant of this scheme, the Rural Transaction 
Centres (RTC) programme which enables small rural communities to provide new 
services or bring back past services in by supporting the establishment of self-
funded and community run centres (OECD, 2010a).   
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Alternative delivery mechanisms cover altering delivery by changing the time of 
availability for the service to fit peak need, bringing services to users and utilising 
the internet to provide services. A common strategy for bringing services to users 
is adopting mobile services, such as mobile libraries and dentistry, health care 
clinics and training facilities. Canada has mobile training labs that support skill 
training to fill gaps in the rural economy (i.e. carpentry, electrical, plumbing etc.) 
(OECD, 2010a). Governments have been exploring the use of information and 
communication technology (ICT) as a response to the global economic crisis of 
2008 and the constraints that this has brought to their fiscal budgets (e.Estonia, 
2013; Haug & Buscher, 2000; OECD, 2007c; OECD, 2009d). The use of e-
government service delivery is particularly pertinent for areas which are 
challenging for governments to service, such as peripheral areas and those that 
are depopulating.  
Although the majority of the e-government provision is concentrated on central 
government services, technology is also providing new prospects for delivering 
crucial services, such as healthcare (OECD, 2007c). Provision of healthcare is a 
major problem with fewer workers and increasing demand in many developed 
nations. Research in the US, shows that 640 counties across the country do not 
have access to an acute care hospital (Williams, 2013). Health provision is turning 
to telecare as an option to provide for ageing populations in peripheral areas, 
with examples in Denmark, the Netherlands, Scotland, and the US (Brink, 2013; 
Healthcare IT news, 2013; Johnsen & Perjo, 2014; OECD, 2007c). 
Use of ICT has improved government service delivery but has not achieve the 
success that was hoped for due to poor user uptake of services (OECD, 2009d).   
There is a significant difference in the use of e-government services between 
OECD countries as well as a large gap in supply and use of e-government services 
in many OECD countries. From research it is clear that improving user uptake is 
required to fundamentally improve public sector service delivery (OECD, 2009d). 
User uptake in peripheral areas and in an ageing population is likely to be 
challenging, with many older people having little to no access to the electronic 
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infrastructure that is necessary for use. A strong focus on e-government may also 
be socially polarising as lower socio-economic groups may become further 
disenchanted (OECD, 2009d). 
Another shift that is occurring in service delivery is the changing relationship 
between government entities, business provision through market forces and civil 
society. Civil society, in some countries, is taking the place of government 
services, especially in severely depopulating areas (Dremel, 2013).  
In Germany a study of eight examples of service and technical infrastructure 
provision in rural areas found that modern strategies for dealing with service 
delivery could include: coordination and cooperation across municipalities and 
sectors, public-private partnerships, support and assistance for voluntary 
community work and non-profit organisations, mobile service units and the use 
of ICT for service delivery (Dremel, 2013). Three of the eight case studies showed 
that civil society could function as a source of finance when business and state 
entities were not able or willing to provide the necessary funding for local level 
projects. In other cases the state would provide the funding or just start-up 
funding for a project then run by communities (Dremel, 2013). The case studies 
showed that which actor was predominant was dependent on the type of 
infrastructure that was required. For instance: 
 Technical infrastructure – state involvement is necessary for logistics, 
standard requirements and legal reasons 
 Retail infrastructure – projects were initiated by civil society – required 
partnership with community and business. 
 Social infrastructure – the state is the most important actor in healthcare 
provision but other forms can use civil society 
 Cultural infrastructure – civil society is the predominant actor. State and 
market are important but participation of civil society is essential for 
initiatives to work (Dremel, 2013). 
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In all cases, civil society played a role in the success of the local solution, 
requiring active partnership with the government and business entities (Dremel, 
2013). 
There are many innovative initiatives to improve service provision for 
communities, however the cost of such initiatives is often prohibitive. A case 
study in Germany of a bioenergy village project showed the vast amount of 
technical expertise and funding was required to make a difference at local level 
(Appendix 3.1) (Dremel, 2013).  Although the project was successful and met the 
needs of the village it would not have been possible without significant outside 
help. If a cost benefit analysis was conducted on the enterprise it may be that 
the project should not have gone ahead. 
5.3.2.2. Planning accepting strategies 
A large volume of research focuses on how to measure and respond to shrinking 
cities.  A ‘shrinking city’ is defined as “a densely populated urban areas with a 
minimum population of 10,000 residents that has faced population losses in 
large parts for more than two years and is undergoing economic transformations 
with some symptoms of a structural crisis” (Johnson, et al., 2014, p. 152). This 
phenomenon is widespread in cities of the US and Europe. Well known examples 
of shrinking cities are the industrial Rust Belt cities, such as Detroit, which 
suffered substantial loss of population due to economic restructuring (Schilling & 
Logan, 2008). 
The trend in the US is now extending beyond the rust belt into the lifestyle Sun 
Belt cities which experienced significant growth during the 1990s and early 2000s.  
Many European cities are also suffering the same fate; Taranto, Porto, Aberdeen, 
Frankfurt, Oder, Tallin, and Leipzig (Johnson, et al., 2014, p. 152). In some cities 
local authorities have accepted that they will not be able to replenish their 
populations and have been responding with strategies to reduce their cities’ 
infrastructures (Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 2012b; Schilling & Logan, 2008).  
Planners have been grappling with the expense of ageing infrastructure and 
under-utilised infrastructure in declining regions and cities and the cost of 
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maintaining or upgrading these. Planning strategies focus on shrinking the built 
infrastructure to match the smaller population in an effort to maintain housing 
values and improve the quality of the environment (Schilling & Logan, 2008; 
Rhodes & Russo, 2013; Rienits, 2009; Rink, et al., 2009). ‘Smart shrinkage’ is a 
term coined by a number of regions and cities that are focusing on reducing 
surplus infrastructure and buildings to match the smaller population size 
(Hollander, 2011; Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 2012a; Shrink Smart, 2014).  
There is a strong social element to depopulation as abandoned buildings can 
reduce quality of life by leading to high rates of crime, health and safety issues 
and cause environmental hazards. Property values can drop and investment in 
the area follows suit (Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 2012a). Smart shrinkage 
encompasses both reducing size of the infrastructure and housing but also 
adopting alternative land uses for vacant land in an attempt to reduce the 
negative social consequences of depopulation (Johnson, 2014). According to 
Johnson, et al (2014), there are opportunities to improve quality of life for the 
citizens that remain. The underlying assumption of the ‘smart shrinkage’ 
proponents is that “it is possible for a place to lose population while ensuring a 
high quality of life and enhanced aggregate social value” (Johnson, et al., 2014, p. 
151).  
The city of Youngstown, Ohio in the US lost over 90,000 people between 1960 -
2000. The city is attempting to embrace shrinkage with a city wide planning 
project that focuses on reducing the infrastructure to fit the smaller community 
size.  The programme began in 2001 funded by Community Development Block 
Grants (Boardman, 2008; Hollander, 2011) and a citywide Youngstown 2010 Plan 
was launched in 2005. A key feature of the plan is the acknowledgement that the 
city cannot expect to return to its former size (Rhodes & Russo, 2013). The city is 
broken into districts which are assessed on their current conditions and 
improvements are considered. The smart decline project focuses on tearing 
down abandoned buildings, transforming abandoned building lots into green 
space and buying out residents of minimally populated areas to allow for a 
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reduction in city services. As most approaches to redevelopment are bound to 
the growth paradigm this intervention was significant as it reversed well 
established conventions (Rhodes & Russo, 2013). Several US cities have adopted 
the right sizing approach, such as, Buffalo and Rochester, New York; Detroit, 
Michigan; Dayton, Ohio; and St. Louis, Missouri (Rhodes & Russo, 2013). The 
Youngstown initiative has been touted as a great success by some while others 
have reservations. Rhodes & Russo (2013) analysed the Youngstown 2010 Plan 
and found although the redevelopment programme improved the image of the 
city, it neglected many neighbourhoods that required strengthening.  
The municipalities of Heerlen, Kerkrade and Sittard-Gellen in the Netherlands 
have plans to use decline as an opportunity to improve their government owned 
housing stocks. The quality of the homes in these areas is low. The programme 
particularly aims to demolish the worst performing houses, merge small homes 
to create larger ones and improve noise and energy performances for homes 
that are not demolished (Dreijerink, et al., 2012). 
In the city of Leipiz in East Germany a large scale demolition programme began in 
2001 to remove vacant residential houses. The focus of the programme is not so 
much on improving the quality of the housing stock, or removal of unsightly 
buildings for social purposes but is an attempt to regain housing market 
equilibrium (Shrink Smart, 2014).  When Leipiz first experienced population 
decline after the reunification of East and West Germany, the city responded by 
creating a building boom in an attempt to attract people. This strategy resulted 
in a severe oversupply of apartments and the demolition programme is seeking 
to redress this housing supply issue (Shrink Smart, 2014). The adjacent East 
German cities of Halle and Halle-Neustadt removed a total of 11,746 apartments 
between 2002 and 2009 (European Commission, 2010). Demolition is 
contentious. In the case of Halle-Neustadt in Germany, the general public in 
fought against the decision to remove buildings. On the whole the population of 
Halle has responded positively to redevelopment public projects and has 
generated private investment (European Commission, 2010). Halle experienced 
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tremendous population loss through 1997 – 2002. The population may be 
beginning to stabilize as from 2004-2008 although Halle is still has net migration 
loss each year the numbers have reduced from thousands to only hundreds 
(European Commission, 2010).  
Rebalancing the housing market is also of concern in the US. In the US a 
combination of urban deindustrialization, federal policy supporting 
suburbanization and the subprime mortgage crisis has led to over four million 
homes lost to foreclosure. The impact of these forces led to 30 cities with 
populations of over 500,000 losing 8.61 per cent of their populations on average. 
Traditional remedies for these issues have been investing in housing, 
employment and physical infrastructure. Johnson (2014) proposes that 
alternative land uses could be used to rebalance the housing market, such as, 
allowing the land to be used for urban agriculture, environmental remediation, 
recreation and land banking to save the property for future development when 
markets rebound (Johnson, 2014). 
Vacant land can be in surplus in declining locations, particularly those that have 
adopted a smart shrinkage policy, with land that has never been developed or 
newly vacant land from removing buildings (Johnson, et al., 2014).  There is an 
opportunity to create more green spaces called ‘green infrastructure’ within 
cities and towns that are shrinking. Green infrastructure can be created from 
areas that were never developed, public and private conservation lands, and land 
made available by demolition of houses or old industrial sites.  These spaces can 
be used for urban farming, parklands and walkways. In some locations they have 
been linked together to make extended green spaces (Hollander, et al., 2009). 
Authorities have also created pocket parks on land between buildings and 
demolished housing blocks. These new green spaces that have been created are 
then available for recreation. This technique has been used in the Netherlands, 
Germany and the US. Studies have shown that these parks are popular (Haase, et 
al., 2012) and can increase property values in adjacent housing (Hollander, et al., 
2009).  
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Landscape beautification is part of the greening process whereby derelict 
structures are removed and fencing or planting is added. The focus is on creating 
the appearance of control for land that cannot be redeveloped immediately. The 
property is less likely to become a neighbourhood dumping ground. This 
technique seeks to change the perception of declining areas, maintaining market 
value for future investors by regular maintenance (Hollander, et al., 2009). As 
mentioned in Section 5.2.1 the danger in gentrifying or landscape beautification 
is the impact on those that may be displaced by higher property values which 
accompany such measures. Even small increases in rents can pressure people on 
low incomes to leave the area that has been improved (Fol, 2012).  Consequently, 
any strategy that improves housing values must be considered with much 
caution. 
Temporary use strategies for vacant land that has been cleared or for abandoned 
buildings are another technique that is being used to improve perceptions and as 
a low cost holding strategy, that also has economic and social benefits. These 
strategies are wide ranging and only constrained by imagination; temporary 
market places, venues for extreme sports and cultural events, outdoor art 
installations, gardens, agricultural sites, community gathering places. Although 
these ideas have merit they are inhibited by local regulations, liability concerns 
and landowner objections (Hollander, et al., 2009).  
Another tool that planners are using in the US is land banking. Traditional land 
banking is a tool where landbanking institutions are given special authority to 
enable them to purchase abandoned properties. The titles are then legally 
transferred to developers for redevelopment. Land banking institutions may take 
the initial risk of preparing land for redevelopment in areas of fluctuating real 
estate markets. The expectation is that private investment is more likely to be 
attracted and momentum may be created towards revitalization (Hollander, et 
al., 2009). The objective is community and economic redevelopment.   
Case study analysis has not shown smart shrinkage to be successful in terms of 
reducing depopulation. Regional case studies in Appendices 2.1-2.3 clearly show 
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that population decline has not been stopped by the measures even though they 
are innovative and creative solutions. On a local level, the declining city of 
Youngstown in the US attempted a strong vision of smart shrinkage and still 
struggled to stem the tide (Rhodes & Russo, 2013). The suggestion is that if 
population decline is emphasized to the public then it will become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy (Hospers & Reverda, 2015). These places have however, had some 
success in improving quality of life (Hollander, 2011).   
Demolishing the built environment needs to be handled with great care. 
Strategies for demolishing redundant infrastructure are the hallmark of 
Germany’s response to demographic decline. However, when it comes to homes, 
it is not just about bricks and mortar, houses have far greater value that simply 
an economic one. People have emotional, cultural, social and historical 
connections to their homes. The cultivated environment has too much built 
‘surplus’ to simply remove it all (Hospers & Reverda, 2015, p. 25). According to 
Hospers & Reverda (2015) removing the built environment that appears to be 
redundant, would in fact destroy the social and cultural dimensions of areas.  
Planning for growth and planning for decline can also be defined by the way we 
think about people and space. Planners segregate functions in a growth area so 
that living, working and recreation are separated from each other. This is 
essential and necessary in a growth area, nevertheless in a declining area this can 
become a problem. Hospers & Reverda (2015), state that to maintain quality of 
life in a shrinking area, it is important to group activities.  
“Population decline invites mixed use and concentration instead of 
segregation and separation. Demographic decline demands multifunctional 
building in a certain compactness to prevent dissolution.” (p. 26) 
To keep people together and to keep services viable the development of centres 
or bundles of services in multi-functional buildings may provide a solution. A 
paradigm shift needs to be taken within the planning community to develop 
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plans for consolidation of activities rather than separation (Hospers & Reverda, 
2015). 
Planning strategies that reduce infrastructure may improve a location in terms of 
quality of life but instead may lead to further decline as depopulation is 
emphasized (Hospers, 2014; Rhodes & Russo, 2013). A positive outcome from 
planning strategies is the ability to demolish poor housing which can physically 
improve the district (Dreijerink, et al., 2012). Galjaard, et al. (2012) found that 
integrated policies of urban renewal in conjunction with social policies were 
more effective than physical upgrading.  
5.3.2.3. Economic accepting strategies 
A growth society is typically based on scarcity whereas a declining one on surplus, 
although the balance of scarcity and surplus changes as the society shifts phases. 
For instance, in a growing town there is often scarcity of open space, but a 
surplus of customers for products. In a declining town, there is a surplus of open 
space, but a scarcity of customers for products (Hospers & Reverda, 2015). For 
declining and ageing communities the key for potential economic gain is to look 
for the opportunities in the changing growth or surplus. For instance, with an 
ageing society there will be a surplus of customers for a scarcity of products 
designed for older people.  
The silver economy is defined by the European Commission as “the economic 
opportunities arising from the public and consumer expenditure related to 
population ageing and the specific needs of the population over 50” (European 
Commission, 2015, p. 4). Opportunities arise in catering for the three groups of 
older people; active, fragile and dependant, which each have their own 
requirements and needs (European Commission, 2015).   
The development of new consumer markets and the need to created sustainable 
services for ageing populations is driving the silver economy.  The current silver 
economy is estimated to be worth $7 trillion per year globally, with the private 
spending power of older people expected to rise to $15 trillion by 2020 
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(European Commission, 2015). In 2012, a silver economy initiative was launched 
by the OECD.   
Many sectors have opportunities in the silver economy: “cosmetics and fashion, 
tourism, smart homes supporting independent living, service robotics, health 
(including medical devices, pharmaceuticals and eHealth) and wellness, safety, 
culture, education and skills, entertainment, personal and autonomous transport, 
banking and relevant financial products” (European Commission, 2015, p. 10). 
Innovative living concepts and recreational opportunities for older people are 
also targets in the silver economy (Hospers & Reverda, 2015; Martinez-
Fernandez, et al., 2012b).   
A range of initiatives are being trialled and several large companies are actively 
pursuing the development of products tailored for the older age groups, such as 
Google and Apple (European Commission, 2015). The Japanese are developing 
healthcare robots to take the place of healthcare workers in the care of older 
and disabled people, in a country that is suffering a severe shortage of such 
workers (SBS Australia, 2013).  
Although many of the strategies are place-neutral (providing products for older 
people), some localities are attempting to take advantage of this rising 
demographic and attract business through providing such facilities as ‘care 
hotels’, where older people who require continuing healthcare can enjoy a 
holiday with their families away from their usual residence (Hospers & Reverda, 
2015). Also, as mentioned previously, technology is being harnessed as a place-
based approach to provide for health care provision for older people with 
telecare being used to cater for ageing populations in peripheral areas (Brink, 
2013; Healthcare IT news, 2013; Johnsen & Perjo, 2014). New technologies are 
also changing the way location and business interplay with broadband blurring 
the line between urban and rural, allowing businesses to relocate to lower 
density environments. 
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Developing economic opportunities through providing services, activities and 
opportunities for older people have been successful in some locations. Questions 
remain about whether such strategies are sustainable in the long term. How 
large is the market for care hotels? Will younger people and families want to live 
in locations that are marketed for older people? Will there be too many locations 
that are trying to attract the same older people as retirement destinations? 
(Hospers & Reverda, 2015). What happens when those people move from the 
active to the fragile and dependant, and then require higher levels of care than 
previously? 
5.3.3. To retire towns or not to retire – that is the question! 
At the extreme end of the countering scale is the policy response of ‘exiting’ (i.e., 
exit strategies. Abandonment of towns is widespread across many countries, 
even those which are not experiencing national population decline.  Many towns 
across the industrialised world are simply ceasing to exist in any meaningful way. 
In Japan, a report released in 1999 stated that 191 villages disappeared in the 
previous 10 years. Another Japanese government report in 2006 specified that 
7878 communities had more than 50 per cent of their population over the age of 
65 and 423 of these communities are likely to disappear by 2016. Many of these 
communities are in terminal decline, having ‘reached their limits (Matanle & 
Rausch, 2011, p. 26).  Several isolated Scottish and Irish Isles were abandoned 
during through the 1900s (Cross & Nutley, 1999; Stockdale, 2004). 
Russia has experienced severe decline of regional areas. Over the period 2002-
2010, 8500 villages ceased to exist (RT News, 2012).  Regions of the United States, 
such as North Dakota, are dotted with crumbling towns. Buildings are burnt 
down at times to ease the burden and suicides are common, attributed to 
financial worries and loneliness. The young and mobile have left the area for 
opportunities elsewhere. Those people who don’t have the resources to change 
their situation are left behind. Often the elderly people left behind end up living 
in substandard buildings until they pass away. The built environment is left 
where it is (Bowden, 2008).  
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There is great debate in the literature about whether the government should 
intervene in declining towns. Forth (2000) sees the decline and ultimate demise 
of many smaller country towns as part of an inevitable historical process and 
believes it should be accepted as such. Another viewpoint is that it is a waste of 
resources to prop up declining regions (The Economist, 2013). Matanle & Rausch 
(2011) count the cost of these declining communities on the national level. 
“These communities typically lag behind the rest of the country in virtually 
all indicators, particularly economic; this ultimately exacts a cost nationally 
because financial resources are redistributed from metropolitan regions to 
these areas to compensate for local shortfalls” (p. 26).  
The opposite viewpoint is that building thriving regions is important for national 
competitiveness and all areas can contribute (OECD, 2009c). There is also an 
ecological argument which sees ‘exiting’ as good for the environment, in that it 
reduces pressure on the environment and allows it to recover. However, studies 
have shown that depopulation doesn’t necessarily lead to sustainability 
(Dreijerink, et al., 2012), and declining areas can instead become ecological 
disasters (Matanle, 2015). 
Research shows that the most vulnerable residents can become trapped in a 
cycle of lowering house prices and loss of jobs in depopulating communities 
(Bowden, 2008; Domhardt & Troeger-Weib, 2009; Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 
2012b). There are arguments that the government has a social responsibility to 
provide for the residents in a declining town. This question is being debated in 
places that are suffering advanced population decline. For instance, in Germany, 
planning centred on a concept of equivalent living conditions, however, in the 
face of depopulation a new debate has emerged in German political and 
academic circles about whether the old concept of equivalent living conditions in 
depopulating areas should be replaced with a minimum standard of living (Beetz, 
et al., 2008, p. 296).  
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There are also a number of suggestions in the literature with regard to actions 
that governments could undertake to deal with terminal decline. For instance, 
governments could provide commuting services to allow people to work outside 
of their community so that the town doesn’t need to be shut down, subsidies 
could be provided to encourage people to move to larger regional centres (The 
Economist, 2013), or governments could relocate towns, such as those that are 
flood prone or expensive to service (Kenyon, et al., 2001).  Not all residents want 
to be so-guided, as it has been found that people refuse finance to move to 
busier locations (Boardman, 2008). People have strong social, emotional and 
historical connections to their homes (Hospers & Reverda, 2015). Historical 
preservationists also challenge such measures (Boardman, 2008). Finally, 
Hospers & Reverda (2015) state that it is impossible to remove a district or city in 
one single try as there is too much built environment. 
There are few examples of governments actively intervening in communities that 
are suffering terminal decline.  In some cases, the community instigated the 
evacuation by applying to the government and in other cases the government 
was the initiator (Egan, 2014; Rix, 2012).  Two European examples of evacuating 
communities that were in terminal decline were located in the literature. The 
first case provides an example of government intervention that did not support 
the community, while the second protected the social connectedness of the 
islanders that had been transplanted to the mainland. 
In 1930 the last 36 inhabitants of the Scottish Island of St Kilda requested the 
Scottish Office to evacuate their community to the mainland due to isolation and 
unviable community size. The islanders were allocated jobs by the Scottish Office 
in the Forestry Commission, which did not necessarily suit the islanders who 
came from an island without trees. The families were also separated from one 
another and housed in unsuitable properties (Rix, 2012).  
In contrast, the Irish Blasket Islands were also evacuated in 1953 but in a more 
socially acceptable manner. The Blasket Island group was inhabited for centuries 
but peak population was only 175 residents. When the community shrunk to 22 
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and was cut off from community and emergency assistance, the Irish 
Government decided to evacuate it.  The islanders acknowledged the challenges 
of staying, and accepted the lack of a viable future on the island. The islanders 
signed the government’s forms and were shifted into a group of newly built 
homes on the mainland with three acres of arable land each (Egan, 2014).  
Although islands are special cases due to their extreme isolation (Cross & Nutley, 
1999), they still provide lessons on how communities may be ‘exited’ in a 
manner that sustains the social connectedness of the community.  
A recent example of government initiated intervention that lead to poor 
outcomes is in Australia. The isolated Aboriginal town of Oombulgurri in Western 
Australia was closed in 2011 after it was declared by the Western Australian 
government to be unviable. The government closed the health service, shop, 
school, and police station over a period of time before shutting off the electricity 
and water.  Most of the population drifted away during that period, however the 
last 10 residents were given two days’ notice of the town closure and were 
relocated to Wyndham, with only a few possessions (Solonec, 2014). According 
to Solonec (2014) many residents are now homeless. Martin (2014) found that 
although some residents would choose to return, the State Government has 
tendered for the demolition of around 60 buildings in the community. There is 
concern in Australia that the Western Australian government is focusing on 
economic viability and social problems at the expense of historical, traditional 
and social connections, as the WA government announced in November 2014 
that it intends on closing up to 150 remote, and primarily Aboriginal, 
communities (Davidson, 2014; McInerney, 2015).  
As greater numbers of communities shift into terminal decline these debates will 
become more pertinent and possible exit strategies will need to be assessed. In 
some countries the legal framework needs to be change to allow for exit 
strategies. At present in Germany, the ‘equivalent living conditions’ entitlement, 
that was written into Germany’s constitution in post war West Germany to 
reduce disparate living conditions between the urban and rural populations, now 
130 
 
 
presents a problem for withdrawal from areas that are facing terminal decline  
(Kuhn & Klingholz, 2013).  
Any interventions will need to be careful about protecting social connectedness, 
providing appropriate employment and adequate housing for transferred 
residents. 
5.3.4. The limits of accepting interventions 
The key finding is that none of the accepting strategies that were identified were 
able to stop population decline; rather many supported and improved quality of 
life. It is easier to achieve a better quality of life than to slow population decline 
(Dreijerink, et al., 2012; Galjaard, et al., 2012). In Germany, the government 
redevelopment programme has been operating for 20 years in the former East 
Germany.  Despite vast subsidies and extensive interventions, it has “proven 
impossible to stabilise areas on the periphery (Kuhn & Klingholz, 2013, p. 2).” 
Reducing infrastructure to match a smaller population can improve the financial 
situation of the local council but can also lead to further outmigration, as was 
found in the city of Youngstown in the US.  
With that in mind, the need for exit strategies may become more pertinent in the 
future as many More Developed Countries fall into decline. Policies ended up 
affecting liveability in the regions rather than population decline (Galjaard, et al., 
2012). 
In light of the finding that countering interventions are unlikely to change the 
demographic future, particularly in peripheral areas, the next question is 
whether depopulation is a problem to be solved or whether it would be better to 
consider what opportunities and outcomes could be achieved through accepting 
population decline?   
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5.4. Summary 
This chapter has outlined a range of policy interventions drawn from a broad 
literature review, and organised under two types of policy strategy, countering 
and accepting.  
A key finding is that countering strategies were able to slow down or reverse 
population decline but this was dependent on the location, economic and 
demographic context of each community. Those communities that did 
experience growth after a period of population decline are unlikely to have the 
full set of preconditions for decline. Attention needs to be given to the 
underlying demographic and economic indicators, as pursuing economic 
stimulation without giving timely credence to these can lead to severe 
oversupply of housing and infrastructure. Particularly in peripheral locations, the 
underlying drivers appear to be too strong for any meaningful reversal. Sobering 
perhaps, in the context of general belief in a growth paradigm, the best that can 
be hoped for is to slow down the decline. 
The second key finding is that none of the accepting strategies that were 
identified were able to stop population decline. These strategies served to 
support quality of life and social connectedness rather than reduce decline. In 
fact, there was evidence that care needed to be taken by local governments, in 
that adopting accepting strategies, emphasis should not be unduly put on 
population decline as this may lead to further outmigration.   
The next chapter will discuss the salient themes that were found during a 
thematic analysis of case studies and selected literature.  
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6. Key themes  
Over 40 case studies and selected literature from OECD countries were analysed 
for their key themes. This chapter discusses themes for success that were 
identified across most interventions before discussing other salient themes that 
arose during the thematic analysis. 
6.1. Key themes for success 
Similarities between case studies emerged with themes that were common 
regardless of circumstances or whether they were countering or accepting 
strategies. Figure 12 shows these were: governance, funding and expertise, 
community engagement and participation, utilisation of a particular local 
situation and leadership. Reforming governance arrangements to enable 
adaptive practices appears to be of greater importance than any other theme 
(Beetz, et al., 2008). These themes will be discussed in more detail in the 
following sections. 
Figure 12: Key themes for success  
 
6.1.1. Governance 
Governance emerged as the central theme for all interventions, either enabling 
or inhibiting the ability of strategies to achieve their purpose. Many policy 
sectors, such as health, welfare, and migration are typically the responsibility of 
the national government, while the function and implementation of those 
policies are felt and operationalised at the regional or local level (Ferry & Vironen, 
2011). A difficulty is that stakeholders at various levels of responsibility have 
often vastly different concepts of the demographic challenges and ways to 
combat them (Ferry & Vironen, 2011). Case studies have shown that the 
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successful regional policies were supported by national policies (Galjaard, et al., 
2012, p. 293). An example of this is, the shrink smart programme for housing 
rebalance in Leipzig in East Germany, which was supported by a federal 
programme (Shrink Smart, 2014).     
There was a strong theme regarding the need for governments to change their 
legal structures to enable adaptation, allow innovative solutions for the delivery 
of services and to provide for the consolidation of activities (Beetz, et al., 2008; 
Ferry & Vironen, 2011). Laws and policies need to be in place to allow local and 
regional level solutions. Putting resources into removing barriers and increasing 
subnational level capacity and capability will improve service delivery and 
encourage more effective investment (OECD, 2014, p. 4).  
Some policies and strategies will only be able to be implemented if the national 
level policy is reformed to allow the freedom and adaptability to undertake a 
task at regional or local level (Beetz, et al., 2008, p. 307). For instance, to be able 
to translate the idea of off-grid towns from Germany to New Zealand, there 
needs to be acceptance and an appropriate legal framework at central 
government level to facilitate and support such an endeavour.  However, Hall & 
Stern (2009) contend that the government response should not be translated 
into a top down response, as when higher level governments take a strong role 
in regional government action outcomes are not likely to favour areas that are 
already struggling with depopulation. Instead, governing regional development 
requires cooperation and integration between different levels of government, 
stakeholders in many business sectors, and civil society, and requires cross policy 
sector strategies that acknowledge the role that the new economy has on the 
flow of people and capital (Dremel, 2013; OECD, 2009a).   
Canada’s immigration strategy is a good example of this level of cooperation and 
adaptation of governance frameworks.  The Canadian government changed its 
immigration policies to enable the provinces to develop their own plans to suit 
their particular regional scenarios (CanadaVisa.com, 2015). Without such 
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multilevel governance frameworks it is unlikely that future challenges will be 
able to be met (OECD, 2014).  
6.1.2. Funding and expertise 
The OECD (2014), states that effective public investment is a key to unlocking 
growth in any region, but it requires considerable cooperation and coordination 
across all levels of government (OECD, 2014, p. 4).  This position was supported 
by the findings of this study.  Many successful strategies at local level required 
utilizing regional, national or even supra regional funding programmes, as well as 
sources of expertise. Numerous redevelopment strategies in Europe receive 
operational funding from the European Structural Funds (European Commission, 
2010). For example, the Welsh Government utilises the European Regional 
Development programme to support a range of interventions aimed at 
regeneration (Welsh Government, 2013).  
National level programmes also feature strongly.  In the United States a main 
street revitalization programme that is implemented at local level is run and 
funded by the National Trust for Historic Preservation (National Main Street 
Center, 2015).  In New Zealand a series of cycle trails have been built to 
encourage eco-tourism. A central fund was created to support the construction 
of the ‘great rides’ across the country. It was found that although many trails 
were built from local initiatives, most trails would not have been built without 
receiving funding from the New Zealand Cycle Trail Project (Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment, 2014b). In Canada the local level immigration 
initiative in the town of Morden in Canada taps into a provincial level 
programme (CanadaVisa.com, 2015). 
The ability to source expertise and develop strong linkages with business, 
government and community was a salient theme in many case studies (Lambe, 
2008).  In an Australian study of 14 successful small towns it was found that “all 
the communities have been successful in cultivating allies, actively seeking 
information, networking with outside supporters and securing outside funding” 
(Kenyon, et al., 2001, p. 26).  In Germany, a successful energy production 
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initiative that enabled a small village to provide for its own energy needs was 
supported and built with expertise from the local university (Dremel, 2013).  A 
bottom up, youth initiative begun in the small New Zealand town of Otorohanga 
required the community initiators to convince an education operator to provide 
an education facility in their location for the intervention to achieve its purpose 
(Ministry of Social Development, 2010). This initiative has now been taken up 
nationally by the nation’s local government Mayors, in a highly successful 
‘Mayoral taskforce’ (Mayors Taskforce For Jobs, 2014). 
6.1.3. Community engagement and participation 
Overwhelmingly, the literature identified that successful strategies required 
harnessing the participation of the local business, community and local 
government. International literature has shown that social capital (the 
community) is essential for success (Besser, 2013; Dremel, 2013; Johnsen & Perjo, 
2014; Kenyon, et al., 2001; Lambe, 2008). According to Lambe (2008) people are 
the vital ingredient to successful development.  An example of this is the New 
Zealand Cycle Trail Project which required community engagement through 
volunteering to be successful (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 
2014b). Dremel (2013) also found that civil society was a key element in 
successful implementation of alternative infrastructure provision in Germany.  
Local communities were taking on new roles for providing infrastructure 
provision and increasing the innovation of those initiatives.  
Local vision is equally important in the task of regeneration, which encourages 
engagement and participation (Lambe, 2008). Lambe (2008) found in a study of 
45 successful small towns with populations less than 10,000 in the US, that the 
towns which experienced the most dramatic outcomes “tend to be proactive and 
future-orientated; they embrace change and assume risk” (p. 4).  Kenyon, et al. 
(2001), states that local communities are more likely to participate if they feel 
that their contribution is valued, if it will improve the situation and if projects 
have been successful in the past, elsewhere. 
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6.1.4. Utilisation of particular local situation  
Utilising the local situation to build competitive advantage is essential for success 
for many communities. However, assets are not always obvious. For instance, a 
small town in Brevard proved that the community’s pensioners could be an 
economic development asset (Lambe, 2008). Assets can be as wide ranging as; 
mountains, beaches, lakes, rivers, individual people, businesses, farms, parks, 
landfills (biomass), public services, museums, schools and architecture; even the 
size of the town can be an asset (Lambe, 2008).  
The small New Zealand town of Waihi is an example of a location that has used 
their history, industry and location to competitive advantage.  Waihi is 
experiencing a resurgence of economic activity due to several factors. It has 
utilised a central government initiative for building a cycleway bringing local and 
international tourists into the area, their position as a cross roads to attractive 
seaside communities and their heritage as a past and present gold mining town 
(Morrow, 2011).  In Australia, the town of Balingup in Western Australia located 
in a picturesque valley, experienced significant population decline in the 1960s as 
the economic base activities of the area became unviable. The local community 
chose to utilise their location, historic values and natural amenities to support a 
range of promotion activities that have drawn in new settlers. By 2001 the town 
had a diversified economic base with a strong creative class of residents (Kenyon, 
et al., 2001).   
6.1.5. Leadership 
American and Australian research found that success of regional development 
was dependent on committed quality business and community leadership that is 
continually renewed (Kenyon, et al., 2001; Lambe, 2008; McKinsey & Company, 
1994).  Strong leadership supports the community’s attitude to creating change. 
“Communities that resist change, ignore new opportunities, focus on 
threats and refuse to take any risks are in serious trouble” (Kenyon, et al., 
2001, p. 22).  
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Strong mayoral leadership helped drive interventions in Scotland Neck and 
Etowah in the US (Lambe, 2008). The success of the Otorohanga youth 
interventions in New Zealand was aided greatly by the drive of the former Mayor 
of the town (Ministry of Social Development, 2010). 
The McKinsey Report of Regional Development in Australia made the statement 
that: 
“Given the task of rejuvenating a region and the choice of $50 million, or $2 
million and 20 committed local leaders, we would chose the smaller 
amount of money and the committed leaders” (McKinsey & Company, 1994, 
p. 4).  
Strong leadership is necessary but requires strong support from the community 
as well. 
6.1.6. Success discussion 
Declining areas that have the potential for retention of population and positive 
growth are those that have significant factors that can support their community’s 
regeneration plans. Studies have shown that those towns that decide to take 
action before they have passed too many negative demographic indicators are 
sometimes able to regenerate (Kenyon, et al., 2001). Table 19 provides a 
synopsis of the range of factors that support community regeneration, gathered 
from case studies and literature. 
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Table 19: Range of factors that support community regeneration  
Socio-demographic 
 Few negative demographic indicators 
 Few negative socio-economic factors 
Location 
 Are on major transport routes  
 Have high amenity values 
 Have good services 
 Are close to vibrant urban hubs 
Community – social capital 
 Attitudes of optimism, empowerment and interdependence 
 Viewing challenges as opportunities instead of seeing themselves as victims 
 Have a community that has strong leadership, optimism, problem solving skills, self-
reliance and community ownership 
 Organisational arrangements that foster community participation 
 Leadership - shared community-wide leadership and skilled individual leaders 
 Have active local actors in internal and external networks  
 Have a well-developed self-help capacity to stimulate employment growth 
Resources and economy 
 Have the ability to exploit social and cultural capital to stimulate employment 
growth 
 Have the ability to change functions to match the global marketplace  
 Have the ability to exploit rural amenities and cultural capital to stimulate 
employment growth in tourism 
Compiled from Besser (2013); Dremel (2013); Garcilazo (2013); Johnsen & Perjo (2014); Kenyon, 
et al. (2001); Lambe (2008); Martinez-Fernandez (2010); Midmore, et al. (2010); Polese & 
Shearmur (2006); Spiller (2012); Terluin (2003).  
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These success themes are describing an almost a perfect scenario which is often 
not achievable in reality. The communities that do not have these factors are 
likely to suffer continued depopulation that will be very challenging to combat. 
Coupled together with the list of pre-conditions for decline from Section 5.2.3, 
the future does not look so promising for many of the small towns that are 
already or projected to experience population decline.  
6.2. Other salient themes 
Several other themes emerged during the research that are not focused 
primarily on ‘success’ as such, but are still pertinent to the topic of attempting to 
alter the depopulation future. 
6.2.1. Social policies  
Depopulation is essentially felt as ‘social impacts’ – abandonment of homes, 
increased crime, withdrawal of services, worsening social inclusion etc. (Beetz, et 
al., 2008; Ferry & Vironen, 2011; Martinez-Fernandez, et al., 2012a; Matanle & 
Rausch, 2011).  It is no surprise, therefore, that the social aspect of interventions 
emerged as one of the most significant themes. For instance, social ‘place 
making’ was a key aspect of economic development that draws people to 
locations (Knight Foundation, 2010). Galjaard, et al. (2012) noted that urban 
renewal policies were more effective when combined with social policies.  
The Welsh Government undertook a review of the history of regeneration in the 
UK and found that most successful programmes appeared to be a combination of 
people or ‘social’ approaches and place-based approaches (Welsh Government, 
2013).  Social focused youth initiatives led to success of small towns in Australia 
(Kenyon, et al., 2001). Strong attachment to communities was found to retain 
people; retention of migrants was also more successful when coupled with social 
integration policies (City of Morden, 2015; Johnsen & Perjo, 2014), thus feeding 
into the need for social inclusion (Kenyon, et al., 2001).   
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Strong social capital enables towns to survive external shocks (Besser, 2013) and 
have been shown to advance successful and fast recovery of communities in the 
aftermath of disasters (Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004).  
Although social policies are successful in that they build quality of life, social 
inclusion, retain people in communities and in some cases draw people to 
locations, it is easier to achieve improved quality of life than slow population 
decline in peripheral locations (Galjaard, et al., 2012).  Social policies should be 
considered in any countering or accepting strategy as appropriate tools to 
improve local communities. However it needs to be acknowledged that the 
repopulation or stabilising outcomes that decision makers may seek are unlikely 
to be able to be achieved in places that have passed too many negative 
demographic indicators and are shifting into natural decline.  
6.2.2. Integration of policies 
Another theme was the need for an integrated approach to countering or 
accepting.  Cross sector approaches across several policy sectors showed more 
potential for success than single policies with single solutions (Johnsen & Perjo, 
2014). Lambe (2008) found that a single intervention approach was not 
successful - small towns require multifaceted comprehensive packages that 
cover a range of strategies and tools that focus on the specific context of the 
area and the opportunities that could arise from their core assets (Lambe, 2008). 
The OECD noted that the most interesting examples of interventions are those in 
which “horizontal and vertical integration have been combined, and smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth dimensions are intertwined” (OECD, 2014, p. 
207). 
6.2.3. Sustainability 
There is a hope that one positive outcome of depopulation is improved 
sustainability. Unfortunately, preliminary conclusions from assessments of 
sustainability in depopulating locations suggest that shrinking populations do not 
necessarily make districts more sustainable (Dreijerink, et al., 2012). The 
assumption of ‘fewer people = less destruction’ has not come to fruition.  For 
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instance, research has shown that low density areas still require maintenance of 
roading systems and water pipes even though fewer people are using them 
(Kuhn & Klingholz, 2013, p. 3); and vacant green spaces are not necessarily a 
positive improvement, the space may become a rubbish site, be too small for any 
other purpose or have soil contamination from a previous use (Dreijerink, et al., 
2012; Haase, 2008). 
The most positive outcome in a Netherlands study of sustainability was that 
demolishing poor housing can physically improve the district (Dreijerink, et al., 
2012). Another issue for improving sustainability is that costs involved in green 
infrastructure provision (Dremel, 2013) and green downsizing solutions can be 
prohibitive (Dreijerink, et al., 2012).  
Creating a sustainable local environment in a shrinking area appears to be a 
more challenging and a different process than the same task in a growing area 
(Dreijerink, et al., 2012; Matanle, 2015). 
6.3. Summary 
This chapter summarised key themes that were found from a thematic analysis 
of over 40 case studies and selected literature from OECD countries. This chapter 
discusses key themes for success that were identified across most interventions 
and other salient themes that arose during the research. 
To achieve success in building attractive places to live with a strong community 
spirit there needs to be access to funding and expertise, strong social capital 
which enables communities to capitalise on utilise assets in the location, 
combined with strong leadership and enabling governance structures. Social 
strategies are also emerging as key elements in the success of interventions.  
Even when a community succeeds in returning to population growth for a period, 
they have not arrived at their destination as fluctuations of population can occur 
and the underlying drivers may still encourage depopulation. An Australian study 
of 14 small communities that experienced regeneration noted that none of the 
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communities felt that they could ‘rest on their laurels’.  The journey needs to be 
a continuous one.   
Not all communities have the elements necessary to succeed in the New 
Economy, especially those that have already passed a number of negative 
demographic indicators. The communities that do not have these success factors 
are likely to suffer continued depopulation that will be very challenging to 
combat. The future does not look so promising for many of the small towns that 
are already declining or projected to experience population decline.   
There is evidence that economies no longer operate in the same way as the past. 
Globalisation and all its associated attributes have changed the behaviour of 
human and financial capital flows. Research suggests that human and creative 
capital drive economic growth rather than being a result of such growth.  
Strategies that were used in the past to regenerate communities may no longer 
be successful. What is emerging is the rise of an expectation of quality of life and 
this appears to be driving rather than following economic development. People 
now expect to enjoy the place that they live in, not live there just for 
employment.   
Addressing depopulation with policy interventions is very challenging, 
particularly in peripheral locations as the structural demographic and economic 
trends encourage outmigration. The research showed that in the context of zero 
or low growth national population growth such communities are unlikely to gain 
population. Outmigration is even more significant in peripheral communities in 
nationally declining countries. 
Due to the fact that demographic change affects most aspects of society and 
how it functions, comprehensive integrated initiatives are likely to have greater 
success than single initiatives which target just one policy sector. The most 
appropriate response to declining populations appears to be the adoption of a 
mix of countering and accepting interventions across the policy sectors.   
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7. Case study - New Zealand and the Waikato Region 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the range of strategic interventions 
that may be applied to New Zealand so that New Zealand is well placed to 
respond to depopulation that is projected to occur. The findings from the 
previous chapters were applied to a case study of New Zealand, with a particular 
focus on the Waikato Region of New Zealand.   
This chapter begins by describing the demographic context of New Zealand and 
the spatial distribution of population in the Waikato.  This demographic context 
builds the case for the need to find strategic interventions to demographic 
change for subnational areas of New Zealand. The following section discusses the 
drivers of population change at Territorial Authority (TA) level and how these 
may impact on possible intervention choices. Due to the time constraints these 
drivers are limited to the demographic components of change (natural 
increase/decrease and net migration) and the effect of distance from urban 
agglomerations in the Waikato Region.  Finally, the chapter concludes by briefly 
exploring the challenges of transferring interventions from other countries to the 
New Zealand governance framework. These governance considerations affect 
what can be transferred to the local level to effect change for depopulating areas. 
Despite currently being a region of high population growth, the Waikato Region 
of New Zealand was chosen as a case study, as several of its 10 Territorial 
Authorities (TAs) are already experiencing a number of negative demographic 
indicators and are well on the way to natural decline (Cameron, et al., 2014). In 
that sense, the Waikato Region is typical of many regions of New Zealand that 
are growing whilst simultaneously heading for decline, and is a good example of 
the vast spatial variation that can exist within a region.  
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7.1. Building a case for intervention – New Zealand 
New Zealand has a small population in proportion to its land mass. The 
estimated resident population of New Zealand was 4,578,900 at the 31 March 
2015 and is continuing to grow (Statistics NZ 2015). New Zealand’s Rate of 
Natural Increase (RNI, births minus deaths) is still high in comparison to other 
OECD countries (Figure 13), supported by one of the highest fertility rates out of 
the More Developed Regions (Jackson, 2011).  
Figure 13: Rate of Natural Increase for New Zealand and other more developed regions 1955-
2015  
 Source: World Population Prospects 2015 Revision: UN Population Division 
 
As noted in section 4.5.3, although New Zealand’s total fertility rate is higher 
than most other developed countries it has recently dropped to 1.92 births per 
woman.   
New Zealand’s population is also impacted by migration flows (Labour & 
Immigration Research Centre, 2012). New Zealand has often been a migrant-
receiving nation with relatively high net international migration gains (United 
Nations, 2013).  The importance of migration to New Zealand’s history and its 
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current population is evident in the fact that by 2015, more than 25 per cent of 
the population was foreign born (Statistics New Zealand, 2015b). Bedford, et al. 
(2001) states that migration is likely to have a greater impact on New Zealand’s 
future than many other countries due to the size of the receiving population and 
the mobility of the people. Since the 1960s a cyclical pattern of permanent long 
term (PLT) migration has emerged with net losses followed by a period of net 
gains (Labour & Immigration Research Centre, 2012). This fluctuation is clearly 
shown by the fact that for the year to June 2011, New Zealand had the weakest 
net migration (+3,900 PLT) for a decade, which has since swung back to 
extremely strong net migration, with a seasonally adjusted net gain of 53,800 PLT  
for the January 2015 year (Statistics New Zealand, 2015a).  
Although the national demographic picture does not support a need to explore 
interventions to respond to depopulation, the story is very different at 
subnational level.  The national demographic context in New Zealand can mask 
the problems of population maldistribution and/or depopulation at the 
subnational level (Jackson, 2014).  Over 75 per cent of the population is located 
in the North Island, primarily in urban centres (Statistics New Zealand, 2015b).  
The Auckland region accounts for a two-thirds of the population of New Zealand. 
Three quarters of the population growth that New Zealand experienced between 
2006 and 2013 was concentrated in 11 of New Zealand’s 12 cities, with the 
remainder spread across 30 Territorial Authorities (TA) (Jackson, 2013a). Of these, 
only five TAs each gained more than 2 per cent of growth. Twenty of New 
Zealand’s 67 TAs failed to grow or declined (Cameron, et al., 2014; Jackson, 
2013a).  
As well, New Zealand is facing structural ageing of the population with a shift to 
more elderly than children and more deaths than births.  This trend is expected 
to end growth and usher in permanent population decline (Jackson, 2013b).   The 
structural ageing of New Zealand is likely to change every aspect of society - 
living arrangements, living requirements, and transportation, to name a few 
(Clark, 2004). Ageing and its implications are felt more strongly at the sub-
146 
 
 
national level, with the internal migration of the youth population from rural 
areas to urban areas. This net loss of young people from rural areas results in 
accelerating structural ageing of regional areas (Jackson, 2011).   
These future problems are also likely to impact on New Zealand’s trading base. 
Although the majority of the population of New Zealand is located in urban areas, 
the economy is primarily land or environmental resource based with export 
earnings strongly linked to primary production from the regions. In 2014 New 
Zealand was still earning 47 per cent of its export earnings from primary 
production (a drop from 88 per cent in 1964), while tourism, which also makes 
use of regional areas, makes up a further 12 per cent (Nana, 2014).   
There is a strong symbiotic relationship between the cities and the rural areas 
which add value to industry production chains by providing the desk based 
specialised services that enable New Zealand to sell to the world (Spiller, 2012, p. 
4). On the other hand these services would not exist without the primary 
production to support them. Of note, New Zealand’s heartland areas provide 
over 26 per cent of the nation’s tradable sector GDP (Nana, 2014). This is only 
possible with economically healthy regional areas.  With so much of New 
Zealand’s tradable sector located in the heartlands and often peripheral areas 
that are experiencing a shift towards depopulation, it is important to have 
solutions to respond to the challenges of declining areas. 
7.1.1. Waikato Region – demographic past and present 
The Waikato Region is indicative of many regions in New Zealand that are 
experiencing both growth and decline within their TA’s. This section presents the 
Waikato Region as an example of the spatial variation of subnational population 
that is common amongst regions of New Zealand. This section makes a case for 
adopting strategies to manage depopulation in peripheral towns within regions 
of New Zealand that are experiencing or are likely to soon experience 
subnational depopulation.  
The Waikato Region is the fourth largest of New Zealand’s 16 regions, covering 
25,000km2 and has 1,138km of coastline. The region includes the extent of the 
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Waikato River catchment and reaches from the West Coast of New Zealand to 
the East Coast. The landscape is varied with flat farming land, rolling hill country, 
mountains, beaches, lakes and rivers (Waikato Regional Council, 2015). The 
Waikato Region is made up of 10 Territorial Authorities (TAs), as well as part of 
the Rotorua TA (Internal Affairs, 2011). The Waikato Region is the closest major 
region to the international gateway city of Auckland and thus experiences 
spillover effects to the north of the Region (Waikato Regional Council, 2015). 
The Waikato Region’s population was estimated as 403,638 at the 2013 Census, 
with the main city of Hamilton containing over 36 per cent of this (147,290).  The 
population of the Waikato Region increased by 6 per cent between 2006 – 2013 
(+22,815) (Statistics New Zealand, 2014).  
The Waikato region is a medium-size economy and on the whole is thriving and 
growing in both population and economy. Around 9.4 per cent of New Zealand’s 
population lives in the region, and the region provides 9.1 per cent of national 
employment (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2014a). The 
region’s economy increased by 23.8 per cent between 2009 and 2014, driven 
primarily by agriculture and manufacturing (Statistics New Zealand, 2015d). 
At a sub-regional level, the picture is not so robust.  Growth is disparate and 
centred around the main urban hub of the region’s major city, Hamilton (Jackson, 
2013b).  The Waikato Region contains both the second youngest (Hamilton City) 
and the second-oldest Territorial Authorities (Thames-Coromandel District) in 
the country in terms of structural ageing (Cameron, et al., 2014).  Hamilton City 
has dominated growth, with the city’s population increasing by 55.4 per cent 
over the period 1986-2012, contributing to 58.0 per cent of the region’s overall 
growth over the same period. The Waikato District, which borders the Auckland 
region, experienced the strongest growth (77.4 per cent), contributing to 31.0 
per cent of the region’s overall growth.  South Waikato and Waitomo 
experienced decline of 19.7 and 9.3 per cent respectively, over the same period 
(Cameron, et al., 2014; Jackson, 2013b). 
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Figure 14 shows the disparate pattern of growth and decline of Waikato TAs 
from 2001-2013. This figure clearly indicates deepening decline in some areas 
and stronger growth in others. Some areas, such as the Thames-Coromandel 
District, grew in the 2001-2006 period before losing population between 2006 
and 2013. Other areas that experienced weak decline over the period 2001-2006 
began to grow again during 2006-2013 (Cameron, et al., 2014).  Figure 14 also 
shows that even within TAs there can be great difference between which census 
areas units (CAUs) are growing or declining. This occurrence supports Hospers’ & 
Reverda’s (2015) assertion that population decline does not occur in a uniform 
manner at the local level and is therefore challenging for local governments to 
address.      
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Figure 14: Percentage change in the Estimated Resident Population of Census Area Units (CAU), 
2001-2006 and 2006-2013: Waikato Region (Source: Shefali Pawar 2015) 
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7.1.2. Waikato Region – future state 
The population of Waikato Region is projected to grow to a peak of 505,405 by 
2047 before beginning to decline (Cameron, et al., 2014).  Table 20 provides a 
brief profile of each TA in the Waikato Region (with the exception of Rotorua – 
which is not fully contained with the Region). The profile contains key 
demographic information: the population at the 2013 Census, the percentage of 
the population over the age of 65 for the end of 2013-2033 and 2033-2063, the 
projected onset of natural decline and projections of population change over the 
periods 2013-2033 and 2033-2063, along with the project first year of the shift to 
population decline (Cameron, et al., 2014).  Population projections indicate that 
many sub-regions will continue to shrink and age, while others that are currently 
growing will shift into decline (Cameron, et al., 2014). 
Table 20 shows that Hamilton and Waikato TAs are projected to grow strongly 
for the first period and then slow during the second period. Five other TAs 
(Matamata-Piako, Waipa, Taupo, Hauraki) that are projected to experience 
weaker growth in the first period, fall into decline in the second period. 
Otorohanga is projected to experience negligible decline during the first period 
and then deeper decline in the second. South Waikato and Waitomo are the only 
two TAs that are already in decline (although they may have CAUs that are 
experiencing growth) and are projected to experience decline over both periods, 
with South Waikato having the deepest decline (-34.9 per cent between 2033-
2063).  The next group of TAs to fall into decline are projected to do so between 
14 years (Otorohanga) and 20 years (Taupo).  That is not to say, that these towns 
will not experience slight increases in population but based on the medium 
projections the overall trend is towards population decline.  
Table 20 also shows the combining of the drivers of outmigration and natural 
decline, the onset of the ending of growth. Although Taupo is not the first TA to 
start natural decline, it is the first to begin the next phase – the end of growth.  
The data in Table 20 will discussed further in Section 7.2.2 under components of 
change for each TA. 
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Table 20: Waikato Territorial Authority profiles – key demographic indicators  
Local Authority Pop 2013* 
65+ years (%) 
2033** 
65+ years (%) 
2063** 
Natural decline 
begins** 
Projected 
population 
change 2013-
2033** 
Projected 
population 
change 2034-
2063** 
Year of shift to 
depopulation by 
2063** 
Year of Natural 
Decline and 
Outmigration 
combine – end 
of growth 
Hamilton City 147,290 21.4 33.0 2059 29.5% 10.9% - - 
Waikato District 64,910 22.2 29.5 - 27.5% 10.2% - - 
Matamata-Piako 32,210 26.5 30.8 - 6.8% -6.0% 2038 - 
Waipa 46,400 33.8 42.7 2037 19.4% -8.3% 2040 - 
Taupo 34,150 29.8 41.3 2036 8.4% -15.4% 2035 2035 
Hauraki 18,730 35.6 56.0 2029 4.2% -20.6% 2033 2039 
Otorohanga 9,340 18.2 34.1 2062 -1.0% -25.4% 2029 2062 
Thames-Coromandel 27,030 42.0 64.8 2014 5.3% -27.7% 2031 2051 
Waitomo 9,300 17.2 31.3 2055 -9.7% -28.9% In decline 2054 
South Waikato  22,530 25.2 40.3 2042 -15.0% -34.9% In decline 2041 
*Statistics New Zealand 2015b. Census data 
**FutureProof 2014 projections (Cameron, et al., 2014) 
Data from a disaggregate of the components of population change over the period 2014-2063 for the medium population projection 
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7.2. Constraints on changing the demographic path 
When considering interventions for Territorial Authorities, it is important to 
consider the drivers of change that are causing or are likely to cause 
depopulation, and whether these can be addressed and countered or whether it 
is better to put money and resources into dealing with the consequences of 
depopulation.  
There are many influences on sub-regional population distribution and the 
success of interventions but this discussion is limited to location and town 
function and the demographic components of change. Recognising the effect 
that changing spatial trends, such as the mobility of workers and urbanisation, 
have on local populations is important to analyse the likely success of 
interventions. As well, understanding the components of the population change 
in subnational areas is crucial for analysing what interventions may be 
appropriate for each Territorial Authority. Adopting a strategy from an area that 
has a vastly different driver for change may reduce the success of the 
intervention.   
Section 7.2.1 will discuss the effect of distance, labour market areas and town 
function with regards to population projections. 
7.2.1. Location - spatial distribution, distance and town function 
There are several different types of depopulation noted in Section 3.2. The old 
type of depopulation that is being experienced by some towns is often a function 
of spatial distribution, distance and town function. This section explores this 
connection within the Waikato context. 
Changing spatial trends, such as the mobility of workers and urbanisation, impact 
on subnational local populations and may challenge the success of interventions. 
Labour Market Areas (LMAs) can be a good indicator of the changing nature of 
this interconnection between urban centres and peripheral areas by means of 
analysing the mobility of workers. Labour Market Areas can be identified by 
travel to work patterns, delineating particular catchment areas (Newell & Perry, 
2001). Analysis of Labour Market Areas in the Waikato has shown that they have 
been increasing in size and absorbing former self-contained areas. In 1991 the 
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Waikato Region had 31 LMAs which were distinct from each other and only a few 
workers commuted from outlier towns to the city of Hamilton. The number of 
LMAs had dropped to 14 by 2006.  The Greater Hamilton LMA continues to gain 
dominance (Cochrane, 2015). This change in LMAs is a reflection of changing 
commuting patterns with greater numbers of people undertaking urban work 
but living in rural locations (Environment Waikato, 2009). By 2008, over 85 per 
cent of New Zealanders lived in urban or rural areas with ‘moderate to high 
urban influence’, which is expected to increase further over time (Donovan, et al., 
2013).  
Table 21 and the accompanying Venn diagram (Figure 15) explores the 
correlation between distance to the major towns of each TA in the Waikato 
Region, demographic projections for each TA, and describes the commuting 
patterns from the 2013 Census. Table 21 also lists the amenity values and 
commercial values that may also influence the pattern of population, 
accompanied by the driving distance to each town from the centre of Auckland 
and/or the centre of Hamilton. Only towns that are north of Hamilton have the 
distance from Auckland listed.  
There is no consistent definition of periphery. The definition of periphery that 
was adopted in a Canadian study was a radius of one hour’s travel time from a 
major urban centre (population of 500,000 or more) with peripheral areas as all 
those outside of this limit (Polese & Shearmur, 2006). Although this definition 
may be successful for more populous countries, in low population countries, 
such as New Zealand this definition is not useful as the only city that has a 
population of greater than 500,000 in New Zealand is Auckland and consequently 
almost the entire country would be considered peripheral. This definition has 
been adapted to the New Zealand context and therefore periphery is defined as 
those locations that fall outside a radius of one hour’s drive time of an urban 
centre with a population greater than 40,000. 
Each town was identified by a circle on the Figure 15 with an outer ring and an 
inner ring. The outer ring represents the projection population change of the TA 
from 2013-2033, whereas the inner circle represents the projection population 
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change 2033-2063.  The town rings do not show the projected population of 
those specific towns, rather the TA projections are applied as a proxy.  The rings 
are colour coded to match the data from Table 21 with dark orange indicating 
strong growth through to dark blue, strong decline. The Greater Hamilton and 
Greater Auckland Labour Markets are also shown on the diagram with an 
indicative dotted green or orange circle, respectively. 
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Table 21: Waikato Territorial Authority profiles – driving distance and key features 
Territorial 
Authority 
Projected 
population change 
2013-2033* 
Projected 
population change 
2033-2063* 
Driving Distance to urban centres over a 
population of 100,000** 
Territory function***  
 
Main TA towns 
To Ham 
(mins) 
To Auck 
(mins) 
Hamilton City 29.5% 10.9% N/A - - 
Urban centre/agglomeration economies – 
research/university - lakes, river, international gardens 
Waikato District 27.5% 10.2% 
Huntly             
Ngaruawahia  
Tuakau            
Te Kauwhata  
35 
25 
67 
48 
69 
79 
48 
57 
All commuter towns/rural service/primary production  
 
Matamata-Piako 6.8% -6.0% 
Matamata            
Morrinsville          
56 
29 
- 
- 
Rural service/primary production + tourism (Matamata) 
or commuter (Morrinsville)  
Waipa 19.4% -8.3% 
Cambridge            
Te Awamutu         
26 
31 
- 
- 
Commuter/Rural service/Primary production, elite 
sporting hub (Cambridge) 
Taupo 8.4% -15.4% Taupo                   120 - Strong tourism/rural service/primary production  
Hauraki 4.2% -20.6% 
Paeroa             
Waihi             
57 
75 
91 
109 
Rural service/primary production, retirement 
destination/tourism 
Otorohanga -1.0% -25.4% Otorohanga           56 - Rural service/primary production + tourism 
Thames-
Coromandel 
5.3% -27.7% 
Thames           
Whitianga   
80 
157 
87 
156 
Retirement destination/tourism + rural service 
Waitomo -9.7% -28.9% Te Kuiti                72 - Rural service/primary production + tourism 
South Waikato  -15.0% -34.9% 
Putaruru                 
Tokoroa                  
58 
75 
- 
- 
Rural service/industry and primary production 
 
*FutureProof 2014 projections – Cameron, et al. 2014 
**Driving times were calculated using google maps from the Hamilton i-site visitor information centre to the i-site of each town. 
***Territory function – each Territorial Authority government website 
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Figure 15: Spatial model of projected population change correlated with driving distance from 
urban hubs (Author: Rachael McMillan) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key:  
Outer ring for each town – projection population change 2013-2033 (see Table 21) 
Inner circle for each town – projection population change 2033-2063 (see Table 21) 
Population change for towns are based on TA projections not individual towns 
Green ring = indicative Greater Hamilton Labour Market Area 
Red ring = indicative Greater Auckland Labour Market Area  
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Figure 15 and Table 21 show that there are four different types of TA’s, based on 
their main function. There is overlap in some cases as some TAs have more than 
one main type of function.  
These types are based on commuter flows, distance and town function: 
1. The commuter corridor between Auckland and Hamilton – Waikato 
District (Tuakau, Te Kauwhata, Huntly and Ngaruawahia). 
2. Hamilton commuter TA’s – Waikato (Ngaruawahia), Matamata-Piako 
(Morrinsville), and Waipa (Cambridge, Te Awamutu). 
3. The high amenity retirement destination and seasonal tourism locations – 
Thames-Coromandel (Thames, Whitianga), and Taupo (Taupo). 
4. Predominantly rural service or primary production areas supported by 
some minor tourism, beyond the Hamilton or Auckland commuter zones 
– Hauraki (Paeroa), South Waikato (Putaruru, Tokoroa), Otorohanga 
(Otorohanga), and Waitomo (Te Kuiti). 
There is a strong relationship between population growth and urban size; the 
bigger a city is, the more it is likely to grow (Donovan, et al., 2013). Studies in 
New Zealand have shown that districts on the edge of larger cities have 
experienced the highest growth rates (Statistics New Zealand, n.d.). This fact 
holds true in the Waikato as growth is concentrated in areas in close proximity to 
the urban centre of Hamilton and northern parts of the Waikato within 
commuting distance of Auckland, as shown in Figure 15 (Cameron, et al., 2014).   
Towns sandwiched between Hamilton and Auckland are projected to grow 
through the entire projection period but that growth will slow post 2033. These 
towns are in the transport corridor and will be experiencing the Long Distance 
Commuting effect from Auckland housing pressures. The Waikato District 
contains all of the commuter corridor towns south of Auckland, and this will help 
support the population in this district.  The Greater Auckland Labour Market also 
includes the northern Waikato towns of Tuakau and Te Kauwhata.   
Population growth is projected to increase within the Greater Hamilton Labour 
Market (GHLMA), represented by the green circle in Figure 15. Towns within this 
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area to the east and south of Hamilton are projected to grow before shifting into 
decline post 2033.  
Matamata-Piako is projected to grow modestly before shifting to slow decline 
after 2033. Matamata-Piako has two towns, Morrinsville and Matamata.  Recent 
research shows that the GHLMA now includes Morrinsville as a commuter town 
for Hamilton (Cochrane, 2015).   
Other types of TA are Hauraki and Thames-Coromandel.  Table 21 shows that 
these TA’s have the oldest age structures in the region. Thames-Coromandel has 
been experiencing fluctuations between natural increase and natural decline 
from year to year. This period of fluctuation corresponds to the incipient decline 
stage of the demographic transition. Hauraki is project to shift to natural decline 
by 2029. The towns in these TA’s are projected to grow initially due to being 
retirement and lifestyle destinations before declining after 2033 as the baby 
boomers shift into the old-old category (Cameron, et al., 2014). 
Towns in TA’s to the South of the Greater Hamilton Labour Market (Waitomo, 
South Waikato and Otorohanga) are projected to continue to decline over the 
whole of the projection period. These towns are all in the rural hinterland and 
are reliant on primary production with some tourism. The main towns of these 
three TA’s are between 56-75 minutes driving time from Hamilton and thus are 
close to or within the periphery based on the definition adopted from the 
Canadian study mentioned earlier. With the exception of the tourist town of 
Taupo, research into the major infrastructure shocks on small towns in New 
Zealand supports the finding that shocks on population had a greater impact on 
towns that did not have the benefits of near city locations (Grimes & Young, 
2009). 
The next section describes the demographic components of change which give a 
further indication of the challenges of attempting to counter population decline 
in the face of underlying demographic drivers. 
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7.2.2. Components of change, the ending of growth and 
responses 
Section 7.2.1 showed the spatial distribution of the towns in the Waikato Region, 
projection population change, along with their commuter patterns, and main 
town function.  This section presents profiles of the components of population 
change, and describes the ending of growth and possible responses for eight 
Territorial Authorities of the Waikato Region that were identified in Section 7.2.1 
as either already in decline or projected to experience decline within the 
projection period 2013-2063. Neither Hamilton City nor the Waikato District are 
projected to begin depopulation before 2063 and have been excluded from the 
discussion. 
As outlined in Chapter 3, population change is made up of natural increase (more 
births than deaths) or natural decrease (more deaths than births) and net 
migration. In this section each TA will be discussed briefly in terms of their 
component scenarios.  
The following components of change are taken from the Future Proof (2014) 
report written for the Waikato Regional Council and the joint Waikato Territorial 
Authorities (Cameron, et al., 2014). These baseline projections, project a 
‘medium case’ scenario drawing on past fertility, mortality and migration trends 
(1991-2013) with data sourced Statistics New Zealand from the 1991, 1996, 2001, 
2006 and 2013 Censuses, supported by national and subnational period life 
tables, national and subnational vital statistics data, the SNZ subnational 
population projections series, and the reported assumptions underlying those 
projections (Cameron, et al., 2014, pp. 18-19).  
The two driving forces for the projected population change for the two 
projection periods for these TAs is net migration loss and natural decline (more 
deaths than births). Table 21 above shows that natural decrease does not always 
occur prior to population decline, in several cases population decline is projected 
to commence before natural decline. This variability and how it relates to 
interventions is explored in more depth below.  
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The eight Waikato Region TA’s that have been profiled in this section, fall into 
two broad categories: 
 TAs that shift into natural decline first, followed by population decline 
and then net migration loss – Thames-Coromandel, Hauraki, Waipa, 
Taupo.  
 TAs that begin the projection period in population decline, with young 
age structures and continue to lose population primarily through net 
migration loss. Natural decline takes effect after net migration loss – 
South Waikato, Waitomo and Otorohanga.  Matamata-Piako is included 
in this category as it too suffers net migration loss, however it does not 
drop into natural decline during the projection period. 
Councils need to understand the strength of the local drivers and choose an 
appropriate response. Each scenario requires a different response and a different 
mix of interventions to deal with the projected population decline depending on 
the strength of those drivers.  Some towns may have too many challenges to 
attempt to use countering interventions and would be better to accept the 
anticipated population decline, and manage the consequences.  The eight TAs 
that are projected to decline from some point during the period 2014-2063 will 
now be analysed in terms of the type of policy response that would be the most 
appropriate based on their demographic and spatial context. 
Category 1 – Thames-Coromandel, Hauraki, Waipa and Taupo 
Thames-Coromandel, Hauraki, Waipa and Taupo are projected to begin 
depopulation at some point in the projection period, driven primarily by 
significant ageing of the population. These TAs experience net migration gains at 
retiree ages that further accelerate structural ageing of their populations. This 
structural ageing reaches a point where natural decrease deepens and migration 
gains can no longer maintain a state of growth.  As the baby boomer generation 
moves through the population and reduces, there is a reduction in the migration 
inflows. At this point these TAs are on their way to experiencing the effects of 
the new form of population decline, where natural decline is reinforced with net 
migration loss (Jackson, 2013b).  All four TAs show variations on the theme, due 
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to their different locations and different functions, the timing of the shift into 
natural decline, followed by population decline and net migration loss.  Once the 
drivers combine in the new form of population decline it is likely to become self-
reinforcing with fewer childbearing adults and greater numbers of older people 
beyond their childbearing years (Jackson, 2013b, p. 12). 
Thames Coromandel 
Thames-Coromandel has the oldest age structure and is the only TA that started 
the projection period already in natural decline (Figure 16). Although this TA is in 
a peripheral location, its natural attributes and amenities values encourage 
positive net migration and keep Thames-Coromandel in growth until 2032, 
although this in-migration is primarily in the older age groups drawn by the 
appeal of the location as a retirement destination. This positive net migration 
offsets the natural decrease until 2031 but is not able to continue this trend as 
natural decrease deepens.  Positive net migration continues for an extended 
period beyond the shift to population decline, in fact another 20 years, however 
since all of the migration is in the older age groups this will not support a return 
to natural increase.  
Figure 16: Projected components of population change for Thames Coromandel District, 
medium projection 2014-2063  
Source: (Cameron, et al., 2014, p. 33) 
The profile for Thames-Coromandel shows how places that become retirement 
destinations successfully mitigate depopulation in the short term with the influx 
of older people, but over the long term cannot sustain growth and natural 
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decrease ultimately becomes dominant once the baby boomer generation passes 
through.  At this point countering interventions are unlikely to have any success 
as the age structure drivers are too strong and the volume of migration that 
would be required to offset natural decline would be difficult to achieve. 
Furthermore, Thames-Coromandel has difficult topography with high amenity 
values that support tourism but is more challenging to achieve a diversified 
economic base that would support a younger population profile.  Thames-
Coromandel is not projected to experience the ending of growth until 2051. At 
this point adopting an accepting policy response that manages depopulation 
would be best. 
Hauraki 
The Hauraki District began the projection period in a state of population decline 
due to several years of negative net migration (Figure 17). This state is projected 
to shift into mild positive growth fuelled by an anticipated migration turnaround 
and natural increase. The natural increase is relatively short lived, with natural 
decrease projected to begin around 2029. With the district having the second 
oldest age structure in the Waikato region it drops into population decline by 
2032. This decline rapidly advances due to the advanced ageing and then net 
migration also follows suit by 2039.   
Figure 17: Projected components of population change for Hauraki District, medium projection 
2014-2063  
Source: (Cameron, et al., 2014, p. 40)  
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Hauraki is located outside of the Hamilton LMA and experiences the effects of 
peripherization. However, Hauraki has a diversified economic base, with primary 
production, mining, light industry, and tourism. Much of Hauraki’s history has 
been tied to the economic cycles of mining (Hauraki District Council, n.d.). 
Although Hauraki began the projection period in decline due to outmigration at 
higher levels than natural increase, both natural increase and in-migration are 
projected to keep the population in growth for the next 20 years. Hauraki has the 
second oldest age structure and although the TA experiences some retirement 
destination migration the volumes are much lower than for Thames-Coromandel. 
Coupled with a low level of natural increase, the ageing population drives the 
shift to decline which deepens quickly after crossing the threshold into 
depopulation.  Hauraki is projected to experience the ending of growth by 2039.  
Accepting interventions to manage depopulation would be the most appropriate 
at this point to help to improve the quality of life for those living in Hauraki. 
Taupo 
Taupo District is not projected to experience population decline until 2035 
(Figure 18).  There is little projected migration to the district. In the first half of 
the projection period natural increase is the predominant driver that is keeping 
the district’s population in the positive. However, Taupo has the fourth-oldest 
age structure in the Waikato Region and contributes to rapid ageing of the 
population, tipping it into natural decrease. The population is projected to shift 
into decline on the same year as the onset of natural decrease.  
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Figure 18: Projected components of population change for Taupo District, medium projection 
2014-2063 
 
Source: (Cameron, et al., 2014, p. 96)  
Taupo also experiences the effects of peripherization and is the only TA to 
experience the shift to the ending of growth at the same time as the onset of 
population decline, negative net migration and natural decline. This situation 
occurs due to the low numbers of in-migration and although the first period is 
categorised by natural increase, there is a rapid reversal due to structural ageing 
of the population, with no support from in-migration to offset the transition to 
decline. Taupo is the first TA projected to begin the ending of growth by 2036. In 
Taupo’s case a mix of countering and accepting interventions may help shift the 
projected change to the ending of growth further out.  In particular, Taupo needs 
to encourage in-migration of families if it wants to change its future, though the 
effect of peripherization may make this difficult.   
  
165 
 
Waipa 
The Waipa District is projected to experience strong positive net migration which 
begins to decline in 2024, bottoming out by 2049 and then increasing mildly 
again towards the end of the projection period (Figure 19). Natural decrease is 
projected to occur by 2037 and the two drivers combine to cause population 
decline from 2040. The positive net migration later on is not sufficient to offset 
the decline caused by natural decrease. 
Figure 19: Projected components of population change for Waipa District, medium projection 
2014-2063 
 Source: (Cameron, et al., 2014, p. 68)  
Waipa is adjacent to Hamilton City within the Hamilton Labour Market Area and 
consequently does not suffer the peripherization effects of other TAs. Population 
decline is not projected to be as deep in this TA. Although the structural ageing 
of the population will play out, countering interventions are likely to be able to 
be applied to this scenario with some effect, as Waipa is not combating both 
spatial drivers and demographic drivers.  This TA is not projected to experience 
the ending of growth during the projection period. 
  
166 
 
Category 1 summary: 
Those TAs that have old age structures and are in peripheral areas are less likely 
to be able to move back into population increase once significant natural 
decrease combines with out-migration.  Once the drivers of natural decrease and 
outmigration combine, the ending of growth has started as there are not enough 
people who are of childbearing age to produce the necessary natural increase or 
in-migration of people of childbearing age.  To achieve population increase in 
these scenarios interventions must achieve the slowing of the structural ageing 
of the population by drawing in younger people and families. Choosing to focus 
on encouraging retirement migration, although it can extend the period of 
growth for a few more years, will cause a more rapid drop into population 
decline. The ending of growth is unlikely to be turned around but it may be put 
off further.  To improve quality of life for the remaining residents these TAs can 
adopt interventions that adapt to ageing population and support social 
connectedness and social inclusion.    
Category 2 – South Waikato, Waitomo, Otorohanga and Matamata-Piako 
South Waikato, Waitomo, Otorohanga and Matamata-Piako are already, or are 
projected to, experience the old form of depopulation, that is, they lose 
population primarily through net migration loss which is greater than natural 
increase. These TAs have younger age structures and are struggling with the 
effects of urbanisation and peripherization, and the subsequent loss of their 
mobile young age groups, mainly at 20-39 years.  This loss removes young people 
from the population and their reproductive potential, further exacerbating the 
shift to natural decrease. Most of these TAs are projected to shift slowly from the 
old form of depopulation to the new form of depopulation, where net migration 
loss is accompanied by natural decline to form the ending of growth, i.e. 
absolute decline (Jackson, 2013b). Matamata-Piako is the only exception 
amongst this group in that it is not projected to change to the new form of 
depopulation within the projection period. 
  
167 
 
South Waikato 
The South Waikato District was already experiencing population decline at the 
start of the projection period and this decline is projected to continue (Figure 20). 
This decline is driven by outmigration, with natural decrease commencing by 
2041. South Waikato is the first TA in this category to begin the ending of growth 
by 2042. 
Figure 20: Projected components of population change for South Waikato District, medium 
projection 2014-2063 
 
Source: (Cameron, et al., 2014, p. 82)  
South Waikato also has other challenges to face, such as towns that are built on 
the old economy model. One of South Waikato’s largest towns, Tokoroa, was 
built in 1941 as a one-industry town making it vulnerable to the economic cycles 
of that particular industry.  South Waikato faces a very challenging scenario that 
suggests accepting strategies may be the most appropriate choice to try and 
retain current population. 
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Waitomo 
The Waitomo District began the projection period in population decline (Figure 
21).  The main driver of population change is net migration loss. Due to the fact 
that the age structure of Waitomo is more youthful that other TAs, this district 
experiences less population ageing and natural decrease does not commence 
until 2053.  The ending of growth is not projected to occur until 2055 even 
though the TA suffers population decline during the entire projection period. 
Figure 21: Projected components of population change for Waitomo District, medium 
projection 2014-2063 
 
Source: (Cameron, et al., 2014, p. 89)  
As for South Waikato above, the most appropriate response to this situation is to 
accept decline and retain the population, with a particular focus on the younger 
age groups. 
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Otorohanga 
Otorohanga has the third youngest age structure in the Waikato Region (Figure 
22). The driver of population decline in this TA is the loss at the younger age 
groups. The net outmigration is offset by natural increase, but not enough to 
stop the TA from shifting to population decline.  
Figure 22: Projected components of population change for Otorohanga District, medium 
projection 2014-2063 
 
Source: (Cameron, et al., 2014, p. 75)  
The drivers of population change do not combine until 2059 to cause the onset 
of the ending of growth. Otorohanga thus has a small window of opportunity to 
adopt both countering and accepting interventions to maintain natural increase 
by retaining the younger age groups and drawing in families. Unfortunately, 
these strategies will be competing against the forces of peripherization and will 
probably only slow population decline.  
Matamata-Piako 
The Matamata-Piako District is projected to shift to population decline around 
2038 (Figure 23). This district is not ageing as rapidly as others in the region, 
supporting a healthy natural increase that is not projected to shift to natural 
decrease during the projection period, although it will slow from 2020 onwards. 
Thus the shift to depopulation is primarily due to a projected migration loss, 
particularly after 2033, coupled by the ageing of the population. Consequently, 
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Matamata-Piako does not begin the onset of the ending of growth during the 
projection period.  
Figure 23: Projected components of population change for Matamata-Piako District, medium 
projection 2014-2063 
Source: (Cameron, et al., 2014, p. 54) 
Matamata-Piako is the strongest contender for intervening in the demographic 
future of the TA. Both countering and accepting strategies would be of use and 
would help to push out the onset of depopulation. 
Category 2 summary: 
All of these towns are losing people in their younger age groups, and adopting a 
programme of accepting interventions that attempt to retain (or entice back) 
young people and families and build social inclusion may be most appropriate.  
New Zealand and international examples have shown that targeting young 
people can be successful in retaining them, however these interventions are 
unlikely to stop depopulation but rather to slow it. 
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7.2.3. Constraints summary 
The Waikato region is a region of opposites. The picture painted by the findings 
of this research is not a positive one for peripheral and ageing TA’s.  International 
research has shown that population decline in peripheral regions is far harder to 
address than in those close to economically strong centres (Galjaard, et al., 2012, 
p. 293).  In countries that are still growing at the national level, such as New 
Zealand, rural towns that manage to grow under the new economy are those 
close to urban centres, have services and have amenities (Midmore, et al., 2010). 
This can clearly be seen in Figure 15 representing the four distinctive spatial 
patterns within the Waikato Region.  
For some Territorial Authorities, both the long term and short term drivers are 
too strong to adopt a plan of regeneration that ignores the underlying processes.  
To do this could potentially load the local population with unserviceable debt or 
create oversupply of housing and infrastructure (Bernt, et al., 2012; Rink, et al., 
2012). 
The communities that have the most potential for turning around their situation 
are those that have less problems to start with (Figure 24) (Chesire, 2006). The 
factor that has been the most salient in encouraging positive change is the 
strength of the social capital of communities.  
Figure 24: Summary of factors for community regeneration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strengthening communities and supporting ground level initiatives appears to be 
the most successful way of regenerating towns or at very least enabling them to 
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become places that people want to live in, representing a high quality of life.  In 
severely declining peripheral areas of the Waikato Region the best that can be 
hoped for is improving social connectedness and quality of life. 
Once the strategic response to depopulation has been chosen, selecting the right 
interventions is the next challenge. Section 7.3 will discuss the ability to transfer 
interventions from one national context to another. 
7.3. Transferability and governance constraints 
When faced with the challenges of present and future depopulation it is 
tempting to adopt interventions from countries that have more experience with 
the situation and may have solutions or at least strategies for managing 
depopulation. Unfortunately, many interventions cannot be universally applied 
due to a number of issues that will be discussed in this section (Kuhn & Klingholz, 
2013).  
It is proposed that the ability to transfer good practices requires integration and 
cooperation across all actors and levels (OECD, 2014). In general, local level 
initiatives that utilise particular local scenarios’, often require regional guidance, 
regional funding streams and enabling regional institutional structures (Dremel, 
2013; Galjaard, et al., 2012).  However, these rely firstly on an enabling national 
framework with institutional structure, strong national policies and appropriate 
funding streams (Galjaard, et al., 2012).  Figure 25 provides an outline of the key 
elements for transferability of town or individual policy strategies from one 
country context to another. 
Figure 25: Key elements for transferability of town and individual policy strategies 
 
National framework
Enabling legal 
framework
Enabling policies
Funding sources
Regional guidance
Enabling policies
Available expertise
Funding sources
Local initiative
Utilisation of local 
opportunities
Leadership
Local participation
Local context
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One of the key constraints for the ability to transfer strategies from one context 
to another is source funding and institutional and governance arrangements that 
may support or hinder the operation of initiatives. In general, local interventions 
need to complement the national legal and policy framework of the country 
(Kuhn & Klingholz, 2013).  To this effect, Table 22 has been developed to 
compare New Zealand with key characteristics of the seven OECD countries, 
from which interventions were examined. The key characteristics that are 
compared are welfare state regime, governance structure, economic indicators, 
government service responsibilities, central government and subnational 
government revenue and expenditure. This table serves as a guide to the 
possible challenges for transference of interventions. 
The welfare regime typology is a potentially useful device for considering money 
transfers between different entities within the economy (Castles & Mitchell, 
1992; Chung & Muntaner, 2007; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huber & Stephens, 
2001), and may be especially relevant for social initiatives. A number of 
comparative studies have explored a range of types of welfare state regimes.  In 
cluster analysis scholars group nations into welfare state types that have a 
similarity in their welfare services to their citizens. The welfare state typology 
adopted by this study groups countries by Wage Earner Welfare States, Christian 
Democratic Welfare States, and Liberal Welfare State (Castles & Mitchell, 1992; 
Chung & Muntaner, 2007; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huber & Stephens, 2001).   
Wage Earner Welfare States have low welfare state expenditure but strong 
labour movement (Castles & Mitchell, 1992). Liberal Welfare States use means-
tested assistance, with modest universal transfers or modest social-insurance 
plans (Esping-Andersen, 1990), while Christian Democratic Welfare States 
provide welfare services to their citizens, but at the same time uphold social 
status differences so that the resulting redistributive impact is minimal. The role 
of churches and families as providers of social services is emphasized in this type 
(Chung & Muntaner, 2007).   
The categories here are by no means exhaustive as different scholars’ adopt a 
wide variety of typologies (Chung & Muntaner, 2007).  Attempting to transfer 
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social strategies from one country to another may not be successful if the 
political economy is too different or it would require considerable change in legal 
structures in the country attempting to implement the strategy. For instance, 
social strategies may be transferred more easily to New Zealand’s context from 
Australia than the Netherlands or Germany as the type is similar to New Zealand. 
There are many challenges to transferring social interventions. The use of the 
Welfare State Regimes is merely an example of the potential difficulties to 
transferal of such strategies. 
Another consideration is the extent to which tasks are the responsibility of 
national or central government and which tasks are delegated to regional 
governments. Many countries delegate to their local governments 
administration of education, social protection, general services, health, economic 
affairs, defence, etc.  In New Zealand these functions are mainly held by the 
central government. Countries that delegate to the lower levels of government 
are more likely to be able to adapt governance arrangements to take advantage 
of certain innovative interventions. For instance, in Scotland school buildings 
have been utilised for multi-use functions and supply various community and 
social services (Galjaard, et al., 2012). In New Zealand, the central government 
would require policy redirection to enable such changes – the local community 
would not be able to create the solution for themselves. 
Funding for interventions is also a major challenge for local communities and 
local governments. The OECD (2010) notes that, in particularly unitary countries, 
regional development is funded primarily by central government. This reliance 
can constrain freedom of policy and resource allocation at regional level.  
However, in some places centrally controlled interventions may be a more 
efficient way of providing strategic overview and reducing fragmentation (OECD, 
2010b, p. 21).   
In New Zealand, much of the decision-making power with regard to regional 
development is held with central government. Of note in Table 22, New Zealand 
spends less than other countries on subnational government spending as a 
percentage of public expenditure. This may impact on the ability of local 
175 
 
governments to fund initiatives at a regional or local level. This also suggests that 
New Zealand is highly centralised with a low level of autonomy for local 
governments. Again the ability to transfer strategies may be constrained by this 
situation. 
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Table 22:  Typology of countries – government spending at central and local government levels 
 NZ Australia Canada Germany Japan Netherlands UK US 
Welfare state 
regimes8 
Wage Earner 
Welfare State 
Wage Earner 
Welfare State 
Liberal Welfare 
State 
Christian 
Democratic 
Welfare State 
Wage Earner 
Welfare State 
Christian 
Democratic 
Welfare State 
Liberal Welfare 
State 
Liberal Welfare 
State 
Governance 
structure 
Unitary Federation Federation Federation Unitary Unitary Unitary Federation 
Levels of government 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 
GDP growth rate % 
(2012) 
3.0 3.7 1.8 0.7 2.0 -1.2 0.3 2.2 
GDP per capita (USD) 33,026 46,539 42,302 41,243 35,220 43,078 36,892 49,316 
Government responsibilities 
Central or state 
government 
responsibilities 
Education, 
Social 
protection, 
General 
Services, 
Health,  
Economic 
affairs 
Education, 
Social 
protection, 
General 
Services, 
Economic 
affairs 
Education, 
Social 
protection, 
General 
Services, 
Economic 
affairs 
Education Education, 
Social 
protection, 
General 
Services, 
Health,  
Economic 
affairs 
Education, 
Social 
protection, 
General 
Services, 
Health,  
Economic 
affairs 
Health, 
policing? 
Education, 
Social 
protection, 
General 
Services, 
Health,  
Economic 
affairs 
Local government 
responsibilities 
   Education, 
Social 
protection, 
General 
Services, 
Economic 
affairs, some 
health 
 
  Education, 
Social 
protection, 
General 
Services, 
Economic 
affairs 
 
                                                     
8 (Chung & Muntaner, 2007) 
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Government funds – general and tax (total and subnational) 
General government 
revenue per 
capita*** 
12,524 14,229 15,052 18,625 11,198 19,992 15,827 15,193 
Subnational 
government revenue 
per capita* 
1,308 N/A 3,184 3,253 5,698 6,852 5,013 N/A 
Government spending 
General government 
spending per capita 
(USD) 
14,751 16,051 17,223 18,559 14,220 21,713 18,208 20,063 
Subnational 
government 
spending per capita 
(USD) 
1,431 N/A 3,408 3,158 5,663 7,031 5,149 N/A 
Subnational 
government 
spending as % of 
public expenditure 
9.7** N/A 19.8 17.0 39.8 32.4 28.3 N/A 
Subnational 
government 
expenditure % GDP 
4.8** N/A 8.7 7.7 16.7 16.3 13.7 N/A 
OECD (2013). Subnational Governments in OECD Countries: Key Data. OECD Publishing. (2012 figures unless stated). 
*Subnational figures for federation countries are for ‘local government alone’ or regional and local government rather than individual states within the federation. 
**2010 figures 
***General government revenue: tax revenue, transfers (current and capital grants and subsidies); tariffs and fees; property income and social contributions 
General government: combines central/federal government; state government; local government (regional and local) and social security funds. 
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Some interventions are more transferable than others (Rink, et al., 2012). There 
are three levels of governance in New Zealand: national, regional and local. 
Interventions need to be targeted at the specific level of governance that is 
applicable to the leadership and operation of the intervention. For instance, if an 
intervention requires national level governance change, then by definition, the 
intervention will take more coordination and cooperation to be achieved.  
Some individual strategies and tools may be directly translated to the New 
Zealand context. Generally, planning and economic strategies may be translated 
from other countries to New Zealand at the regional level as local governments 
have the legal framework to make decisions at this level.  In particular, Rink, et al. 
(2012), consider smart shrinkage strategies and gentrification strategies as the 
most transferable strategies. Promotion strategies require the cooperation of 
local government and business and do not require central government input, 
except in the area of immigration policy. Some social initiatives will be able to be 
applied at local level, while others will require governance changes. The most 
challenging initiatives are those that require a complete rethink of how our 
governance and planning frameworks operate, particularly for combining 
services, as the current legal arrangements tend to focus on the separation of 
activities (Hospers & Reverda, 2015).   
Even if the national governance structures are not an issue, transferability can be 
affected at the regional or local level by different leadership styles and cultures, 
diverse concepts of time scales, different conceptions of the role and authority of 
planners, and dissimilar policies and political decision making processes (Rink, et 
al., 2012).  However, inspiration can still be drawn from the analysis of strategies 
from shrinking communities which can be then contextualised to the local 
situation (Rink, et al., 2012). 
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7.4. Case study summary 
This case study has shown that although the Waikato Region is on the whole 
growing, there is tremendous variation in the spatial distribution of the 
population at the sub-regional level. The analysis showed that the eight TAs that 
are projected to experience population decline could be disaggregated into two 
main groups – those whose strongest driver is the age structure of their 
populations and those with the primary driver being outmigration. Regardless of 
which is predominant, once the drivers combine the ending of growth is likely to 
begin and to become self-reinforcing. The first TA to experience this new (dual) 
form of decline is set to begin by 2035. This research has shown that population 
decline is challenging to address and ultimately, at best, population decline may 
be slowed rather than stopped.    
An analysis of the transferability of interventions has shown that some 
interventions that would be useful at the local level will struggle to be achieved 
without governance changes at the central government level in New Zealand. 
That said, there are number of countering and accepting actions which Territorial 
Authorities can take that do not trigger higher level governance restrictions. 
Because its overall population is still relatively youthful, New Zealand has the 
opportunity to prepare for subnational depopulation, choose the level of 
response, pro-actively manage the consequences, focus on the opportunities, 
and promote well-being and quality of life. 
Chapter 8 will make suggestions for a local level community action plan for 
activating community change in depopulating Territorial Authorities. 
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8. Conclusion and recommendations 
This thesis studied the drivers of depopulation, the policy responses to 
population decline and the spectrum of interventions available to address 
population decline from a number of OECD countries.  
The literature proposes that there are only three possible policy responses to 
population decline, non-intervention, countering and accepting.  Although there 
were a range of key themes for successful intervention approaches it was found 
that successful ‘countering’ strategies were dependent on the location, 
economic and demographic context of each community and primarily slowed 
decline rather than reversing it.  None of the ‘accepting’ strategies that were 
identified were able to stop population decline. This may have been due to the 
fact that the accepting case studies primarily came from locations where 
population decline had already been accepted and by definition had reached a 
point that the government had decided that there was no longer evidence to 
support attempting to reverse the decline. Ultimately the research identified 
that it is easier to achieve improved quality of life than to slow population 
decline.   
Addressing depopulation with policy interventions is very challenging, 
particularly in peripheral locations as the structural demographic and economic 
trends encourage outmigration. The research showed that in the context of zero 
or low growth national population growth such communities are unlikely to gain 
population. Outmigration is even more significant in peripheral communities in 
nationally declining countries. 
An examination of central governments population policies and regional policy 
approaches showed that there is a strong relationship between depth and length 
of depopulation and the response to depopulation.  Responses to population 
decline vary from country to country based on historical, cultural, political, 
institutional arrangements, issues to be addressed and resource availability. The 
literature suggests that governments around the world are still in the early 
stages of developing policies to manage ageing-driven population decline. This is 
at least in part because it differs fundamentally from past periods of decline, so 
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old approaches no longer work.  It also became evident that there is often a 
divide between central government and local government attention and efforts 
to address depopulation and in some cases this can restrict local level action. 
Some countries put a great deal of effort into providing resources, funding and 
expertise to encourage innovation in their periphery weak areas. Countries that 
follow neoliberal policies more closely tend towards an expectation of self-help 
for local communities. 
What became apparent through this research was that towns are like businesses 
– they need to keep reinventing themselves in the global marketplace to remain 
competitive.  However, some communities do not have the functional elements 
to succeed.  For some areas both the long term and short term drivers of 
population decline are too strong to adopt a plan of regeneration.   
Given the findings of Section 5.4 and 6.3, the most appropriate response to a 
scenario where some places are growing and peripheral areas are not, is to 
adopt a pragmatic response that uses elements from both countering and 
accepting strategies. A pragmatic plan uses the best of both countering and 
accepting strategies in an approach that focuses on positive change while 
acknowledging that success may be measured in quality of life, a healthy 
environment and high quality amenities rather than increasing economic 
outcomes. There is a need to look at what can be resuscitated, what can be 
combined and what might be shut down. Instead of this process being 
undertaken in different government departments, on different governmental 
levels with limited community input, each town could be facilitated to build their 
own solution with support and resources from central and local government.  
Table 23 outlines a suggested action plan with key steps that a community could 
take to encourage change in their community based on a synthesis of the 
research from literature and case studies, and which takes the New Zealand 
governance framework into account.   
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Table 23:  Community level action plan 
Accept  Accept that prosperity may need to have a different appearance than in 
the past. 
 Accept that peak population in peripheral towns was a hallmark of the 
Old Economy when New Zealand was the bread basket of the UK. 
 Accept that the existing infrastructure is a product of those historical 
situations. 
 Accept population ageing.  
Engage  Engage with the local community to see what ideas they have, develop 
local community leaders, train and mentor.  
 Are there people in the community that are looking for leadership 
opportunities? 
Utilise  Identify key industries, natural resources, and amenities that could 
provide new functions for the location. 
Attract 
 
 Use people based initiatives and social strategies for attracting 
newcomers, rather than building new attractions, unless there is a very 
clear opportunity, such as capitalising on the national cycleway network.  
 Use targeted migration integration initiatives in places with low 
unemployment and a high number of job or skill vacancies. 
Retain 
 
 Focus on strengthening the community’s skills base, social inclusion and 
connectedness through – youth initiatives, transport initiatives, 
educational opportunities, skills training, community groups, and senior 
groups.  
Maintain 
 
 Critically examine what can be resuscitated, what can be combined and 
what may need to be shut down.  
 Look at best practise examples of new models for services i.e. citizen 
buses, telecare, off-grid communities, temporary and/or mobile 
provision.  
 Are any of these new models able to be used in the location? 
Provide 
 
 Look for initiatives to provide for the ageing population – providing 
silver learning opportunities, mobility scooter friendly accesses, 
transport initiatives, employment for older people. 
 
 
Retire 
 
 Lobby central and local government to develop a fund to enable derelict 
abandoned buildings to be demolished. 
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 If the costs are too great for demolition, explore other options such as 
beautifying buildings by growing creepers over unsightly buildings. This 
technique has been used in Germany. Many former abandoned 
locations have been reinvented as historic sites after several decades.  
Wait  Good quality buildings may not be used now but should not be 
demolished as in future there may be a new function for them. 
 
Communities that are struggling with depopulation are often not receiving the 
attention and help they need to make a difference.  As noted in Chapter 7, the 
governance framework in New Zealand hinders some transformation strategies 
that could be adopted. Action to face depopulation is often left to individual 
Territorial Authorities to manage in New Zealand. 
This action plan would benefit from a regional level strategy (Figure 26) that 
identifies areas that are struggling within the region and supports change. A 
comprehensive strategic response would require assessment of the regional and 
local contexts, integration across levels, actors and policy sectors, and should 
provide support to local communities so that they have the tools and resources 
to succeed.  
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Local 
•Identify the regional and local level 
place context
Identify
•Determine the policy responseDetermine
•Lobby for an enabling national 
framework
Lobby
•Develop regional guidanceDevelop
•Support stronger local communitiesSupport
•Identify local issues and opportunitiesIdentify
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Figure 26: Developing a regional level strategy to sub-regional depopulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In summary, depopulation may not be able to be halted if the drivers are too 
strong, however, there may still be there are opportunities to slow the 
progression towards the ending of growth in New Zealand’s peripheral locations.  
At the very least measures may be taken to adapt to an ageing population 
structure and increase the quality of life for those that inhabit New Zealand’s 
small declining towns.   
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Appendix 1 – Country Policy Response Profiles 
1.1 Australia 
Australia Regional level depopulation 
Governance 
Structure 
Federation  Layers of 
Government 
3 
Policy position Competitiveness, Interconnection  
Facilitation of 
regional policy 
approaches* 
Regionally driven – some state facilitation 
Central 
government role 
Australia is primarily focused on a paradigm of growth 
(Weyman & Martinez-Fernandez, 2012). Federal 
government supports community development and 
engagement, state governments have their own regional 
development initiatives. Interventions have been limited in 
scope and financial commitment (Collits, 2012). Most 
jurisdictions have adopted a ‘bottom up’, partnership, local 
context approach; with self-help for regions and 
communities; a focus on delivering services and managing 
change, as well as on regional leadership; and strategies 
based on developing regional competitiveness (Chesire, 
2006; Collits, 2002; OECD, 2010b).  
Recent policy 
developments 
A new ministry was created in 2013 responsible for 
regional development covering - infrastructure, regional 
development, local government, territories and disaster 
recovery (OECD, 2014). There are regional migration 
incentives and special Visa categories for international 
migrants. 
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1.2 Canada 
Canada Regional level depopulation 
Governance 
Structure 
Federation  Layers of 
Government 
3 
Policy position Competitiveness, Interconnection  
Facilitation of 
regional policy 
approaches* 
Federation facilitation 
Central 
government role 
Canada aims to reduce regional disparities and provide 
equal opportunities for every Canadian, founded on 
principles in their Constitution Act (OECD, 2010b). Focus 
is on an integrated approach to rural policy so that rural 
priorities are taken into consideration in the 
development of government policy, with an aim for 
policy coherence across ministries (OECD 2006).  There is 
a particular focus on innovation, skills development, 
economic diversification, productivity and business 
development (OECD, 2014). 
Six Federal regional development agencies (RDAs) 
support regional development policy in addition to the 
actions delegated to provinces/localities. Federal RDAs 
focus on supporting innovation, trade and investment, 
business development, and community/local economic 
development (OECD, 2014). Federal RDAs tend to focus 
on actions in rural and remote areas (OECD, 2010b). 
Recent policy 
developments 
The government supports the development of rural 
business. The Community Futures Program promotes 
bottom-up economic development in rural areas. 
The Western Innovation Initiative (WINN) provides 
incentives to get new technologies to the marketplace 
(OECD, 2014).  
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1.3 Germany 
Germany National level depopulation 
Governance 
Structure 
Federation  Layers of 
Government 
4 
Policy position Focusing, utilising, managing  
Facilitation of 
regional policy 
approaches* 
Regionally driven  
Central 
government role 
Germany has a constitutional commitment to regional 
balance (OECD, 2010b). The main regional policy 
instruments focus on improving conditions in weaker 
areas to allow economic development (Ferry & Vironen, 
2011). Germany developed a programme to address 
inadequacies in existing agricultural and other sectoral 
policy approaches. A number of small model areas were 
selected and local partnerships established to improve 
the focus of public policy for the region (OECD, 2006c). 
Although Germany is actively managing shrinkage with a 
particular focus on housing issues, the regions are 
responsible for mergers of local governments and most 
tasks are delegated to the regions (Wiechmann & 
Volkmann, 2012). There is a growing urban bias to 
Germany’s regional development policy and the 
country’s current approach is mainly sectoral (OECD, 
2007d). 
Recent policy 
developments 
There was a reduction in investment subsidies in 2013. 
Funding comes from the EU Structural Funds. There is a 
programme for the Improvement of Regional Economic 
Structure between the federal government and the 
regions (OECD, 2014).  
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1.4 Japan 
Japan National level depopulation 
Governance 
Structure 
Unitary  Layers of 
Government 
3 
Policy position Competitiveness, interconnection, utilising 
Facilitation of 
regional policy 
approaches* 
Mixed, national and local  
Central 
government role 
The central government has a strong role in Japan. There 
is a focus on revitalisation of regions through: 
competiveness, promotion of private investment, 
response to ageing communities, response to energy 
issues. The central government developed the National 
Spatial Strategies which outline grand designs at national 
level for next 10 years. Eight regional plans define 
designs for individual regions under the National Spatial 
Planning Act. Several laws govern specific types of 
regions and frameworks for development (OECD, 2014). 
The central government drove local government reforms 
and mergers (municipalities reduced from 3 232 in 1999 
to 1 718 in 2014) (OECD, 2014). 
Recent policy 
developments 
Some recent policy developments include: Future City 
initiative – sharing experiences from cities that have 
overcome key regional challenges. A Grand Design for 
National Spatial Policy was published in July 2014. A 
review of statutory national spatial plan is also to be 
launched (OECD, 2014). 
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1.5 Netherlands 
Netherlands Regional level depopulation 
Governance 
Structure 
Unitary  Layers of 
Government 
3 
Policy position Competitiveness, interconnection 
Facilitation of 
regional policy 
approaches* 
Regionally driven  
Central 
government role 
The objective of regional policy in the Netherlands is to 
stimulate economic growth in all regions (OECD, 2010b). 
The Netherlands has been pushing a decentralisation 
agenda and a number of functions have been shifted to 
the subnational government levels – spatial planning, 
regional development, traffic and transport, and 
environment (OECD 2014). National level policy “Top 
Sector” policy focuses on supporting sectors that 
achieved the most for the Netherlands economically and 
maximising these. The regions are responsible for 
strategies for regional development or shrinkage (OECD, 
2014). 
Recent policy 
developments 
The government released the National Policy Strategy 
for Infrastructure and Spatial Planning (SVIR) in 2012. 
This document outlines the national priorities by the 
central government. Governance structures are in the 
process of being reformed to reduce the number of 
provinces and municipalities as well as removal of other 
administrative bodies that exist between the provinces 
and local government (OECD 2014). 
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1.6 UK 
UK Regional level depopulation 
Governance 
Structure 
Unitary Layers of 
Government 
4 
Policy position Competitiveness 
Facilitation of 
regional policy 
approaches* 
The United Kingdom consists of four countries – England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and has a highly 
complex sub-national structure and policy approaches 
that differ significantly between countries.  In England, 
the objective is to balance growth promotion while 
reducing the gap between regions. Scotland focuses on 
reducing regional disparities, while Wales recognises the 
need to improve prosperity and quality of life for all sub-
regions (OECD, 2010b). 
Central 
government role 
In England there is an Integrated Regional Strategy. Some 
place-based policies are used but mostly top down. Large 
scale reorder of local agencies that deal with regional 
development. Some communities will be allowed greater 
planning scope at local level. Scotland has been actively 
countering depopulation and has a National Planning 
Framework. Wales has a Spatial Plan which adds in policy 
co-ordination at the regional level (OECD, 2010b). 
Recent policy 
developments 
Since 2010 the nine regional development agencies have 
been abolished in England and focus has been shifted to 
local enterprise partnerships instead that will be able to 
decide on local priorities for investment in infrastructure.  
No clear regional development policy framework since 
abolishment. A Technology Strategy Board was created in 
2013 to build innovation. 24 enterprise zones were 
created with tax incentives and simplified local planning 
regulations (OECD, 2014). 
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1.7 US 
US Regional level depopulation 
Governance 
Structure 
Federation  Layers of 
Government 
4 
Policy position Passive restructuring, adaptation, competitiveness  
Facilitation of 
regional policy 
approaches* 
Regionally or local level driven 
Central 
government role 
There is no overarching framework for regional policy. 
Federal policies may provide infrastructure or planning 
investment to areas that are experiencing economic 
decline (OECD, 2010b). There is a wide range of 
responses to depopulation in the US at the local level. 
For the most part there is passive restructuring or an 
expectation of adaption. Some areas are attempting to 
counter or actively accept with strategies that deal with 
reducing infrastructure or developing places that are 
attractive for ageing populations. 
Recent policy 
developments 
At the federal level there has been some attempt at 
greater coordination and integration of policies for 
regional development, with a general shift towards 
place-based policy. There has also been a greater focus 
on regional innovation clusters (OECD, 2014).  White 
House’s Neighbourhood Revitalisation Initiative – areas 
called promise zones – try to attract private investment, 
develop affordable housing and create jobs (OECD, 
2014). 
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Appendix 2 – Selected regional cross sector case studies 
2.1 Germany – Brandenburg Region 
Motivator: Countering and Accepting   
Context: The economy of Brandenburg was strongly affected by the German 
reunification. Berlin is the central agglomeration in Brandenburg, a peripheral 
former East German area. The former East German industrial economies could 
not compete with western industries and collapsed. Berlin does not contain a 
strong economic structure and therefore there is little spill over from the 
economic conditions in the city to the region itself. Brandenburg has focused 
particularly on policies to reduce population decline. 
Issues: 
 Structural depopulation and ageing 
Policy measures: 
Operational demographic policy check 
o A check against demographic indicators is used whenever investment 
decisions need to be made to make sure they are viable. 
Built environment 
o Financed by additional taxation, an integrated programme in response 
to the German reunification that deals with: vacant housing, private 
house improvement, inner city renewal, renewal of public space and 
derelict land. 
Economic and business  
o A turnaround from the decentralisation agenda to one of “strengthening 
of the strong” 
o Focus on a policy of “from outside to inside” – strengthening of the 
inner cities through retail trade. 
Education 
o Transforming schools – keeping schools open, reducing physical 
deterioration of the schools – the state as a directive role in this. 
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Welfare and care services 
o There is a policy shift away from the responsibility of health care for an 
ageing population focused on the health care sector to there being a 
general social responsibility and informal care. 
Outcomes: The policies have not slowed population decline, however they have 
improved visual effects and quality of life. The quality of the living environment 
has improved but there has been criticism that there has not been enough focus 
on improving general wellbeing. 
 
References: (Galjaard, et al., 2012) 
 
2.2  Netherlands – Sustainability of redevelopment plans 
Location: Municipalities of Heerlen, Kerkrade and Sittard-Gellen 
Motivator: Accepting – improving quality of life  
Context: These three municipalities are expected to shrink significantly over the 
next ten years. In expectation of this occurrence the three areas are developing 
plans to improve quality of life for their residents. 
Policy measures: 
Governance  
o Clustering services in multiple facility buildings – primary schools and 
daycare, healthcare facilities and supermarkets. 
Built environment - planning 
o Demolishing houses with fewer houses being rebuilt than demolished 
o Development of green space – pocket parks 
o Create a green corridor as a link between districts 
o Use shallow gully vacant spaces to create small lakes as a temporary 
water buffer or overflow 
o Separate rainwater from roofs and streets from the sewerage system so 
that this water can be used in the small lakes 
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o Demolish the lowest quality public housing and replace with insulated 
homes. 
o Pavements are being adjusted to cope with an anticipated influx of 
mobility scooters. 
Economic and business  
o Encourage existing businesses to hire the long term unemployed.  
o Create on job learning opportunities for young people so that they do 
not have to leave the location to receive their education. 
o Encourage retailers to locate in the central town areas not in the outer 
districts. 
Social 
o Involving the residents in the redevelopment plans 
o Local residents maintaining public space 
o Providing services for young people to meet  
o Transport – light rail stations 
o Transport – improve accessibility of the districts for cyclists 
 
Outcomes:  
The current situation and the three redevelopment plans were assessed with a 
sustainability performance measurement incorporating 24 aspects that cover the 
areas of planet, people and profit. These measures were compared to the 
performance of an ‘average’ reference district where no sustainable measures 
were undertaken. Preliminary conclusions from the sustainability assessment 
suggested that shrinking populations do not necessarily make districts more 
sustainable. Vacant green spaces are not necessarily a positive improvement. A 
positive outcome is the ability to demolish poor housing can physically improve 
the district. Creating a sustainable local environment in a shrinking area seems to 
be a more challenging and a different process than the same task in a growing 
area. Costs involved in the adopting various measures can also be a complication. 
 
References:  (Dreijerink, et al., 2012)  
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2.3  Scotland – Northeast Scotland 
Motivator: Counter and accepting 
Context: This is a peripheral area that was shrinking until the oil reserves were 
discovered in the North Sea. It has an industrial cluster that is centred on the oil 
industry but lacks in other agglomeration of industries that would support it long 
term if the oil industry suffered a setback. Due to the oil industry there has been 
strong international immigration. However, the region is aware that the 
population is ageing with future impacts on labour force. The region experienced 
a short period of population decline and this has been seen as a warning. 
Population policies are strongly focused on countering. 
Issues: 
 Decrease in school children 
 Services and facilities - i.e.  
 25 per cent drop in number of shops (1981-2008) 
 Increase in vacant buildings 
 Ageing communities 
Policy measures: 
Education provision 
o Law changes on school closures – reforming school closure decision 
making to allow for alternatives, effects on communities and transport. 
o The 3Rs project: Reorganize, Renovate and Rebuild – merging declining 
schools. 
Mixed use of schools: school buildings can be used as a library, police 
station and for social work. 
Welfare and care services 
o Older people’s Action Plan Aberdeen City: care services are customised 
to the needs of older people 
o Flexible care facility and mobile health points – to enable older people 
to live in their homes longer 
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Service provision 
o Fixed service model – services are provided from a central point 
o Mobile services 
o Internet based services 
o Telecare 
Built environment 
o Law changes to Housing Act to enable the government to designate 
homes to be demolished due to being unsafe.  
Economic and business  
o Aberdeenshire Local Development Plan – economic stimulation in rural 
areas through diversification  
Promotion 
o Welcome here immigration policies 
Outcomes: 
Population trends in North East Scotland were reversed in the 1990s by a 
combination of the industrial cluster development and strong immigration 
policies. This reversal is unlikely to have occurred without the oil sector boost. 
The education and older people strategies have had a positive effect on quality 
of life but the effect on population growth is unclear. In general the policies are 
aimed at quality rather than quantity. 
Reference: (Galjaard, et al., 2012). 
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Appendix 3 – Selected local level case studies 
3.1. Bioenergy village 
Location: Germany – Lower Saxony - Juhnde 
Strategy: Decentralization – technical infrastructure provision 
Motivator: Accepting 
Objective: To supply the village with electricity all year round.   
Population (2000)  1072 
Time frame 2004 
Policy measures: The village of Juhnde built a biogas plant fuelled by corn, crop 
silage, sunflowers and manure from local farmers to produce heat and electricity. 
An additional woodchip heat plant was installed to guarantee supply over winter. 
Citizens of the village pay to be part of the project and 70 per cent of the village 
(140 households) have joined. The residue is able to be used again as fertilizer. A 
cooperative was formed to run the plant and is funded by membership 
contributions and profit from selling the energy. 
Funding sources: The project had strong support from outside of the village. 
Expertise came from the Interdisciplinary Centre for Sustainable Development 
(University of Gottingen) which initiated the project and was part of the process. 
Funding was sourced from the Agency of Renewable Resources which receives 
funds from the federal government, from the federal state Niedersachsen, the 
local government of Gottingen and from the EU LEADER+ rural development 
programme.  
Actors: Community leaders, civic society, business community, national level 
input 
Outcomes: Social benefits – building trust and partnerships among community 
leaders. This enables the community to act quickly if new opportunities arise. 
The full range of challenges are being met. 
References: (Dremel, 2013) 
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3.2 Downtown revitalization 
Location: US – North Carolina - Ayden 
Strategy: Downtown revitalization 
Motivator: Countering 
Objective: to create a welcoming place for businesses to prosper and for local 
residents to shop and spend time.    
Context: Ayden’s downtown business community was adversely affected by a 
highway construction project that diverted traffic away from the Main Street. 
Several revitalization projects had previously failed.  
Population (2000)  4,620 
Poverty rate (2000) 26%  
Minority population (2000) 52%  
Proximity to urban center 150km to Raleigh, N.C. 
Proximity to interstate highway 90km 
Time frame 2005-2007 
 
Policy measures: Ayden applied to the North Carolina Main Street Program, an 
off shoot of the National Main Street Program which provides strategy and 
market analysis to enable rural communities to revitalize. Ayden was selected 
and received three years of technical assistance and guidance to develop a 
revitalisation programme, as well as small business assistance and leadership 
training.  
Three groups were formed: design, economic restructuring and promotions, 
peopled by officials, residents and business owners. 
Funding sources: “The National Main Street Program, developed by the National 
Main Street Center of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, includes a 
four-point approach to downtown revitalization based on a comprehensive 
strategy of work, tailored to meet local needs and opportunities. For more 
information, see www.mainstreet.org. The North Carolina Small Town Main 
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Street Program (STMSP), an offshoot of the Main Street program, provides 
market analysis to rural communities and gives small businesses the resources to 
evaluate their market opportunities. 
Grants were provided for updating facades. The planning department also 
offered free design consultations for façade improvements.  There was strong 
uptake of this initiative. 
Actors: Community leaders, civic society, business community, national level 
input 
Outcomes: Downtown revitalization was achieved but only through tapping into 
higher level programmes for support. The success was not large scale but did 
enable the growth of existing small business and conditions for further growth. 
There were also social benefits, such as, building trust and partnerships among 
community leaders. This enables the community to act quickly if new 
opportunities arise.  
 
References: (Lambe, 2008)  
 
3.3  Japan – Ryori Port Rehabilitation Project 
Location: Ryori, Sanriku region, Ofunato Prefecture   
Motivator: Countering – speed 
Policy sectors: Economic and business, social 
Context: Ryori was a fishing community that was severely impacted by the Great 
East Japan Earthquake and tsunami of 2011. A cooperative oversees all fishing 
activities and a factory for processing fish products. Only 206 ships survived from 
a fishing fleet of 610.The tsunami severely damaged the fish processing factory 
meaning that even though fishing has restarted the product must be sent to 
other fishing cooperatives for processing thereby losing economic margin. Over 
half of the population is over the age of fifty. The cooperative has 453 members, 
with each member representing a family or group of fishermen. Only 300 are 
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active fishing participants, the rest being widows or retirees. As these people 
receive financial assistance and profits from the cooperative, the cooperative is 
crucial for the economic and social welfare of older members. 
Policy measures: Revitalizing the fishing industry, rebuilding the factory. 
 
Objectives: To quickly rebuild the fishing fleet and fish processing plant. Any 
delay is likely to worsen the age structure of the population as the younger 
residents leave for more economic opportunities. 
Actors: Central Government, Kizuna Foundation - charitable funds through 
grants and donations, a non-profit organization that was created in response to 
the needs of survivors of the Japanese tsunami 2011. 
Funding: Local and Central Government and the Kizuna Foundation. The 
government has subsidized the ships. Local and central government have 
provided a subsidy for equipment needs up to 90 per cent of the cost. The Kizuna 
Foundation has received approval from the Japanese government for a subsidy 
of 90 per cent to rebuild the factory and is also working on grants for the last 10 
per cent. 
 
Outcomes:  The fishing fleet is now back to 500 ships. The rehabilitation of the 
fishing factory serves as a symbol of recovery for the region. 
 
References: (Kizuna Foundation, 2012) 
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Ishinomaki, Miyagi Prefecture – what happens when intervention isn’t fast 
enough 
Towns and cities in the prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima lost more 
than 72,000 through death or abandonment of their homes. Around 65 per cent 
of the population that left the area was under the age of 30.  
The tsunami destroyed much of Ishinomaki. The rebuild has not been completed 
fast enough to maintain the rest of the population. Over 10,000 people were 
either killed or left from the town of Ishinomaki.  There is a mismatch of jobs to 
job seekers. There are currently 168 employment positions for every 100 people 
seeking word in the town.  
A fish factory was rebuilt and opened in 2013. Demand for the Kinoya company’s 
product is high, however, there are significant challenges for operation of the 
factory.  Kinoya is struggling to attract young workers. Even before the disaster 
young people didn’t want to work in the labour intensive industry. Most of the 
employees are in their 50s and 60s.  
Reference: (Kizuna Foundation, 2013)  
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3.4 Canada – Immigration policies 
Location: Morden, Manitoba Province, Canada 
Motivator: Countering 
Policy sectors: Governance, Promotion, Economic and business    
Context: Canada has a low fertility rate and is ageing. At the same time the 
economy is doing well and there is a shortage of skilled workers. The Canadian 
federal government now shares jurisdiction over the selected of immigrants with 
its 10 provinces and three territories. Most provinces run their own ‘Provincial 
Nominee Programmes.’ Different provinces have different workforce 
requirements which they are struggling to fill. People wanting to move to Canada 
must make an application through the Provincial Nominee Programme (PNP).  
The province of Manitoba has its own Provincial Nominee Program (MPNP). The 
MPNP travels overseas to recruit possible candidates for the ‘invitation’ stream 
for their programme.  
The small town of Morden is going one step further and runs a successful active 
recruitment campaign through their own community driven immigration 
initiative to fill gaps in their job market. Living costs in the town are among the 
lowest in Canada. Canadian cities are experiencing rising costs of living that is 
outstripping the rate of inflation leading to a potential shift away from 
immigrants seeking to live in the cities. 
Morden 
Population 9,000 
Nearest major city Winnipeg – 112km 
Unemployment rate 3.1% 
 
Policy measures: The campaign taps into the Manitoba Provincial Nominee 
Programme, however Morden identifies potential residents before they make 
their PNP application. The community consults with local employers and then 
promotes candidates for immigration through the PNP. The community only 
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accepts applications from candidates that fall into the target occupations and the 
candidate must make a visit to the area to have an interview, make local 
contracts and seek employment. 
Actors: Collaboration between local residents, employers, local government, 
developers. 
Funding sources: Manitoba Provincial Nominee Programme 
Timeframe: Started in 2012 
Outcomes: There has been a high retention rate for immigrants.  The community 
is backing the programme - with employer support, developers considering 
building dwellings to house immigrants and locals welcoming newcomers. A 
recent survey found that 85 per cent of Manitoba provincial nominees were 
working three months after arrival with many employed within one or two weeks. 
 
References: (CanadaVisa.com, 2015; CIC News, 2014; City of Morden, 2015) (City 
of Morden, 2015) 
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Appendix 4 – Policy variables for the World Population Policies 2013 
Variable 
name 
Variable definition Response 
categories 
Policy on 
growth 
Indicates Government’s stated policy to 
influence the rate of population growth in 
the country. 
Too low  
Satisfactory  
Too high 
Level of 
concern 
about ageing 
of the 
population 
Indicates Government’s level of concern 
about the growing size or the proportion of 
older persons in the population and its 
consequences for health and social welfare 
provisions. In cases where the current 
proportion of older persons is relatively 
small, Government’s concerns about the 
challenges that a growing older population 
will pose in the future are included. 
Major concern 
Minor concern  
Not a concern 
Measures to 
address 
population 
ageing 
Indicates whether the Government has 
adopted specific measures in the last five 
years to address population ageing in the 
country. 
1. Change in 
statutory 
retirement age  
2. Reform in the 
pension system 
Neither 
View on 
spatial 
distribution 
Indicates whether the Government 
considers the spatial distribution of 
population within the country to be 
satisfactory or whether it desires a change. 
Major change 
desired  
Minor change 
desired 
Satisfactory 
Policy on 
migration 
from rural to 
urban areas 
Indicates Government’s policy to influence 
the flow of migration from rural to urban 
areas within the country. Migration from 
rural to urban areas is not applicable in 
countries with 100 per cent urban 
Raise  
Maintain Lower  
No intervention 
Not applicable 
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population. 
Policy on 
immigration 
Indicates Government’s policy to influence 
the level of documented immigration into 
the country. 
Raise Maintain 
Lower  
No intervention 
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Appendix 5 – Fertility 
One of the key demographic trends causing depopulation is the reduction in 
fertility. As can be seen from Figure 27, although the less developed regions and 
least developed countries have higher fertility rates than the more developed 
regions, they have also experienced a significant reduction in the average 
number of children per woman over the period 1950 to 2010. Figure 27 shows 
that the More Developed Regions crossed this threshold as a group in the late 
1970s. However, there remains wide disparity between countries in this group, 
with the USA and New Zealand maintaining a higher total fertility rate. 
Figure 27: Estimate of Total Fertility Rates for selected regions 1950-2015 
Source: UN Population Division: World Population Prospects 2015 Revision  
 
Figure 28 shows Total Fertility estimates from selected MDC countries, revealing 
that New Zealand’s TFR hovers around the replacement level. Although some of 
the countries experienced recent short term escalations in TFR (Sweden and 
Japan) none of the other countries in this group have maintained a rise in the 
TFR for an extended period, or reached above the replacement level since the 
1980s.  
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Figure 28: Selected Most Developed Countries (MDC) – TFR estimates 1950-2010 
Source: UN Population Division: World Population Prospects 2012 Revision - Spreadsheets 
 
Ultra low fertility is now prevalent in Pacific Asia (Jones, et al., 2009) (See Figure 
29). South Mediterranean countries are also experiencing significant entrenched 
ultra-low fertility (See Figure 30).  
Figure 29: Estimated TFR 1950 – 2010 Ultra low fertility – Asian Countries 
 
Source: UN Population Division: World Population Prospects 2012 Revision – Spreadsheets 
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Figure 30: Estimated TFR 1950-2010 Low fertility – Selected Southern European Countries 
 
Source: UN Population Division: World Population Prospects 2012 Revision - Spreadsheets 
 
There are some views that once fertility drops to these levels it is impossible to 
increase it except by a few points (Jones, et al., 2009). The reason is the drivers 
behind these significant drops in TFR. According to Clark (2004) “declining 
marriage rates, increased cohabitation without children, increasing labour force 
participation by women and the increasing costs of having and educating 
children will tend to keep fertility low” (p. 48).   
McDonald (2001), states that there are four main theoretical arguments for low 
fertility – rational choice or demand theory; risk aversion; post materialist values; 
and gender equity theory. 
Rational choice or demand theory presupposes that people make rational 
choices about the relative costs and benefits of having a child. If there is greater 
benefit in having the child then fertility will increase and therefore the opposite 
can also be assumed; if fertility declines the relative cost of having a child has 
increased (Becker 1981, in McDonald).  Aligned with this theory is the 
assumption that as economic pressures bear on potential families, couples delay 
childbearing (Longman, 2004).  
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The theory of risk and opportunity adds to demand theory in that in people 
refrain from having children if there is a perception that their future is uncertain. 
Risk aversion may be in reaction to uncertainties in a wide range of spheres, such 
as relationships, work, housing, and family support.  
Post-materialist values theory looks at the changing value structures of society 
and stipulates that the rise of individualism and liberalism with the 
accompanying break down of religious values changes previous assumptions 
about the need to have children (McDonald, 2001). This theory essentially holds 
that having children is just one option in a world of many preferences. 
Gender equity theory expostulates that women will restrict the number of 
children they have if they are given near equivalent opportunities as men in 
education and employment. Even though gender equity has advanced in many 
industrialised countries the male breadwinner model is still prevalent. It has 
been observed that there is lower fertility amongst more traditional countries, 
such as found in Southern Europe, that lack institutional arrangements for 
childcare support (McDonald, 2001). In these countries the opportunity cost of 
having a child would be higher for women than in their counterpart less 
traditional societies. The opportunity cost for women to leave the workforce to 
produce children also increases with the length of time spent in the workforce, 
the seniority attained and incremental rise in salary or wages (Wattenberg, 
2004). 
Regardless of the reasons for low fertility, postponement of childbearing is a 
characteristic of low-fertility countries, with the mean age of mothers rising 
significantly in many such countries. The postponement of childbearing to older 
ages is also having an adverse effect on perinatal and maternal outcomes, such 
as infertility, birth defects and premature delivery (United Nations, 2014). These 
factors will contribute to the sustaining of low fertility. 
Many countries are concerned that these fertility patterns will have significant 
social and economic consequences (United Nations, 2014). According to Pearce 
(2010), once this trend has been established is very hard to turn it around and it 
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will have profound implications for the developed nations: “Girls that are never 
born cannot have babies” (Pearce, 2010, pp. 247-248). 
Extended low fertility will have ramifications for businesses, families, economies, 
and politics, to name a few. If the conditions that have caused fertility to drop 
over the last 50 years continue then it is unlikely that the total fertility rate will 
suddenly increase. 
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Appendix 6 – Ageing and longevity 
Population ageing is unprecedented in world history as this new phenomenon 
that has not been experienced before.  As such, it has profound implications for 
all aspects of human life and will affect most societies to some degree (United 
Nations Population Division, 2002).  
In 2011 Japan, Italy and Germany had the oldest populations in the World 
(Bloom, et al., 2011). Figure 31 shows the six oldest countries in the World. By 
2013 all these countries had more than 19 per cent of their populations over the 
age of 65. 
Figure 31: Countries with the oldest populations in the World 1960 - 2013 
Source: World Bank (2015) indicator database 
Population ageing impacts on a wide range of sectors, such as; the proportion of 
the population in the workforce which affects both tax revenues but also labour 
shortages; demand for and funding of old age pensions; healthcare demand and 
services for old age support; and the reduction in education facilities as there are 
less children (Bloom, et al., 2011; United Nations, 2010).   
The pace of population ageing is also an important consideration for socio-
economic conditions, as these conditions may be amplified by the speed of 
ageing. Rapid changes in structural ageing can make it difficult for governments 
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and institutions to adjust to changes that need to be made (United Nations, 
2010). Lutz, et al. (2008) states that the speed of ageing is likely to increase over 
the coming decades but to decelerate again after mid-century, after the ‘baby 
boomers’ have passed through old age. 
